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RÉSUMÉ 
Considérons le problème qui consiste à maximiser les profits issus de la tarification 
d'un sous-ensemble d'arcs d'un réseau de transport, où les flots origine-destination 
(produits) sont affectés aux plus courts chemins par rapport aux tarifs et aux coûts 
initiaux. Cette thèse porte sur une structure de réseau particulière du problème ci-
dessus, dans laquelle tous les arcs tarifables sont connectés et forment un chemin, 
comme c'est le cas sur une autoroute. Étant donné que les tarifs sont habituellement 
déterminés selon les points d'entrée et de sortie sur l'autoroute, nous considérons 
un sous-graphe tarifable complet, où chaque arc correspond en réalité à un sous-
chemin. Deux variantes de ce problème sont étudiées, avec ou sans contraintes 
spécifiques reliant les niveaux de tarifs sur les arcs. 
Ce problème peut être modélisé comme un programme linéaire mixte entier. 
Nous prouvons qu'il est Np-difficile. Plusieurs familles d'inégalités valides sont 
ensuite proposées, celles-ci renforçant certaines contraintes du modèle initial. Leur 
efficacité est d'abord démontrée de manière théorique, puisqu'il s'agit de facettes 
des problèmes restreints à un ou deux produits. Certaines des inégalités valides 
proposées, ainsi que plusieurs contraintes du modèle initial, permettent aussi de 
donner une description complète de l'enveloppe convexe des solutions réalisables 
d'un problème restreint à un seul produit. Des tests numériques ont également 
été menés, et mettent en évidence l'efficacité réelle des inégalités valides pour le 
problème général à plusieurs produits. Enfin, nous soulignons les liens entre le 
problème de tarification de réseau étudié dans cette thèse et un problème plus 
classique de tarification de produits en gestion. 
Mots clés: Tarification de réseaux, programmation mixte entière, op-
timisation combinatoire. 
ABSTRACT 
Consider the problem of maximizing the revenue generated by tolls set on a subset 
of arcs of a transportation network, where origin-destination flows (commodi ties) 
are assigned to shortest paths with respect to the sum of tolls and initial costs. 
This thesis is concerned with a particular case of the above problem, in which all 
toll arcs are connected and constitute a path, as occurs on highways. Further, as 
tollieveis are usually computed using the highway entry and exit points, a complete 
toll subgraph is considered, where each toll arc corresponds to atoll subpath. Two 
variants of the problem are studied, with or without specifie constraints linking 
together the tolls on the arcs. 
The problem is modelled as a linear mixed integer program, and proved to be 
NP-hard. Next, several classes of valid inequalities are proposed, which strengthen 
important constraints of the initial model. Their efficiency is first shown theoreti-
cally, as these are facet defining for the restricted one and two commodity problems. 
Also, we prove that sorne of the valid inequalities proposed, together with sever al 
constraints of the linear program, provide a complete description of the convex hull 
of feasible solutions for a single commodity problem. Numerical tests have also 
been conducted, and highlight the practical efficiency of the valid inequalities for 
the multi-commodity case. Finally, we point out the links between the problem 
studied in the thesis and a more classical design and pricing problem in economics. 
Keywords: Network pricing, mixed-integer programming, combina-
torial optimization. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
ln a current context of deregulation, companies need to apply a good tarification to 
their products or services. Indeed, overcapacity, increased competition and higher 
costs have strengthened price competition in many industries. Rowever, pricing is 
one of the most complex decisions facing any company. 
First, customers play an important part in a price decision, because they react 
to prices by purchasing - or not - the products. They are looking for good products 
at lowest priees. But the reaction of competitors is also important. Indeed, as they 
influence cu st omer choice, they impose practicallimitations on pricing alternatives. 
Rence, companies have to find the best possible prices, low enough so that a large 
number of customers buy their products, and at the same time high enough to 
generate large revenues. 
Focusing on the operational research literature, sever al classes of pricing prob-
lems have been considered. These can differ in the objective functions, as weIl as 
in the category of products or services considered. The main objective functions 
deal with the maximization of revenues, social welfare, or a combination of both 
criteria. In what concerns the category of products or services considered, apart 
from papers that address the problem of pricing a generic product, other categories 
of products are, for example, financial assets or transportation routes. 
We deal with a particular case of a pricing problem that involves a transporta-
tion network. Let us define a transportation network as a set of nodes (cities) and 
a set of arcs (routes) linking sorne of these nodes together. Further, a fixed cost is 
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assigned to each arc of the network. Now consider two classes of economic agents. 
The first, a manager, owns a subset of arcs of the network on which hejshe imposes 
toUs so as to maximize revenues. The second category of agents are network users, 
which travel from one node to another of the network while minimizing their costs. 
The Network Pricing Problem consists of devising the toUlevels that should be 
imposed by the manager on the subset of toU arcs such as to maximize its revenues. 
Then, reacting to the toUs, the network users travel on short est paths from their 
origins to their respective destinations, with respect to a cost equal to the sum of 
toUs and initial costs. 
This thesis is concerned with a particular case of the above problem in which 
aU toU arcs are connected and constitute a path, as occurs on highways. As toU 
levels are usuaUy computed using the highway entry and exit nodes, a complete 
toU subgraph is considered, where each toU arc corresponds to a toU subpath. Two 
variants of the problem are studied, with or without specific constraints linking 
together the toUs on the arcs. 
As the manager and the users seek to maximize revenues and to minimize costs 
respectively, the problem belongs to a class of hierarchical, sequential and non co-
operative optimization programs. As in the Stackelberg version of the duopolistic 
equilibrium (see Stackelberg [63]), a leader (the manager) integrates in its opti-
mization process the reaction of a foUower (the network users) to its own decisions. 
More specificaUy, it is a bilevel problem, i.e., a hierarchical optimization problem 
involving two levels of decision. 
This class of problems has many applications: hierarchical structures can be 
found in the field of transportation (network design, airline revenue management, 
transportation of hazardous materials, ... ), management (location of schools, aUot-
ment of funds, ... ), and planning (agricultural, electrical or environmental policies, 
... ). 
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As we will see later, the problem considered in the thesis is very generic. Bence 
the purpose of this study is to better understand the very heart of a network pric-
ing structure, and to develop tools that could be transposed to more realistic or 
complex problems. More precisely, the thesis provides a first study of the polyhe-
dral structure of a Network Pricing Problem. Bence models, valid inequalities and 
proofs of facets are the core of our research. 
The thesis is organized as follows. In Chapter 2, we present the Network Pric-
ing Problem. As it can be modelled as a bilinear/bilinear bilevel program, we first 
formulate a bilevel program. Then the Network Pricing Problem is introduced. We 
summarize the main contributions to this topic from the literature. 
The particular Network Pricing Problem addressed in the thesis, whose network 
structure can represent features specifie to a real highway network, is presented in 
Chapter 3. Mathematically, it is formulated as a linear mixed integer program with 
a single level. Then we prove that this problem is NP-hard using a reduction from 
3 - SAT. 
In Chapter 4, we propose valid inequalities for the problem. These exploit the 
underlying network structure and strengthen important constraints of the model. 
Next, we explore the strength and efficiency of the valid inequalities. 
Chapter 5 provides proofs that the valid inequalities, as well as sever al con-
straints of the initial model, are facet defining for the convex hull of feasible so-
lutions for a restricted problem involving two origin-destination pairs. AIso, we 
prove that sorne of the valid inequalities proposed, together with other constraints 
of the linear program, provide a complete description of the convex hull of feasible 
solutions for a single commodity problem. 
The practical efficiency of the valid inequalities is then confirmed in Chapter 
6 by numerical results. Most of the valid inequalities proposed are very efficient, 
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at least to decrease the gap or number of nodes in the branch and eut algorithm. 
They also allow to decrease the computing time for one variant of the problem. 
Finally, the aim of Chapter 7 is to link the specifie problems studied in the the-
sis with a more standard design and pricing problem in economics. A description 
of these problems, together with an overview of the main contributions from the 
literature, are provided. Then we point out the strong relationships between both 
families of problems. 
CHAPTER 2 
THE NETWORK PRICING PROBLEM 
The aim of this chapter is to present the Network Pricing Problem. As its initial 
formulation is a bilinear /bilinear bilevel program, we first give an introduction 
to bilevel programming. Next, we focus on (bi)linear/(bi)linear bilevel problems, 
i.e., problems in which both constraints and objective function are (bi)linear. We 
also present a more precise bilinear/bilinear bilevel pricing problem. The Network 
Pricing Problem is next introduced. First modelled as a bilinear /bilinear bilevel 
program, we show that it can be reformulated as a single levellinear mixed integer 
model. Then we summarize the main contributions on this topic in the literature. 
2.1 Bilevel programming 
Consider a sequential game with two players, where a leader plays first, taking 
into account the possible reactions of the second player, called the follower. If 
vectors x and y denote the leader and follower decision variables respectively, this 
situation can be described mathematically by a bilevel program1 : 
(BP) min F(x, y) 
x,y 
s.t. G(x, y) ::; 0, 
y E argmin f(x, y) 
y 
s.t. g(x, y) ::; o. 
lSlightly abusing notation, we use y for denoting both the optimal solution and the argument 
of the lower level problem. 
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The mathematical bilevel formulation first appears in 1973, in a document by 
Bracken and McGill (1973, [8]). These authors publish several articles (1973, [8]; 
1974, [9]; 1978, [10]) dealing with military, production and marketing applications. 
The bilevel and multilevel terms come from Candler and Norton (1977, [13]), who 
do not consider upper level constraints involving both x and y variables in their 
models. The more general formulation, involving a constraint of type G(x, y) ::; 0 
at the upper level, appears for the first time in an article by Shimizu and Aiyoshi 
(1981, [59]). 
Also, formulation (BP) ensures that, if there are multiple optimal solutions for 
the lower level problem, the leader most profitable solution is selected. This is an 
optimistic approach, by opposition to a pessimistic approach. In the latter, 
the leader chooses the solution which protects himself against the follower worst 
possible reaction. Such situations have been studied by Loridan and Morgan (1989, 
[45, 46]) or Ishizuka and Aiyoshi (1992, [36]). 
Note that the bilevel problems described here are very close to mathematical 
problems with equilibrium constraints (MPECS). In the latter, the lower level rep-
resents an equilibrium problem, often described by a variational inequality. The 
interested reader could refer to books by Shimizu et al. (1997, [60]), Outrata et al. 
(1998, [56]) or Luo et al. (1996, [47]). 
Generically non differentiable and non convex, bilevel problems are, by nature, 
hard. Even the linear bilevel problem, where the objective functions and the con-
straints are linear, has shown to be NP-hard by Jeroslow (1985, [37]). Hansen et 
al. (1992, [34]) prove strong NP-hardness. Vicente et al. (1994, [68]) strengthen 
these results and prove that merely checking strict or local optimality is strongly 
NP-hard. 
Several authors have presented optimality conditions for bilevel problems. Among 
these ones, let us name Chen and Florian (1991, [15]), Dempe (1992, [21]) or Tuy 
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et al. (1993, [64]) who use non linear analysis techniques, as weIl as Savard and 
Gauvin (1994, [58]) or Vicente and Calamai (1995, [67]) who take into account the 
geometry of the induced region. Liu et al. (1994, [44]) describe geometric features 
of solutions. Unfortunately, because of the difficulty of handling the mathematical 
objects involved in aIl these optimality conditions, they are quite useless in practice 
and do not provide any sufficient stopping criterion for numerical algorithms. 
Let us now briefly summarize the algorithmic contributions to bilevel program-
ming in the literature. Note that most algorithmic research has focused on problems 
involving linear, quadratic or convex constraints and/or objective function. In aIl 
these classes of problems, the lower level problem admits extremal solutions, which 
allows the development of methods with a guarantee of global optimality. In con-
trast, research on nonlinear bilevel problems has mainly focused on algorithms with 
a guarantee of local optimality. 
One of the first method that has been proposed is based on vertex enumeration. 
It has been used by Candler and Townsley (1982, [14]), Bialas and Karwan (1984, 
[6]) or Tuy et al. (1993, [64]) to solve linear bilevel programs. 
Next, when the lower level is convex and regular, it can be replaced by its 
Karush-Kuhn-Tucker conditions. The bilevel problem is then reformulated as a sin-
gle level problem, which contains the primaI-dual constraints and complementarity 
conditions. However, the single level problem stays very difficult to solve, mainly 
due to the complementarity constraints. Several algorithms based on branch and 
bound on these constraints have been proposed to solve different classes of bilevel 
programs, among which linear (Bard and Falk (1982, [30]), Fortuny-Amat and Mc-
Carl (1981, [29])), linear-quadratic (Bard and Moore (1990, [5])) and quadratic 
(AI-Khayal et al. (1992, [3]), Edmunds and Bard (1991, [27])). Combining branch 
and bound, monotonicity principles and penalties as in mixed integer program-
ming, Hansen et al. (1992, [34]) have been able to solve linear bilevel medium size 
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instances. 
Descent methods have also been used to solve bilevel programs. These methods 
assume that the lower level problem has a unique optimal solution for any x, and 
consider y as an implicit function y(x) of x, hence obtaining upper level descent 
directions. Such algorithms have been proposed by Savard and Gauvin (1994, [58]) 
or Vicente et al. (1994, [68]). 
Further, penalty function methods have also been proposed to solve bilevel pro-
grams. Aiyoshi and Shimizu (1981, [59]; 1984, [1]) replace the lower level problem 
by a penalized problem. Ishizuka and Aiyoshi (1992, [36]) use a double penalty 
method in which both objective functions are penalized, the lower level penalized 
problem being replaced by its stationarity condition. 
Finally, trust region methods have also been used for solving nonsmooth bilevel 
programs (see Kocvara and Outrata (1997, [38]), Fukushima and Pang (1999, [4]), 
Marcotte et al. (2001, [50]) or Coison et al. (2005, [17])). 
Motivated by Stackelberg game theory, several authors have studied bilevel 
programming. For a more complete bibliography about bilevel or multilevel pro-
gramming, the interested readers could refer to Vicente and Calamai (.1994, [66]), 
Migdalas et al. (1997, [53]) or, for more recent references, to Dempe (2002, [20]), 
Marcotte and Savard (2005, [49]) or Coison et al. (2007, [18]). 
2.2 (Bi)linear bilevel programming 
As global optimality algorithms are restricted to subclasses of problems involv-
ing specifie mathematical properties, we focus on bilevel programs with linear or 
bilinear objectives. The linear /linear bilevel problem takes the form: 
(LBP) maxclx + dly 
x,y 
x2:0 
y E arg max d2y 
y 
y 2: 0, 
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The constraints AIX + ElY::; bl (resp. A 2x + E 2y ::; b2 ) are the upper (resp. 
lower) level constraints. The linear term CIX + dly (resp. d2y) is the upper 
(resp. lower) level objective function, while X (resp. y) is the vector of upper 
(resp. lower) level variables. 
In order to characterize the solution of such a problem, the following definitions 
are required. 
Definition 1 The set of feasible solutions for (LBP) is defined as: 
Definition 2 For every x 2: 0, the lower level feasible set is: 
O(x) = {y: Y 2: 0,E2y::; b2 - A2x}. 
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Definition 3 The trace of the lower level problem with respect to the upper level 
variables is: 
D2 = {x: x ~ O,D(x) -1- 0}. 
Definition 4 For a given vector x E D;, the lower level optimal set is: 
S(x) = {y : y E argmax{d2y : y E D(x)}}. 
Definition 5 The induced region is defined as the set of feasible solutions for the 
upper level problem, i. e., 
These definitions highlight the polyhedral nature of the induced region and 
allow to characterize the set of optimal solutions for (LBP). 
Definition 6, A point (x*, y*) is optimal for (LBP) if: 
• (x*, y*) Er; 
Renee, a direct consequence of the polyhedral nature of the induced region r is 
that, if (LBP) has a solution, an optimal solution is attained at an extreme point 
of D. 
Although much attention has been paid to linear jlinear bilevel programming, 
it appears that bilinear /bilinear bilevel programs better fit real life situations. In-
deed, this allows to model interactions between the leader and the follower in the 
objective function. An interesting class of bilinearjbilinear bilevel problems is the 
class of pricing problems where a firm (leader) imposes taxes on activities while 
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consumers (follower) choose minimal cost activities. 
Consider a vector of activities (Xl, X2), a firm and a set of consumers. At the 
upper level, we assume that the firm seeks to maximize its revenues by imposing 
taxes on the activities corresponding to vector Xl' At the lower level, consumers 
react to the taxes by choosing minimal cost activities. Let (c, d) be the vector of 
initial priees for (Xl, X2), and t be a tax vector linked with the activity vector Xl. 
Note that this model can coyer various situations. lndeed, the tax vector t can 
represent taxes as well as subsidies. AIso, Xl and X2 vectors can be consumption 
as weIl as production levels. One obtains the bilinear jbilinear bilevel pricing 
model: 
(BPP) 
s.t. (XI,X2) E argmin(c+ t)XI + dX2 
Xl,X2 
s.t. AXI + BX2 = b 
We assume that the polyhedron {(XI,X2) : AXI + BX2 = b,XI,X2 ~ O} is 
bounded and non empty, while {X2 : BX2 = b, X2 ~ O} is non empty. Renee the 
lower level problem has a finite optimal solution for every value of the tax vector 
t. These conditions also ensure that the objective function of (BPP) is finite. 
Note that, for a given lower level vector (XI,X2), (BPP) reduees to an inverse 
optimization problem where one must select a tax vector t such that (i) (Xl, X2) 
is optimal with respect to this tax vector and (ii) the revenue tXl is maximal. 
From the leader's perspective, the objective function tXl is piecewise linear and 
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discontinuous at points t that induce a change of optimal basis in the lower level 
problem. We illustrate the evolution of the objective function tXI with respect to 
the tax t in Figure 2.1, where (xL X2) is the optimal solution of the lower level 
problem corresponding to a tax t with values between t i and t i + 1 . 
Figure 2.1: Evolution of the objective function tXI with respect to tax t 
An optimal pricing policy consists in setting t high enough to generate large 
revenues for the leader but, at the same time, low enough to promote the use of 
taxed activities corresponding to Xl by consumers. 
The Network Pricing Problem is a particular case of a bilinearjbilinear pricing 
problem, which involves a transportation network and considers the arcs of the 
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network as activities. We present this problem in the next section. 
2.3 The Network Pricing Problem 
Let us define a transportation network as a set of nodes (cities) and a set of 
arcs (routes) linking sorne of these nodes together. At the upper and lower level, 
consider an authority and a set of network users respectively. We also define a 
commodity as a set of network users travelling from the same origin to the same 
destination. 
In addition to a fixed cost associated with every arc, toUs are imposed by the 
authority on a specified subset of arcs of the network. Renee the Network Pricing 
Problem consists of devising toUlevels on the specified subset of toU arcs in order 
to maximize the authority's revenues. Then, reacting to the toUs, each commodity 
travels on the shortest path from its origin to its destination, with respect to a cost 
equal to the sum of toUs and initial costs. 
Let us now introduee additional assumptions. First, in order to avoid trivial 
solutions leading to infinite revenues for the authority, we assume that there exists 
a toU free path for each commodity. Further, we restrict our study to non negative 
toU vectors. 
Rowever, note that there exist models (see Labbé et al. (1998, [43]), Cirinei 
(2007, [16]) or Brotcorne et al. (2001, [12])) which also aUow negative toUs. The 
latter yield compensations with other (positive) toUs, when the corresponding arcs 
are used by multiple commodities. Even if such situations will not be considered 
in the thesis, the reader should know that there exist more realistic (but also more 
complex) models, which consider congestion effects (see for example Fortin (2005, 
[28])) and/or a non uniform distribution of the fixed cost perception in a population 
(see for example Marcotte et al. (2007, [51])). 
14 
The small network example depicted in Figure 2.2 illustrates the Network Pric-
ing Problem. Assume that a commodity composed by a single user travels from 
node 1 to no de 5, the bolded arcs (2,3) and (4,5) being the toU arcs. 
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Figure 2.2: Network example 
If we look closely at that network, we conclude that the user will never pay 
more that 22, which is the cost of the toll free path 1 ---> 3 ---> 5. In contrast, if the 
authority sets all tolls to zero, the user will choose the path 1 ---> 2 ---> 3 ---> 4 ---> 5 
with cost 6. It means that an upper bound on the authority revenues is 22 - 6 = 16. 
However, this bound is not always reached, as in the example. Whatever the 
tolls imposed by the manager, its revenue will never exceed 15. Indeed, the toll 
arc (2,3) can only be selected by the network user if the toll on this arc is less or 
equal to 5, because of the arc (2,4) ((2 + x) + 2 :S 9). In the same manner, the toll 
arc (4,5) can only be used if the corresponding toll does not exceed 10, because of 
the arc (3,5) (2 + x :S 12). An optimal solution for this example consists in setting 
tolls of 5 on the arc (2,3) and 10 on the arc (3,5). 
The bilinear/bilinear bilevel Network Pricing Problem was first introduced by 
Labbé et al. (1998, [43]). Consider a multi-commodity network defined by anode 
set N, an arc set A u B and a set of origin-destination pairs {(ok, dk) : k E Je}, 
called commodities, each one endowed with a demand T/k. Let A be a subset of 
arcs a upon which tolls ta can be added to the original fixed cost vector c and 
B the complementary subset of toll free arcs, for which the cost vector c is also 
given. Assuming that, for a given toll policy t = (ta)aEA, the network users travel 
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on short est paths with respect to the toUs and fixed costs on arcs, the Network 
Pricing Problem consists of devising a revenue maximizing toU policy. Upon the 
introduction of vectors xk = (X~hEJC,aEA that specify the flows on commodities 
k E K (i.e., x~ = 1 if commodity k travels on the toll arc a and x~ = 0 otherwize), 
the Network Pricing Problem can be formulated as the bilevel program (Labbé et 
al. (1998, [43])): 
(TP) 
subject to: 
ta 2: 0 \faEA (2.1) 
X E argm~n L (L(Ca + ta)x~ + L cax~) 
kEJC aEA aEB 
(2.2) 
subject to: 
-1 if i = ok 
L x~+ L x~- L x~- L x~= 1 if i = dk 
aEi+nA aEi+nB 
o otherwise 
\fk E K, \fi E N (2.3) 
x~ E {O, 1} \fk E K, \fa E A, (2.4) 
where i- (resp. i+) denotes the set of arcs having node i as its head (resp. tail). 
Note that the characterization of lower level solutions as origin-destination paths 
carrying either no flow or the total origin-destination flow aUows to obtain an 
integer programming formulation of (TP) that involves binary variables. Now, in 
view of the unimodularity of the constraint matrix associated with the shortest 
path problem at the lower level, one may drop the integrality requirements for the 
flow variables x. It foUows that the lower level problem can be replaced by its 
primaI dual constraints and primaI-dual optimality conditions, yielding a single-
level program involving complementarity (Le., disjunctive) constraints. 
Through the introduction of auxiliary variables 
{
ta if commodity k uses arc a E A, 
k 
Pa 
a otherwise 
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corresponding to the actual unit revenue associated with arc a E A and commodity 
k E K, Labbé et al. (1998, [43]) der ive a mixed integer linear formulation for this 
problem, namely 
(TP2) max L L rlp! 
kEIC aEA 
subject 1.0: 
Vk E K, Vi EN (2.5) 
>'~(a) >.k t(a) ::; Ca + ta Vk E K, Va E A (2.6) 
>.k >.k h(a) - t(a)::; Ca Vk E K, Va E B (2.7) 
L( k k) L k >.k >.k CaXa + Pa + CaXa = dk - Ok Vk E K (2.8) 
aEA aEB 
p! ::; M:x! Vk E K, Va E A (2.9) 
ta - p! ::; Na {1 x~) Vk E K, Va E A (2.10) 
p! ::; ta Vk E K, Va E A (2.11) 
p! ~ 0 Vk E K, Va E A (2.12) 
x~ E {a, 1} Vk E K, Va E A (2.13) 
xk > 0 a- Vk E K, Va E 8, (2.14) 
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where h(a), t(a) correspond to the head and tail of the toU arc a E A, while M: 
and Na are sufficiently large constants. 
Constraints (2.5) describe fiows on commodities. (2.6), (2.7) and (2.8) are the 
primal dual constraints and optimality conditions of the lower level problem. Con-
straints (2.9), (2.10) and (2.11) come from the modellinearization, and ensure that 
p~ = tax~ for aU k E K, a E A. 
Roch et al. (2005, [57]) and Grigoriev et al. (2005, [32]) prove the NP-hardness 
of this problem, even under restrictive conditions such as a single commodity or 
lower bounded toUs (see Labbé et al. (1998, [43])). However, several particular 
cases are polynomiaUy solvable, such as the Network Pricing Problem with a single 
toU arc (see Brotcorne et al. (2000, [11])). Van Hoesel et al. (2003, [65]) prove 
that, when the number of toU arcs is upper bounded, the optimal solution of the 
Network Pricing Problem can be obtained by solving a polynomial number of linear 
programs. The latter also present other particular polynomial cases of the problem. 
In contrast with (TP2) formulation, in which the paths chosen by commodi-
ties are described by fiows on arcs (latter caUed 'arc formulation'), Bouhtou et al. 
(2003, [7]) and Didi et al. (1999, [24]) propose formulations involving directly fiows 
on paths for commodities. Bouhtou et al. also propose a standard graph represen-
tation of a network together with reduction methods for this last one, which often 
lead to a significant reduction of the network graph. This aUows obtaining good 
numerical results for medium size instances. Tests on randomly generated prob-
lems involving 15 to 80 commodities and 20 to 100 toU arcs (in networks with 75 or 
100 nodes and 2000 or 4000 arcs) show that an optimal solution can be identified 
within a couple of seconds. However, note that these instances lead to only 2 or 3 
non dominated paths on average for each commodity, and thus are rather easy to 
solve. 
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Unfortunately, a commercial solver for linear programs such as Xpress cannot 
solve large size instances, neither of the (TP2) arc formulation presented ab ove nor 
of the path formulation. This is mainly due to the bad quality of the linear relax-
ation in variables x (i.e., (2.13) are replaced by 0 :::; x~ :::; 1 for all k E /C, a E A). 
To overcome this problem, several approaches are considered. 
Dewez et al. (2007, [23]) set values for constants M:, Na : k E /C, a E A of 
(TP2) formulation by computing upper bounds on the tolls on arcs, and propose 
valid inequalities for the various models (arc formulation and path formulation). 
Numerical tests have been carried out on randomly generated problems involving 
20 to 40 commodities and 5% to 20% toll arcs, in networks with 60 nodes and 208 
arcs, latter called 'grid graphs'. The results show that the adjustment of constants 
makes it possible to divide by two the value of the duality gap at the root of the 
branch and bound tree, whereas the valid cuts allow a reduction of the explored 
nodes as well as the computing time. 
Cirinei (2007, [16]) proposes a column generation algorithm for the inverse op-
timization problem, which consists of devising the tolls that should be imposed 
on the network, considering that the reaction of the network users is known and 
maximizing the authority's revenue. Tests on randomly generated problems involv-
ing 10 to 40 commodities and 15% toll arcs in grid graphs show that the method 
performs well in terms of computing time. All instances can be solved in a couple 
of seconds. The column generation algorithm also allows to solve the largest in-
stances much faster than without the algorithm. Further, the author proposes an 
exact resolution algorithm based on an intelligent enumeration of the solutions of 
the lower level problem. This resolution method allows to define improved upper 
bounds on the authority's revenue. 
As solving large size problems to optimality is hard, several authors propose 
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heuristic methods for the Network Pricing Problem. Brotcorne et al. (2001, [12]) 
present two heuristics for the problem: the first consists in setting toUs sequentiaUy 
over the arcs, while the second is based on a primaI-dual approach. Tests on prob-
lems involving 10 to 20 commodities and 5% to 20% toll arcs in grid graphs show 
that heuristic solutions are on average within 1.5% and 7% of optimality respec-
tively. Both heuristics are mu ch faster than an exact resolution. The latter (2000, 
[11]) also examine a very similar problem, in which commodities have to be routed 
from several locations to customers according to their respective demands. 
AIso, Roch et al. (2005, [57]) propose an approximation algorithm for the single 
commodity Network Pricing Problem, with a guaranteed performance of ~ log n+ 1, 
where n is the number of toU arcs in the network. 
FinaUy, Cirinei (2007, [16]) presents a tabu based local search algorithm, which 
exploits the underlying network structure of the lower level problem. This last 
method is very efficient, both in terms of solution quality and computing time, 
producing heuristic solutions within 1% of optimality for instances involving 10 to 
100 commodities and 5% to 20% toU arcs in grid graphs. 
Dewez (2004, [22]) also studies a particular case of the Network Pricing Prob-
lem that deals with specific network structures similar to highways. lndeed, the 
model considered involves a path of toU arcs as weU as Triangle inequalities on the 
toU variables. She proves that, when it reduces to a single commodity, the prob-
lem is polynomiaUy solvable. She presents an exact resolution algorithm for the 
multi-commodity problem, based on an enumeration of the solutions of the lower 
level problem. Unfortunately, due to the enumeration at the lower level, the time 
needed to solve the problem to optimality grows exponentiaUy with the number of 
commodities and the number of nodes in the network. 
The author also proposes several heuristics to set the flow variables for this 
problem. Then the inverse problem aUows to determine the toUs yielding the best 
( 
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revenue for the authority, once flows are fixed. We briefly describe the ide a behind 
the three best heuristics. 
1) For each commodity k E K, set x~ = 1 for the toU arc a with the largest 
upper bound M; : a E A. Then solve the inverse optimization problem to 
find the toUs leading to a maximal revenue for the authority. 
2) For each commodity k E K, set x~ = 1 for the toU arc a with the largest upper 
bound M; : a E A. Then observe that, if two commodities use the same toU 
arc a E A, the leader could take advantage to force the use of another toU arc 
b E A \ {a} (i.e., x~ = 1) for one of both commodities (with respect to the 
demand T/ and the upper bounds M;). Next, solve the inverse optimization 
problem to find the toUs leading to a maximal revenue. 
3) For each commodity k E K and for each toU arc a E A, set x~ = 0 if 
M; < ex maxkEK M; (0 :s: ex :s: 1), i.e., if the upper bound on the revenue 
M: is too smaU with respect to the upper bound on the same arc a for other 
commodities. Then solve the remaining problem. 
When tested on grid graph instances involving 21 to 36 commodities and 10 to 
20 toU nodes in the highway, the best heuristics produce solutions within 5% of 
optimality in a couple of seconds. 
Grigoriev et al. (2005, [32]) consider another particular case of the Network 
Pricing Problem, where each commodity chooses at most one toU arc from its ori-
gin to its destination. As this specifie network structure looks like a town divided 
by a river with crossing bridges or tunnels, this problem is caUed the Cross River 
Network Pricing Problem. The authors prove that this particular problem is 
NP-hard. 
Further, they also show that the Uniform Network Pricing Problem, in which 
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tolls on the arcs are all equal, constitutes an O(n)-approximation algorithm (where 
n is the number of toll arcs in the network) for the Cross River Network Pricing 
Problem. Under sorne particular assumptions, the Uniform Network Pricing Prob-
lem provides an O(log n)-approximation algorithm for the same problem. 
We conclude this chapter with a summary (see Figure 2.3) of the main contri-
butions to the Network Pricing Problem in literature. 
Network Pricinlil 
Problem 
J 
Arc formulation 
• 
• 
1 
Exact solution 
approaches: Labbé 98, 
Cirinei 07, Dewez 07 
1 
Inexact solution 
approaches: Brotcome 01, 
Roch 05, Cirinei 07 
Hililhway Network 
Pricing Problem 
Path formulation 
Exact solution 
approaches: Didi 99, 
Bouhtou 03, Dewez 07 
Cross River Network 
Pricing Problem 
Figure 2.3: Main contributions to the Network Pricing Problem 
CHAPTER 3 
NETWORK PRICING WITH CONNECTED TOLL ARCS 
In this chapter, we present the specifie Network Pricing Problem addressed in the 
thesis. First modeUed as a bilinear/bilinear bilevel pricing problem, it is reformu-
lated as a single level linear mixed integer model. Next, we propose a new linear 
mixed integer formulation for the problem, together with settings of constants and 
a preproeessing of the network. FinaUy, the complexity of this specifie Network 
Pricing Problem is studied. 
3.1 Network Pricing Problems with Connected ToU Arcs 
We now focus on a particular Network Pricing Problem dealing with structured 
networks in which aU toU arcs must be connected and constitute a path. As these 
structures can represent features specifie to a real highway topology and for the 
sake of clarity, we define a highway as the path of toU arcs in the network. The 
first variant of this problem, caUed Basic NPP, is directly derived from the classical 
Network Pricing Problem. Rowever, the toUs are additive in this network structure, 
while toUlevels are usuaUy determined with respect to given entry and exit points 
on the highway. Renee, a second variant is considered, that involves a complete 
toU subgraph, i.e., each toU arc represents a toU subpath between two entry and 
exit points. It is caUed General Complete ToU NPP. FinaUy, a third variant, caUed 
Constrained Complete ToU NPP, involves a complete toU subgraph together with 
specifie constraints that link toUs on several paths. 
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The first variant is directly derived from the Network Pricing Problem presented 
in Chapter 2. Let us define a commodity as a set of users with the same origin and 
destination nodes. A commodity can either take the short est toU free path from its 
origin to its destination, or foUow the highway, using shortest toU free paths to and 
from the highway. We assume that users who have left the highway are not aUowed 
to reenter, which implies that paths are uniquely determined by their respective 
entry and exit nodes. 
This problem is caUed the Basic Network Pricing Problem with Connected ToU 
Arcs, for short "Basic NPP". It is illustrated in Figure 3.1, where toU arcs are 
dashed. ToU free arcs are inserted between origin and destination nodes, as weU as 
from/to the origin and destination nodes to/from the highway. These arcs represent 
short est toU free paths between the corresponding nodes. We also assume that a 
fixed cost is set on each arc, and provides a measure of the distance, time or gas 
consumed on the arc. The fixed cost set on a toU free arc corresponds to the 
smallest fixed cost of a path between its nodes. 
Set of ongin and 
destination nodes 
Set of entry 
and exit nodes 
Figure 3.1: Basic NPP 
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The mathematical formulation (TP2) presented in Chapter 2 applies to this 
situation. Rowever, additional constraints must be appended to (TP2) in order 
to ensure that a commodity which leaves the highway at sorne exit node does not 
reenter the highway at another entry node. Let us define the set N ç N of aIl 
possible origin and destination nodes, i.e., N = {ok,dk : k E K}. Assuming that 
each shortest toU free path is represented by a single arc, the Basic NPP is described 
by model (TP2), with the additional constraints 
L x~+ L x~ = 0 (3.1) 
aEi+nB 
Rowever, note that the toUs are additive in this network structure, i.e., a com-
modity must pay the sum of the toUs on aU arcs that belong to its path. As toU 
levels are usuaUy determined with respect to given entry and exit points on the 
highway, we consider the Network Pricing Problem with Connected ToU Arcs in-
volving a complete toU subgraph. Rence, as we assume that users who have left 
the highway are not aUowed to reenter, each toU subpath is represented by a single 
toU arc. This problem is depicted in Figure 3.2 and called "General Complete 
ToU NPP". 
Sel of cnLry 
, 
, , 
, , 
, , 
, , 
Figure 3.2: Complete ToU NPP 
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Let us now introduce sorne notation. For each arc a E A, let t( a), h( a) E N 
be its tail and head nodes respectively. For each commodity k E K and for each 
toU arc a E A, let c~ denote the fixed cost on the corresponding path Ok -----+ t( a) -----+ 
h( a) -----+ dk , where t( a), h( a) E N are the entry and exit nodes on the highway. The 
fixed cost on the toU free path Ok -----+ dk is denoted by C~d' while the corresponding 
fiow variable is X~d' For each commodity k E K and for each toU arc a E A, variable 
x~ represents the fiow on the corresponding path Ok -----+ t( a) -----+ h( a) -----+ dk , while 
variable ta is the toU on the arc a (i.e., toU subpath a). Further, we consider that 
nodes are labeUed by the index 1 to m, leading to lAI = n = m(m - 1) toll arcs. 
One obtains the foUowing bilevel formulation (2004, Dewez [22]): 
(HP1) max L L rltax~ 
t,x 
kEK aEA 
subject to: 
ta :::: 0 'Va E A (3.2) 
x E arg mln L ( Dc~ + t")x~ + c~x~) (3.3) 
kEK aEA 
subject to: 
LX~ + X~d = 1 'Vk E K (3.4) 
aEA 
x~ E {O, 1} 'Vk E K, 'Va E A (3.5) 
X~d E {O, 1} 'Vk E K (3.6) 
Note that, as each toll subpath is now represented by a single toU arc, the fiow 
constraints (3.4) ensure that each commodity chooses either a toU path a (x~ = 1) 
or the toU free path (X~d = 1). 
As for the classical Network Pricing Problem defined in Chapter 2, the con-
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straint matrix associated with the lower level problem is unimodular. As a conse-
quence, the lower level problem can be replaced by its primaI dual constraints and 
optimality conditions, yielding a single level program involving complementarity 
(i.e., disjunctive) constraints. Further, in order to obtain a linear model, variables 
k {ta Pa = 
o 
if commodity k uses arc a E A, 
otherwise 
are introduced, corresponding to the actual unit profit associated with arc a E A 
and commodity k E K. This yields (2004, Dewez [22]): 
(HP2) maxLLr/p~ 
kEK. aEA 
subject to: 
LX~ + X~d = 1 Vk E K (3.7) 
aEA 
)..k < ck + t 
- a a Vk E K, Va E A (3.8) 
)..k < ck 
- od Vk E K (3.9) 
L ( k k k) k k )..k caXa + Pa + codXod = Vk E K (3.10) 
aEA 
p~ ~ M:x~ Vk E K, Va E A (3.11) 
ta - p~ ~ Na(l - x~) Vk E K,Va E A (3.12) 
p~ ~ ta Vk E K, Va E A (3.13) 
p~ ~ 0 Va EA (3.14) 
Xk > 0 ad - Vk E K (3.15) 
x~ E {O, 1} Va ~ A,Vk E K, (3.16) 
where M: and Na are suitably large constants. For now, let us assume M: 
maXkEK.{c~d - c~} and Na = N = maXkEK.,aEA M:. 
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Now, consider a network composed of three entry jexit nodes (labeUed 1,2,3) 
on the highway and two commodities k l , k2 E K with respective demands 7]kl = 80, 
7]k2 = 10. The fixed costs on paths c~ : k E K, a E A are described in Table 3.1, 
while c~à = 20 and c~â = 21. The corresponding optimal toUs, according to model 
(HP2), are given in Figure 3.3. 
ToU arc a ch a Ck2 a 
(1,2) 12 11 
(1,3) 15 14 
(2,1) 13 9 
(2,3) 17 15 
(3,1) 11 10 
(3,2) 12 10 
Table 3.1: Fixed costs c~ : k = kl , k2 , a E A for a network example with three 
entry jexit nodes on the highway 
Q 
JI \ \ I, \ \ 
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Figure 3.3: Optimal toUs ta : a E A for a network example with three entryjexit 
nodes on the highway 
At optimality, commodity k i travels on the path Okl -7 3 -7 1 -7 dk1 , while 
commodity k2 travels on the path Ok2 -7 2 -7 1 -7 dk2 . One can observe that 
t2I = 10 < t 3I = 9, i.e., the toU imposed on the path Ok2 -7 2 -7 1 -7 dk2 is less 
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than the toU imposed on the path Ok2 --r 3 --r 1 --r dk2 . While this can make sense 
in the airline industry, where tickets correspond to specifie origin-destination pairs, 
this is unrealistic in a highway. 
In order to prevent such situations, the Triangle and Monotonicity inequalities 
(3.17), (3.18) can be introduced, and the corresponding problem is called "Con-
strained Complete Toll NPP". 
Va,b,c E A: 
t(a) = t(b), h(b) = t(c), h(c) = h(a) (3.17) 
Va,b E A: 
t(a) = t(b) < h(a) = h(b) + 1 or t(a) = t(b) - 1 < h(a) = h(b) 
or t(a) = t(b) > h(a) = h(b) - 1 or t(a) = t(b) + 1 > h(a) = h(b). (3.18) 
Triangle constraints ensure that between two given entry and exit nodes of the 
highway, a commodity would not take benefit from leaving the highway upstream 
and then reentering downstream latter. The Monotonicity constraints imply that 
the toU on a path cannot be less than the toll of any subpath. Subnetworks on 
which these inequalities apply are illustrated in Figure 3.4. 
Q CD CD ~ ~ 1 \ 1 \ 1 \ 
1 \ 1 \ 1 \ 1 \ 1 \ 
lb \ lb \ 1 \ 1 \ 1 \ 
t \ cb\a ~\ 1 \ lb \ la la cpla 9 1a 1 • 1 i + 1: • 1 i - 1': ] 1 ] 1 1 1 1 1 1 le 1 1 , lb , Ib/ , 1 , l , l , l , 
!f @ CD l, l, cD cD 
Figure 3.4: Subnetworks on which Triangle and Monotonicity constraints apply 
In the next section, we propose an alternative formulation for the problem. The 
latter does not involve dual variables and allows to express the optimality of the 
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lower level problem more explicitly in the constraints. 
3.2 Model reformulation 
While the lower level optimality conditions in (HP2) involve arc fiow variables, 
an alternative is to express the optimality of the lower level problem in terms of 
path fiows, without resorting to dual variables. The primaI dual constraints and 
optimality conditions (3.8), (3.9) and (3.10) of (HP2) are then replaced by the 
equivalent 
Vk E K,Vb E A (3.19) 
aEA 
Vk E K. (3.20) 
aEA 
lndeed, these constraints ensure that the cost of the path chosen by commodity 
k E K at optimality is smaller than (or equal to) the cost of any other path for this 
commodity. 
However, the second family of constraints (3.20) is obviously redundant due to 
constraints (3.7), (3.11) and the definition of constants M~ : k E K, a E A. Next, 
based on constraint (3.7), variables x~d can be removed, yielding the more compact 
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model: 
(HP3) maxLLrlp~ 
kEK aEA 
subject to: 
L x~ :s: 1 Vk E K (3.21) 
aEA 
L (p~ + c~x~) + c~d(l - L x~) :s: ta + c~ Vk E K,Va E A (3.22) 
bEA bEA 
p~ :s: M:x~ Vk E K,Va E A (3.23) 
ta - p~ :s: N a (1 - x~) Vk E K,Va E A (3.24) 
p~ :s: ta Vk E K, Va E A (3.25) 
p~ 2. 0 Va E A (3.26) 
x~ E {O, 1} Vk E K,Va E A, (3.27) 
In the sequel, we consider two variants of this program. In the General Com-
plete ToU NPP (GCT-NPP), tolls are independent, while the Constrained 
Complete ToU NPP (CCT-NPP) imposes Triangle and Monotonicity con-
straints (3.17) and (3.18). The corresponding models are labelled (HP3) and 
(HP3*) respectively. 
Unfortunately, these models contain a large set of variables, especially for de-
scribing flows on paths x~ : k E K, a E A. The next section provide suggestions 
to reduce the size of the problem, i.e., to set several flow variables to zero before 
solving the problem. 
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3.3 Preprocessing 
Thanks to the complete toU subgraph structure, each feasible path from an ori-
gin to a destination contains a single toU arc, and there exists a bijection between 
the toll arc set for a commodity and the corresponding path set. Further, the paths 
that are never used by a given commodity can be deleted, i.e., the corresponding 
flow variables are set to zero. 
Property For each commodity k E K, the toll arcs a E A such that c~ > c~d 
are never used, i.e., one can set x~ O. 
For the Constrained Complete Toll NPP, an improved preprocessing can be 
applied according to the Monotonicity constraints. Let us introduce the following 
definition. An illustration of this definition is provided in Figure 3.5. 
Definition 7 FoT' aU a in A, the following set is defined: 
Ca {b E A: t(a) :::; t(b) < h(b) :::; h(a) OT' t(a) ~ t(b) > h(b) ~ h(a)}. 
In the CCT-NPP, the toll variables must be such that ta ~ tb for all b in 
~. According to the following proposition, for each commodity, several additional 
paths (toU arcs) are never used, and the corresponding flow variables can be set to 
zero. 
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Fig;ure 3.5: Example of a toll arc b E 
Proposition 1 (Constrained Complete Toll NPP) Let a, b E A be two toll arcs of 
the netwo7'k such that b E 12a. If the fixed costs are such that c~ < c~ for a given 
commodity k E K, then one can set x~ = 0 sinee the corresponding path is never 
used. 
Proof 
The cost of the path containing b E A is c~ + tb for commodity k, while the cost of 
the path containing a E A is c~ + ta. As the Monotonicity constraints impose that 
ta ~ tb, the cost of the path containing a E A is always larger than the cost of the 
path containing b E A for commodity k, and one can set x! O. o 
Finally, in order to complete the models (HP3) and (HP3*), the next section 
provides settings for the constants M:, Na : k E K, a E A. 
3.4 Setting the constants M and N 
For each commodity k E K and each toll arc a E A, the constants M:, Na that 
appear in models (HP3) and (HP3*) represent upper bounds for p! and ta variables. 
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Constant M: represents the largest toU that can be imposed on the toU arc 
a E A for commodity k E K. Dewez (2004, [22]) shows that, for aU k E K and 
for aU a E A, constants M: = max{O, C~d - c~} are valid for (HP3*), thus also 
for (HP3). lndeed, the network users travel on shortest paths with respect to a 
cost equal to the sum of toUs and initial costs. Hence it is clear that the largest 
toU that can be imposed on a toU arc a for commodity k is equal to the difference 
between the cost of the toU free path and the cost of the toU path a for commodity k. 
Next, constant Na represents the largest toU that can be set on the toU arc 
a E A among aU commodities. Depending on whether the Constrained or General 
Complete ToU NPP is considered, different settings are applied for these constants. 
In what concerns the General Complete ToU NPP, the constants Na = maXkEIC !vI: 
for aU a E A are clearly valid for (HP3). Unfortunately, when adding Triangle and 
Monotonicity constraints to the problem, the previous settings for Na : a E A are no 
longer valid. By contradiction, assume Na = maXkEIC M: for aU a E A, and consider 
b E Ca' If maxkEIC M: < maxkEIC Mt, there do es not exist any feasible solution of 
the problem which satisfies the Monotonicity constraint ta ~ tb. As a consequence, 
for the Constrained Complete ToU NPP, the constants Na = N = maXkEIC,aEA M: 
are valid for (HP3*). 
With these settings, models (HP3) and (HP3*) can be implemented efficiently. 
We refer the reader to Chapter 6 for numerical results. In the next section, we 
praye that the Constrained and General Complete ToU NPP are NP-hard. 
3.5 Complexity 
As a highway network can take several specific formats, we distinguish three 
cases. First, we consider a single directional highway network, i.e., aU toU arcs are 
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oriented in the same direction: t( a) < h( a) for aU a E A or t( a) > h( a) for aU 
a E A. Next, we consider a more general bi-directional highway network, in which 
toU arcs appear in both directions of the highway. FinaUy, we also consider a third 
case, in which the bi-directional highway network contains feasible access from aIl 
origins to aIl entry nodes of the highway and from aU exit nodes of the highway to 
aU destinations. 
It has been shown by Dewez (2004, [22]) that the Constrained Complete ToU 
Network Pricing Problem is polynomiaUy solvable when either a single commodity 
or a single toU arc is involved. In contrast, we prove that the Constrained Complete 
ToU NPP is NP-hard, using a reduction from 3-SAT. Note that similar reductions 
have been used by Roch et al. (2005, [57]) for the Network Pricing Problem or 
Grigoriev et al. (2005, [32]) for the Cross River Network Pricing Problem, which 
are also based on a reduction from 3 - SAT. 
Definition 8 Let Xl, ... , Xn be n Boolean variables, and F = !\~~l (lil V li2 V li3) be 
a conjunctive normal form of m clauses with literals lij : j = 1,2,3 that represent 
a variable Xi or its negation. Given a su ch conjunctive normal form, 3 - S AT 
consists in fin ding an assignment of value TRUE or FALSE to the variables such 
that the formula is TRUE. 
Proposition 2 The single directional Constrained Complete Toll NPP is NP-
hard. 
Proof 
Any conjunctive normal form F = !\~l (lil V li2 V li3), where lij : j = 1,2,3, repre-
sents a variable Xi : i E {1, ... , n} or its negation, can be polynomiaUy converted to 
an instance of the Constrained Complete ToU NPP, in its decision form. 
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For each variable Xi : i E {l, ... , n}, a subnetwork is constructed as shown in Figure 
3.6. 
3 
2 
3 
Figure 3.6: Subnetwork for variable Xi (single directional Constrained Complete 
Toll NPP). 
Each of these subnetworks contains three commodities (aij , dij ) : j E {l, 2, 3} with 
unit demand, and two toll arcs ai, ai of zero fixed cost corresponding to the truth 
and false assignment for variable Xi respectively. Further, in any subnetwork, an arc 
is added from the tail no de of arc ai to the head node of arc ai, which corresponds 
tci ai n ai. Toll free arcs of cost zero connect ail (resp. a i3 ) to the tail no de of arc 
ai (resp. ai), the head no de of arc ai (resp. ai) to dil (resp. di3 ), ai2 to both tail 
nodes of toll arcs, and both head nodes of toll arcs to di2 . Toll free arcs (ail, dil ) 
of cost 3, (ai3 , di3 ) of cost 3 and (ai2 , di2 ) of cost 2 are also added. 
Henee an upper bound on the revenue for each subnetwork is 7, obtained by setting 
to 2 the toll on either ai or ai and the other ones to 3. In all other cases, the 
revenue cannot exeeed 6. Then, the subnetworks are linked together so that the 
single directional highway corresponds to the set of all connected subnetworks. 
Note that the toll of 3 on arc ai n ai ensures that this arc is never taken. Indeed, 
suppose that commodity i2 chooses this arc ai n ai (there is no path using this arc 
for commodities il and i3). As the revenue on i2 is bounded by atoll free arc of 
cost 2, the toll on the arc ai n ai must be smaller or equal to 2. But then, due to 
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the Monotonicity constraints added to the problem, tolls on the other two arcs of 
the subnetworks cannot exceed 2 and the maximal revenue of 7 cannot be reached, 
which is a contradiction. Aiso note that the toll free arcs that do not appear from 
some origins to tail nodes of toU arcs (resp. from head nodes of toU arcs to some 
destinations) are supposed to be so expensive that they can never be used and they 
are not depicted in the network graph. 
Further, for each clause k, a clause-commodity (ok, dk) with unit demand is con-
structed as depicted in Figure 3.7. 
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Figure 3.7: Part of network for F = ( ... V Xi V Xj) A (Xj V Xz V ... ) A ... (single 
directional Constrained Complete Toll NPP). 
If variable Xi (resp. Xi) is a literaI of clause k, toll free arcs of cost 0 are added from 
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Ok to the tail node of ai (resp. ai) and from the head node of ai (resp. ai) to dk , 
which means that toU arc ai belongs to the clause-commodity k. Further, if two or 
three toU arcs are connected, in the same direction (in the highway graph) and be-
long to the same clause-commodity, toU arcs are added between the corresponding 
entry and exit nodes of the network. For the part of network example depicted in 
Figure 3.7, a single toU arc is added between the tail node of aj and the head node 
of az . Those addition al toU arcs correspond to the intersection of corresponding 
variables, i.e., for the example the toU arc is aj n az . Note that there is no arc 
linking tail and head nodes of toU arcs belonging to different clause-commodities, 
because there does not exist any path which could include them both. ToUs on the 
new arcs aj n az are set to 2 if aj and az are both set to 2, and to 3 otherwise. 
FinaUy, an addition al toU free arc (Ok, dk ) of cost 2 is added, which defines an upper 
bound of 2 on the revenue from each clause-commodity. 
Now let us show that a satisfying truth assignment for F exists if and only if the 
revenue for the Constrained Complete ToU NPP is equal to 2m + 7n, where m is 
the number of clauses and n is the number of variables. 
Assume there exists a satisfying truth assignment, which means that at least one 
literaI is true in each clause. We set the corresponding toUs to 2, and the other 
toUs (in the corresponding subnetworks) to 3. Then the total revenue from aU 
clause-commodities is 2m. For aU remaining subnetworks, if any (i.e., this situa-
tion only happens if a variable Xi does not appear in any clause), the toU arcs are 
set arbitrarily to 2 and 3 for a variable and its negation respectively. Henee the 
revenue from aU subnetworks is 7n, which means that the total revenue is 2m + 7n. 
Conversely, suppose there exists toUs such that the total revenue is 2m + 7n. The 
maximal possible revenue from aU subnetworks is 7n, only achievable by setting 
one toU per subnetwork to 2 and the other ones to 3. On the other hand, the 
maximal possible revenue from aU clause-commodities is 2m. We set to true the 
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literaIs corresponding to arcs with toU 2, and to false the others. This corresponds 
to a weU-defined assignment for F, since there is exactly one toU of 2 in each sub-
network. Further, each clause-commodity contributes to the total revenue with a 
toU of 2, which means that at least one literaI per clause is true, and there exists 
a truth assignment for F. 0 
Next, we extend the previous result to a more general highway network, which 
contains toU arcs in both directions of the highway. 
Proposition 3 The bi-directional Constrained Complete Toll NPP is NP-hard. 
Proof 
As toU arcs can now appear in both direction of the highway, subnetworks for 
variables Xi : i E {l, ... , n} are constructed in a slightly different way, as shown in 
Figure 3.8. 
3 
Figure 3.8: Subnetwork for variable Xi. 
We consider that toU arcs ai : i E {l, ... , n} are in one direction of the highway, 
while toU arcs ai : i E {l, ... , n} are in the other direction. 
Further, for each clause-commodity and as for the single direction al graph, if two 
or three connected and with same direction (in the highway graph) toU arcs belong 
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to the same clause-commodity, toll arcs are added between the corresponding entry 
and exit nodes of the network. Such a network is depicted in Figure 3.9. 
1 • ~ 2 
\ 
la: 
l ' 
2 
Figure 3.9: Subnetwork for F = ( ... V Xi V Xj) 1\ (Xj V Xz V ... ) 1\ ... (bi-directional 
Constrained Complete Toll NPP). 
As the users are supposed to choose one direction or the other of the highway, no 
toll arc is added between the tail node of a toll arc in one direction of the highway 
network to the head node of another toll arc in the other direction of the highway 
network. Then, the same argument as before can be applied. o 
Note that the problem instances constructed in both preceding proofs contain 
non feasible access from several origins to the highway, or from the highway to sev-
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eral destinations. It means that the corresponding path are so expensive that they 
could never be taken. Renee we consider a third case, in which the bi-directional 
highway network contains feasible aceess from aU origins to aU entry nodes of the 
highway and from aU exit nodes of the highway to aU destinations. 
Proposition 4 The bi-directional Constrained Complete Toll NPP is NP-hard, 
even if access to all entry nodes (resp. from all exit nodes) is feasible from all 
origins (resp. to all destinations). 
Proof 
This additional condition means that no path is so expensive that it could never 
be taken, which is slightly different from the situation described before. 
Subnetworks are constructed as before, exeept that several additional toU free arcs 
(the ones that were too expensive) are added so that there is one toU free arc from 
any origin to any tail node of a toU arc, and from any head node of a toU arc to any 
destination. For each commodity k and for each toU arc ai, the cost on the arcs 
(ok, t (ai)) and (h( ai), dk) are set such that the sum of both fixed costs is equal to 
the cost of the toU free arc (ok, dk ). Such a subnetwork is depicted in Figure 3.10. 
2 
3 
Figure 3.10: Subnetwork for variable Xi (AU feasible aceess Constrained Complete 
ToU NPP) 
Renee the new arcs can only be used if toUs are set to zero on the corresponding 
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arcs, which do es not lead to a maximal revenue for the leader. Then, tolls are set 
as before and the same argument can be applied. D 
It is clear that very similar proofs can be derived for the General Complete 
ToU NPP. For space considerations, we omit the proof that the Basic NPP is also 
NP-hard (see the Appendix for a detailed proof). 
CHAPTER 4 
VALID INEQUALITIES 
Solving large mixed integer linear programs is hard. Renee, a common practice 
consists of appending valid inequalities to the initial model. These can, sometimes 
but not ever, help to solve 'faster or better' the initial problem. By 'faster or 
better', we mean to decrease (i) the computing time to solve the problem, (ii) the 
number of nodes in the branch and eut algorithm, or (iii) the gap between the 
optimal solution value of the linear relaxation (i.e., 0 :S x~ :S 1 in our problem) 
and the optimal solution value of the integer problem. 
In this chapter, we propose several new valid inequalities for the Constrained 
Complete Toll NPP and General Complete Toll NPP. We used the open souree 
software Porta (see http:j jwww.zib.dejOptimizationjSoftwarejPortaj for more de-
tails) , which offers a collection of routines for analysing polyhedra. More specifi-
cally, given a set of inequalities, the software returns the set of vertices and extreme 
rays of the corresponding polyhedron. Conversely, given a set of vertices and ex-
treme rays of a polyhedron, it returns the corresponding faeet equations. Using 
this specifie routine, we obtain the faeet equations for very small instancesl of the 
CCT-NPP and GCT-NPP. Next, we generalize sorne of these facet equations, in 
order to obtain valid inequalities for a multi-commodity problem. The efficiency 
of the valid inequalities will be examined, both theoretically and numerically, in 
Chapters 6 and 7. 
1 By very smaU instances, we mean a single commodity and at most five entry and exit nodes 
on the highway for the CCT-NPP, and at most two commodities and five entry and exit nodes for 
the GCT-NPP. lndeed, as the number of commodities or toll arcs increase, so does the number 
of variables and constraints of the problem. 
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In the next sections, we propose valid inequalities that strengthen the 'Shortest 
Path' constraints (3.22) and 'Profit Upper Bound' constraints (3.23) of (HP3) and 
(HP3*). 
4.1 Strengthening the Shortest Path Inequalities 
The valid inequalities presented in this section involve a pair k l , k2 E K of 
commodities, and strengthen the 'Shortest Path' constraints (3.22) of (HP3). RecaU 
that these constraints ensure that the cost of the path chosen by commodity k l 
at optimality is smaUer than (or equal to) the cost of any other path for this 
commodity. The valid inequalities proposed state that the cost of the path chosen 
by commodity k l also depends on the choice of a path b for commodity k2 . 
Proposition 5 Inequalities 
( 4.1) 
L (p~l + C~lX~l) + c~à(1- LX~l)::; c~à + L (p~2 + (C~l - C~à)X~2) (4.2) 
bEA bEA bEA \S 
where k l , k2 E K, a E A and 5 is any subset of A (possibly the empty set), are valid 
for CCT-NPP and GCT-NPP. 
Proof 
Let k l , k2 E K and 5 ç A. If X~l = 0 for aU b E A, then: 
• If there exists b E A \ (5 U {a}) such that X~2 = 1, (4.1)-(4.2) yield c~à ::; 
ta + p~2 + C~l for aU a E A and c~à ::; p~2 + C~l respectively. As p~2 = tb by 
(3.24) and (3.25), the inequalities imply that the cost of the path containing 
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b E A must be than the cost of the toll free path for commodity k l , 
and are valid by (3.22) and (3.26). 
• In aIl other cases, (4.1)-(4.2) yield c!à ~ ta + C~l for aIl a E A and c!à ~ c!à 
respectively, which are valid by (3.22). 
Now assume that there b E A such that =1. 
• If there exists d E A \ (SU {a}) such that X~2 = 1, (4.1)-(4.2) yield p~l +C~l ~ 
ta +p~2 for aIl a E A and p~l +C~l ~ p~2 +C~l respectively. As p~l = tb and 
p~2 = td by (3.24) and (3.25), the inequalities me an that the path containing 
b E A must be cheaper than the path containing d E A for commodity k l , 
and are valid by (3.22) and (3.26). 
• In aIl other cases (i.e., if there does not exist any d E A \ (S U {a}) such 
1), (4.1)-(4.2) become p~l + C~l ~ ta + C~l for all a E A and 
p~l + C~l ~ C~d respectively. This means that the path containing b E A must 
be cheaper than any other path for commodity kI , and are valid by (3.22). 0 
Note that the Strengthened Shortest Path inequalities (4.1 )-( 4.2) still hold when 
k1 = k2 = k. In this case, they become 
L (P: + c:x:) + c~d(1 L xt) ~ ta + C~ + L (p: + (c: - c~)x~) (4.3) 
bEA bEA bEA\(SU{a}) 
L (P: + c:x~) + c~Al- LX:) ~ C~d + L (p~ + (c~ - C~d)X~) (4.4) 
~A ~A ~A~ 
for aH k E !C, for aIl a E A and for all S ç A. However, (4.4) can be equivalently 
rewritten as: 
Vk E J(,VS ç A 
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which are redundant by constraints (3.23). 
Any choice for the set 5 is valid. Therefore the number of inequalities (4.1)-(4.2) 
is exponential and an efficient separation procedure is required. Let (E, p, x) be a 
current fractional solution of (HP3). For each commodity k1 E !C, the separation 
problem consists in determining a commodity k2 E !C, a toU arc a E A and a subset 
S of A such that the corresponding inequalities (4.1)-(4.2) are most violated, i.e., 
minimizing the respective right hand sides of these inequalities. For (4.1), we only 
consider inequalities such that C~1 ~ C~1 for aU b E A \ (S U {a} ), as only these 
are stronger than the Short est Path constraints (3.22). Further, as we would like 
to test the efficiency of both inequalities (4.1) and (4.2), we devise a separation 
procedure for each family. 
For each commodity k1 E !C, the separation procedure is the foUowing one. 
First, sort the toU arcs so that c} ~ ... ~ c~ ~ C~d' where n is the number of toU 
arcs in the network. Our goal is to construct the right hand sides of (4.1) and (4.2) 
as smaU as possible. Hence, for a given commodity k2 and a given toU arc a, the 
toU arcs in A \ (5 U {a}) (resp. A \ 5) are these for which: 
l.e., 
(4.5) 
Hence, for any commodity k2 E !C, each toU arc b E Ais assigned to a node of a 
_k2 + k1 _k2 
singly-linked list so that the corresponding values Pb _~b2 X b are sorted in increasing 
X b 
order, i.e., each node of this list contains a toU arc as data and points to the node 
_k2 + k1 _k2 
which contains the toU arc b E A with the next largest term Pb _~~ X b 
X b 
Then, for each commodity k2 and for toU arcs a going from 1 to n (i.e., sorted 
in increasing order), the sets A \ 5 are constructed sequentiaUy in order to obtain 
the smaUest values for the respective right hand sides of inequalities (4.1)-(4.2) 
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corresponding to commodity k1. Note that, for a given commodity k2 , the smaUest 
right hand si de values of (4.1) do not differ very much from a given toU arc a to 
the next one a + 1 (in terms of increasing order of the corresponding fixed costs), 
as if a E A \ S for a given toU arc, then a + 1 E A \ S by (4.5). FinaUy, we 
deduce the smaUest values for the right hand sides of inequalities (4.1) and (4.2) 
among aU k2 E K. For each commodity k1 E K, this separation procedure can be 
computed in O(knlogn), where k and n are the number of commodities and toU 
arcs respectively. 
We also derive other valid inequalities for the CCT-NPP and GCT-NPP, that 
tighten the 'Profit Upper Bound' constraints (3.23). These are presented in the 
next section. 
4.2 Strengthening the Profit Upper Bound Inequalities 
In this section, we propose valid inequalities for the CCT-NPP and GCT-NPP 
that strengthen the 'Profit Upper Bound' constraints (3.23). For any pair of com-
modities k1, k2 E K and any toU arc a E A, these ones link the profit variables p~l, 
p~2 with flows on both commodities Xkl and Xk2. 
First note that, due to the fixed costs c~ : k E K, a E A, any toU arc for a given 
commodity k1 E K cannot be ch os en alongside with any other toU arc for another 
commodity k2 E K. More formaUy, we have the foUowing definition. 
Definition 9 For any pair of commodities k1 , k2 E K, two toll arcs a, b E A are 
said ta be compatible for k1 and k2 respectively if there exists a feasible solution of 
(HP3) (resp. (HP3*)) su ch that X~l = 1 and X~2 = 1. For clarity of notation, this 
is labelled (b, k1) rv (a, k2 ) (and (b, k1) f (a, k2 ) otherwise). 
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The mam constraints of (HP3) (resp. (HP3*)) that influence compatibility 
are the Shortest Path constraints (3.22). The following lemma states a necessary 
condition such that two toll arcs are compatible for a pair of commodities. 
Lemma 1 For any pair of commodities k1, k2 E K and for any toll arcs a, b E A, 
a necessary condition sa that (b, kI) rv (a, k2 ) is 
Proof 
x~! = 1 = X~2 implies that tb + c~! ::; ta + c~! and ta + C~2 ::; tb + C~2 by the Shortest 
Path constraints (3.22). This yields c~! - c~! ::; ta - tb ::; C~2 - C~2, which proves 
that the condition is necessary. o 
For the GCT-NPP (i.e., model (HP3)), and assuming that the network has 
been presolved according to the Property mentioned in Section 3.3, the necessary 
condition mentioned above is also sufficient to allow compatibility between two toll 
arcs for a pair of commodities. 
Lemma 2 For any pair of commodities k1, k2 E K and for any toll arcs a, b E A 
such that ck! < ck! (resp. Ck2 < ck2 ) and ck2 < ck2 (resp. ck! <_ ckad!), a necessary b-ad b-ad a-ad a 
and sufficient condition sa that (b, kI) rv (a, k2 ) for (HP3) is 
Proof 
As we already know that the condition is necessary, let us proof that it is sufficient. 
Assuming that ck2 - ck2 > 0 point xk! = 1 = Xk2 tb = ·pk! = 0 t = pk2 = ck2 _ Ck2 b a - , b a' b ,a a b a 
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and td = Nd for aU d E A \ {a, b} is a feasible solution of (HP3). lndeed, the 
Shortest Path constraints (3.22) imply that 
thus also 
which are valid sinee C~2 - C~l ~ C~2 - C~l. The other Shortest Path constraints are 
clearly valid sinee variables td have been set sufficiently large for all d E A \ {a, b}. 
Further, C~2 ~ c~â ensures that p~2 ~ M:2, i.e., constraints (3.23) are satisfied. 
In the same way, if C~2 - C~2 < 0, point X~l = 1 = X~2, ta = 0, tb = C~2 - C~2 and 
td = Nd for aU dE A \ {a, b} is a feasible solution of (HP3). o 
Next, given the profit upper bounds M: : k E K, a E A, the ftow values Xkl for 
a commodity k1 E K give information about the feasible ftow values for another 
commodity k2 E K. This is expressed in the foUowing lemma. 
Lemma 3 For any pair of commodities k1 , k2 E K and for any toll arc a E A such 
that M:2 ~ M:l, X~l = 1 implies that there exists b E A such that X~2 = 1, with 
total cast tb + C~2 ~ ta + C~2 . 
Proof 
As X~l = 1, one should have ta = p~l ~ M:l by (3.23), (3.24) and (3.25). Henee 
ta ~ M:2, which means that the path containing toU arc a E A is cheaper than the 
toU free path for commodity k2 . o 
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Now we can present several valid inequalities that link the profit variables p~l, 
p!2 with flows on both commodities Xkl and Xk2. They exploit the notion of compat-
ibility defined above and allow to strengthen the Profit Upper Bound constraints 
(3.23). These rely on the following sets. 
Definition 10 For any pair of commodities k l , k2 E K and for any toU arc a E A, 
we define the set 
(4.6) 
which contain the toU arcs b E A such that (b, kd rv (a, k2 ) and (b, k2 ) rf (a, kl)' 
The complementary subset A \ A~ is denoted A~. 
First we propose valid inequalities that link a given Profit Upper Bound con-
straint p!2 :; M~2X~2 with (i) the flow variables X~l : b E A for another commodity 
k l and (ii) the remaining flow variables X~2 : b E A for commodity k2 . 
Proposition 6 Consider a pair of commodities k1 , k2 E K, a toll arc a E A such 
that jVI~l :; 1\tf~2 and b* argrninb A>'Mk2>Mkl {C~l - C~2}. Under the assumption E""a' b - b 
that there do es not exist any b E A \ { a} such that c!2 - c!l = C~2 - C~l, the foUowing 
inequalities are valid for CCT-NPP and GCT-NPP: 
p~2 :; M:2X~2 + (M:2 - M:l) ( I: (X~2 - X~l) - X~l) (4.7) 
bEAh{a} 
p~2 :; lVI:2 X~2 + (M:2 - M:l) ( I: (X~2 - X~l) - X~l) 
bEA~\{a} 
(4.8) 
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Note that, for given kl , k2 E K and a E A, the inequality (4.7) (resp. (4.8)) is 
non redundant if and only if xZ1 1 X!2 for b a (resp. b = a or b E A~), and 
helps to restrain the upper bound on p!2 in this case. 
Proof 
Let k1 , k2 E K and a E A be fixed. If 0 for aIl a E then X~l = 0 for aIl ~--------------
a E A such that M:2 ;::: M:l by Lemma 3. This yields 0 :; O. 
Now assume that X~2 = 1. The case xZ1 1 with b E A~ \ {a} is avoided by Lemma 
2 and the fact that there does not any b E A \ {a} such that C!2 -C~l = cZ2 -cZl . 
Otherwise: 
• If .T~l = 1, inequalities (4.7)-(4.8) become p!2 :; M!;l, which is valid by (3.23), 
(3.24), (3.25). 
• If xZ1 = 1 with b E A~ such that 111;2 ;::: M;l, (4.7)-(4.8) yield p~2 :; M!;2 
and p~2 :; M;'l + c~: - C~2. The first inequality is valid by (3.23). For 
the second inequality, constraint (3.22) imposes that p!2 + C~2 :; tb + cZ2. 
Further, p~l :; M;l by (3.23). As tb = p:l by (3.24) and (3.25), one has 
p~2 :; A1;1 + C~2 - C~2. The result follows from the definition of b*. 
• In aIl other cases, one obtains p!2 :; l\1f/;2, which is valid by (3.23). 
If X~2 = 1 with b E A~ \ {a} and X~l = 0 for aIl a E A or X~l 1 with d E A~ : 
M;2 < lvf;\ inequalities (4.7)-(4.8) become 0 :; M/;2 M/;l. If X~l 
d E A~ such that M;2 ;::: M;l, inequalities (4.7)-(4.8) become 0 :; A1/;2 
1 with 
A1k1 and a 
o :; M/;2 - M!;l - lvf;'2 + M;'l respectively, valid by definition of b*. Otherwise, 
if X~l = 1 with d E A~) one obtains 0 :; O. 
If x:2 = 1 for any b E A~ such that M;2 ;::: M;l and X~l 0 for aIl a E A or 
X~l = 1 with d E A~ : A1;2 < M;l, inequalities (4.7)-(4.8) become 0 :; 0 
and 0 < A1;.2 - M;'l, which is valid by the definition of b*. If X~l 1 for any 
./ 
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d E A~ : M;2 2 M;l, one obtains 0 ::; o. Other cases, i.e., X~l = 1 for any d E A~ 
cannot occur due to Lemma 2. Indeed, it would yield C~2 - C~l ::; C~2 - C~l, which 
is impossible by definition of the sets A~ and A~. 
Finally, if X~2 = 1 for any b E A~ such that M;2 < M;l and X~l = 1 with d E A~ : 
M;2 < M;l, inequalities (4.7)-(4.8) become 0 ::; O. The case X~l = 0 for aU a E A 
is avoided by Lemma 3. Other cases are avoided by Lemma 2. Indeed, case X~l = 1 
for any d E A~ would yield C~2 - C~l ::; C~2 - C~l, which is impossible by definition 
of the sets A~ and A~. Case X~l = 1 for any d E A~ such that M;2 2 M~l 
would yield Ck2 - Ckl < Ck2 - Ck1 As one knows that Ck2 - Ckl < Ck2 - Ckl and b b-d d· d d-ad ad 
[J 
Further, we also propose similar valid inequalities that link a given Profit Upper 
Bound constraint (3.23) p~2 ::; M~2X~2 with (i) the profit variable p~l for another 
commodity kI , (ii) the fiow variables X~l : b E IC for this same commodity kI and 
(iii) the remaining fiow variables for commodity k2 . 
Proposition 7 Gonsider a pair of commodities kI , k2 E IC, a toll arc a E A such 
that M~l ::; M~2 and b* = arg minb A> .Mk2 >Mkl {C~l - C~2}. Under the assumption 
E a· b - b 
that there does not exist any b E A \ {a} such that C~2 - C~l = C~2 - C~l, the following 
inequalities are valid for GGT-NPP and GGT-NPP: 
Pk2 _ pkl < M k2 '"""' (xk2 _ Xkl) a a- a~b b ( 4.9) 
bEA~ 
(4.10) 
bEA~ 
Note that, for given kI , k2 E IC and a E A, (4.9)-(4.10) are non redundant either 
if Xkl = 1 = Xk2 or if Xkl = 1 = Xk2 for b E A> such that M k2 > Mkl 
a a b a a b- b· 
Proof 
Let kI , k2 E K and a E A be fixed. 
If x~! = 0 for aIl a E A, then either 
• X~2 = 1, yielding p~2 ::; M:2 which is valid by (3.23); 
• X~2 = 1 for any b E Af \ {a}, which yields 0 ::; lVI:2; 
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• X~2 = 1 with b E A~ such that M;2 ~ M;! and (4.9)-(4.10) become 0 ::; 0 
and 0 ::; M;} - M;}, which is valid by definition of b*. 
• Or, in aIl other cases, one obtains 0 ::; o. 
If x~! = 1, then either: 
• X~2 = 1, and (4.9)-(4.10) become p~2 - p~! ::; 0, which is valid by (3.24); 
• X~2 = 1 for any b E Af \ {a}, which yields to -p~!::; 0, valid by (3.26); 
• X~2 = 1 with b E A~ are avoided by Lemma 2. 
• X~2 = 0 for aIl b E A cannot occur due to Lemma 3. 
If x~! = 1 for any b E Af \ {a} and if X~2 = 1 for any d E Af \ {a}, one 0 btains 
o ::; O. The case X~2 = 0 for aIl a E A is avoided by Lemma 3. AH other cases 
cannot occur due to Lemma 2. lndeed, case X~2 = 1 would yield C~2 -c~! ::; C~2 -c~!, 
which is impossible since b E Af \ {a} and there does not exists any b E A \ {a} 
such that Ck2 - c k ! = Ck2 - c k ! Case Xk2 = 1 with d E A> would yield Ck2 - c k ! < 
a a b b' d a d d-
C~2 - c~!. Or, by definition of the sets Af and A~, one has C~2 - c~! > C~2 - c~! 
and C~2 - c~! ::; C~2 - C~!, which is a contradiction. 
If x~! = 1 for any b E A~ such that M;2 ~ M;!, case X~2 = 0 for aIl a E A is 
avoided by Lemma 3. Case X~2 = 1 with d E A~ such that Mj2 < Mj! cannot 
occur. lndeed, Lemma 1 yields C~2 - C~l ::; C~2 - C~l. But one also knows that 
Ck2 _ c k ! < Ck2 - c k ! and Ck2 - c k ! > Ck2 - c k ! which is a contradiction Otherwise b b - ad ad d d ad ad' ., 
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• if X~2 = 1, (4.9) becomes p~2 ::; M~2, which is valid by (3.23). Further, 
constraints (3.22) and (3.23) impose p~2 + C~2 ::; tb + C~2 and p~l ::; M;l 
respectively. As tb = p~l by (3.24) and (3.25), this yields p~2 ::; M;l + C~2 -
C~2 ::; M~l + c~; - C~2 by definition of b* and (4.10) is valid. 
• If X~2 = 1 for any d E A~ \ {a}, one obtains 0 ::; M~2 and 0 ::; M~2 + M~l -
M~2, valid by definition of b*. 
• The last case X~2 = 1 for any d E A~ such that M;2 2:: M;l leads to 0 ::; o. 
Finally, if X~l = 1 with b E A~ such that M;2 < M;l, then either 
• xk2 = 1 yielding pk2 < M k2 valid by (3 23)· a' a - a' .,
• X~2 = 1 for any d E A~ \ {a}, and one obtains 0 ::; M~2; 
• X~2 = 1 for any d E A~ such that M;2 2:: M;l, and (4.9)-(4.10) become 0 ::; 0 
and 0 ::; M~2 - M~l, which is valid by definition of b*. 
• Or, in all other cases, one obtains 0 ::; O. o 
Finally, the following valid inequalities link the profit variables p~2, p~l for a 
given toll arc a E A and two commodities k1 , k2 E K with corresponding flow 
variables X~l, X~2 : b E A. Even if they do not really strengthen the Profit Upper 
Bound constraints (3.23), we decide to present these here sinee they are very similar 
to the previous valid inequalities proposed. 
Proposition 8 For any pair of commodities k1 , k2 E K and for any toll arc a E A 
such that M~l ::; M~2, assuming that there does not exist any b E A \ {a} such 
that C~2 - C~l = C~2 - C~l, the following inequalities are valid for GGT-NPP and 
GGT-NPP: 
p~l _ p~2 ::; M:l L (X~2 - X~l). (4.11) 
bEA~\{a} 
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Proof 
Let k1 , k2 E K and a E A be fixed. If X~l = 0 for aU a E A, then either 
• X~2 1, yielding _p~2 ::; 0 which is valid by (3.26), 
• X~2 1 for any b E A~ \ {a}, which yields to 0 ::; M:l. 
• Or, in aIl other cases, one obtains 0 ::; O. 
If X~l = 1, then: 
• If x:2 1, (4.11) becomes p~l - p:2 ::; 0, which is valid by (3.24), 
• If X~2 1 for any b E A~ \ {a}, one obtains p~l ::; M:l, valid by (3.23). 
• Other cases, i.e., X~2 = 1 with b E A~ and X~2 
occur due to Lemmas 2 and 3 respectively. 
o for aH a E A, cannot 
If 1 for any b E , case X~2 = 0 for aIl a E A is avoided by Lemma 
~--------~----~~~ 
3. Further, cases X~2 = 1 or X~2 = 1 with d E A~ cannot occur due to Lemmas 
2. lndeed, X!2 = 1 would yield C~2 - C~l < C;2 - C~l, which is impossible sinee 
b E A~ \ { a} and there does not exists any b E A \ {a} such that C~2 - C~1 = C~2 - C~1 . 
The case X~2 1 with d E A~ would yield C~2 - C~l :::; C;2 - C;1, which is avoided 
b th d fi 't' f h A> d A< 0 h . . 'f kl 1 C y e e m Ions 0 t e sets a an fi' t erwlse, Le., 1 X d = lor any 
d E A~ \ {a}, one obtains 0:::; O. 
Finally, if 1 for any b E , then: 
~--------------~ 
• If X~2 1 for any d E A~ \ {a}, one obtains 0 :::; !vf:1 . 
• The case X~2 = 1 yields to _p~2 ::; 0, which is valid by (3.26). 
• AH other cases yield 0 :::; o. o 
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4.3 Extension 
U pon close inspection of the facet equations returned by Porta for smaIl in-
stances, one can infer that the preceding inequalities, as weIl as constraints of 
model (HP3), can be combined to produce new valid inequalities. 
For example, let us consider the two foIlowing inequalities 
P~2 _ p~l < M~2 ~ (xk2 _ xkl) a a- a6b b 
bEAf 
of type (4.9) and (3.23), with b E A~ \ {a} for the second inequality. These can be 
combined to produce the new valid inequality 
ap~2 + p~2 _ p~l < aM_k2 X~2 + M~2 ~ (Xk2 _ xkl) 
b a a- bb a 6 b b' (4.12) 
bEAf\{b} 
with 
Let us prove the validity of (4.12). If X~2 = 0, one obtains (4.9). Hence X~2 
1 = X~l with d E A~ is the only non trivial case, which yields 
But constraints (3.22) ensure that p~2 + C~2 :::; tb + C~2, while constraints (3.23) to 
(3.26) give tb = p~l ::; M;l for aIl b E A~. Thus the a value must correspond to 
the largest possible choice for tb = p~2, and the result foIlows. 
However, given the apparent number of possible combinations, deriving them 
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aU and/or trying to find the better combinations would be too long for this thesis. 
Further, before beginning such an analysis, one should ponder its real usefulness in 
a larger context compared to the difficulty of performing it. 
Also note that, if two toU arcs a, b E A are not compatible for a pair of com-
modities kI , k2 E K, i.e., (a, kI ) cf (b, k2 ), hence inequality X~l + X~2 ::; 1 holds. 
Based on this compatibility notion, one cou Id imagine to construct a confiict graph 
with vertices x~ : k E K, a E A, in which the arcs would represent 'non compat-
ibility' between vertices. In this graph, any clique of vertices would be a subset 
of 'non compatible' vertices and yields a corresponding valid inequality. However, 
this class of inequalities, which only contains fiow variables, does not appear in the 
facet equations given by Porta for smaU instances. Indeed, aU the facet equations 
contain at least one toU or profit variable ta, p~ : k E K, a E A. Hence we decided 
to focus on this second class of inequality, at least for the purpose of the thesis. 
4.4 Conclusion 
In this chapter, we proposed sever al families of valid inequalities for CCT-NPP 
and GCT-NPP. They exploit the underlying network structure, and strengthen 
important constraints of (HP3) and (HP3*) models. In the next chapters, we will 
study the efficiency of these valid inequalities, both theoreticaUy and numericaUy. 
CHAPTER 5 
ASSESSING THE VALID INEQUALITIES 
The aim of this chapter is to assess the valid inequalities presented in Chapter 
4. In that purpose, we restrict our attention to problems involving one or two 
commodities. In Section 1, we focus on single commodity problems. Several (HP3) 
and (HP3*) constraints, as well as valid inequalities from the preceding chapter, 
are proved to be facet defining for the single commodity CCT-NPP and GCT-NPP, 
i.e., for the polyhedron described by the convex hull of (HP3) or (HP3*) feasible 
solutions. Further, for the single commodity GCT-NPP, a complete description of 
the convex hull of (HP3) feasible solutions can be highlighted. Next, in Section 
2, we prove that sever al (HP3) constraints, as well as most valid inequalities from 
the preceding chapter, define facets for the two-commodity GCT-NPP, i.e., for the 
convex hull of (HP3) feasible solutions. 
5.1 Single commodity Problems 
While it is known that the single commodity case is polynomially solvable, yet 
its analysis provides sorne insight. This section aims to highlight several facets 
of the convex hull of (HP3*) solutions, i.e., for the Constrained Complete Toll 
NPP. For the single commodity General Complete Toll NPP, we also show that a 
complete description of the convex hull of (HP3) feasible solutions can be obtained. 
5.1.1 Single commodity CCT-NPP 
Now we focus on the Constrained Complete Toll NPP with a single commodity 
and, for notational simplicity, remove the index k. Let us denote by pc the convex 
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hull of feasible solutions for the Constrained Complete Toll NPP, i.e., 
pC = conv {(t; p; x) E ~~ x ~~ x {a, 1}n : (3.17) - (3.18), (3.21) - (3.27)} , 
where n is the number of toll arcs l . 
In what follows, we assume that the network has been preprocessed according 
to Section 3.3, i.e., the toll arcs that are never used are removed and the set A is 
modified accordingly. 
Note that, in the single commodity case, constraints (3.24) can be removed from 
the model (HP3), allowing to set variables ta : a E A to arbitrarily large values 
when the corresponding toll arcs a E A are not used, i.e., when x~ = a for all 
k E K. We introduce a scalar M such that M > Cod - Ca for all a E A. Further, 
let Ma = max{a, Cod - Ca} as defined in (HP3*), and denote by ea a unit vector in 
the direction a. We also denote by 1 a vector with all coordinat es equal to 1. 
We also recall the definition of the sets {2r that have been introduced in Sec-
tion 3.3, i.e., 
{2r = {b E A : t(a) :::; t(b) < h(b) :::; h(a) or t(a) ~ t(b) > h(b) ~ h(a)}. 
Further, we define similar sets Ca, for all a in A. The corresponding subnetworks 
are depicted in Figure 5.1. 
Definition 11 For each a in A, the following set is defined: 
Ca = {b E A : t(b) :::; t(a) < h(a) :::; h(b) or t(b) ~ t(a) > h(a) ~ h(b)}. 
1 For notational simplicity, dashed letters denote vectors. 
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Figure 5.1: Examples of b E Ca and b E Ca 
Renee, if Triangle and Monotonicity inequalities are included in the problem, the 
toll variables must satisfy ta ~ tb for all b in Ca' Note that an arc b is in Ca if and 
only if a is in Cb' 
Throughout the analysis, we assume that the arcs are totally ordered (labels 1 
to n) in a manner that is compatible with the partial order induced by the Mono-
tonicity and Triangle inequalities. More specifically, the coordinates of toll arcs are 
such that if b E Ca for sorne couple a, b E A, i.e., the corresponding toll variables 
satisfy ta ~ tb, th en a has a sm aller index (also denoted 'a') than b. 
First, we prove that pC is full dimensional. 
Proposition 9 The polyhedron pC has full dimension, i.e., Dim (pC) = 3n. 
Proof 
Suppose by contradiction that the points pC lie on a generic hyperplane at + J1p + 
,x = 6. The points (Ml; 0; 0) and (Ml + ~bEA:b::::a eb; 0; 0) belong to pC for all 
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a E A. It follows that 
ML ab = 8 and Nf L ab + L ab = 8, 
bEA bEA bEA:b:S;a 
thus aa = 0 for ail a E A and 8 = O. Further, the points 
(M(l - L eb) + L eb; 0; ea) 
bEQ" bEA:b<a 
(Ml + L eb + (Ma - M) L eb; Maea;ea) 
bEA:b<a 
are in pC for aU a E A, thus la = 0 = Pa for aU a E A and the result follows. 0 
One can also prove that several constraints of model (HP3*) define facets of 
pC. Let (t; p; x) be points of pC. In order to prove that a given inequality is facet 
defining for pC, we define H as the hyperplane induced by a given inequalîty, and 
9 as a generic hyperplane defined by at + pp + IX = 8. 
pC n H and we deduce that 9 = H. 
we select points of 
Proposition 10 Constraints (3.21), (3.23) and (3.26) are facet defining for pC. 
Proof 
(i) Let H = {(t;p;x): I:aEAxa = 1}. 
For aU a E A, we consider the points (M(l - eb); 0; ea) and 
(M(l I:bE!2a eb) + I:bEA:b<a eb; 0; ea) of pc n H. This yields 
M L ab + la = 8 and 
bEA\Qa 
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Renee aa = 0 and la = 8 for aU a E A. Next, points 
(Ml + (Ma - M) L eh; Maea; ea) 
bEQa 
are also in pC n H for aU a E A. Renee (Ja = 0 for aU a E A. 
(ii) Let H = {(t; p; x) : Pa = M(ix(i, 7i E A}. 
Points (Ml; 0; 0) and (Ml + LbEA:b:Sa eh; 0; 0) are in pC n H for aU a E A, 
which implies that 
bEA bEA bEA:b:Sa 
thus aa = 0 for aU a E A and 8 = O. Points (M(l - LbEQa eh); 0; ea) also 
belong to pC n H for aU a E A \ {ii}, and la = 0 for aU a E A \ {ii}. As 
(Ml + (Ma - M) LbEQa eh; Maea; ea) are in pC n H for aU a E A, it foUows 
that (Ja = 0 for aU a E A \ {ii} and la = -M(if3a. The result foUows. 
(iii) Let H = {(t;p;x): Pa = 0, Ci E A}. 
Points (Ml; 0; 0) and (Ml + LbEA:b:Sa eh; 0; 0) are in pC n H for aU a E A, 
thus aa = 0 for aU a E A and 8 = O. As (M(l - LbEQa eh); 0; e a) also belong 
to pC nH for aU a E A, it foUows that la = 0 for aU a E A. FinaUy, the points 
(Ml + (Ma - M) LbEQa eh; Maea; ea) are in pC nH for aU a E A \ {ii}, thus 
(3a = 0 for aU a E A \ {ii} and the result foUows. o 
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Further, the Triangle and Monotonicity constraints also define facets of pC. 
Proposition 11 The Triangle constraints (3.17) are facet defining for pC. 
Proof 
Let'H = {(t; p; x) : ta = ti; + tê , a, b, è E A S.t. t(a) 
Further, assume that the index are so that b < è. 
belongs to pC n 'H, which implies 
t(b), h(b) t(è), h(è) = h(a)}. 
point (M (1 + 2:.:bEA:b:Sà eb); 0; 0 ) 
MLab + i\1 L ab 8. 
bEA bEA:b::;a 
For all a E A \ {a}, points (i\1(1 + 2:.:bEA\{a}:b::;a eb) + Sea; 0; 0) are in pC n 'H 
with S = M for a < b, S = 21''v1 for b ::; a < c, and S 3M for a ;:::: è. It follows 
that 
MLab+ M L ab+ 8. 
bEA bEA\{a}:b::;a 
From the first case a < b we know that aa = 0 (for a 1= a) ; from the second one 
we conclude that aii = -ai; and that the other index aa 0; from the last one we 
obtain aa = -aè and aa = 0 for the other index. 8 O. 
Further, for aIl a E A such that a, b, c r:J ~, the points 
(M(l + L eb L eb); 0; ea) 
bE<Jâ bEQ., 
belong to pc n 'H. In those point coordinates, the first sum ensures that the given 
Triangle inequality holds at equality, while the second sum ensures that ta Pa 
(as imposed by constraints (3.24) and (3.25) of (RP3*)) and that the Monotonicity 
inequalities hold. For aIl a E A such that either a or b or c in 
(M(l 2:.:bEQa eb); 0; e a ) are in pC n 'H. Renee Îa = 0 for aIl a E A. 
the points 
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one considers points Next, for aIl a E A such that à, b, è rf. 
(1\1(1 + I:bé7â nA eb) + (!vIa - M) eb; Maea; ea ) of pC n Ji. Otherwise, Le., 
if either à or b or c is in the points 
are in pC n Ji. This yields Pa = 0 for aIl a E A and the result foIlows. D 
Proposition 12 The Monotonicity constraints (3.18) ta ~ tb are facet defining 
for pC if and only if Cd ~ Ca for all d E A such that b E ~ and à rf. Cd (see Figure 
5.2). 
,0 
" 1 1 1 
l , 
d!Q 
1 1 \ 
l ,\ 
, ,b \ U-- ',a 
~: 
1 , , 
, 1 g 
Figure 5.2: Part of network for the assumption of Proposition 29 
Proof 
Let Ji = {(t;p;x): t à = t b, à,b E A S.t. t(à) = t(b) < h(à) = h(b) + 1}. 
First, let us show that the proposition assumption is required. By contradiction, 
suppose that there exists d E A such that b E ~, à rf. and Cd > Ca (see 
5.2). If ed = 1, one must have Cd + td ~ Cà + tà, which implies td < But, as 
b E ~, one also has td ~ t b = t à for points of Ji. Renee aIl points of pC nJi belong 
to the hyperplane Xd = 0, which is a contradiction. 
Now assume that the proposition assumption holds. For aIl a E A \ {à}, points 
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(M(l + I:bEA\{à}:b:Sa eh) + Seà; 0; 0) are in pc n H if the constant S is so that 
- -S = 0 for a < band S = M for a 2:: b. As (Ml; 0; 0) also belongs to pc n H, it 
follows that 
MLab = 8 and MLab + M 
bEA bEA bEA\{à}:b:Sa 
From the first case a < b we know that aa = 0 (for a =1= a) ; from the second one 
we conclu de that aà = -ab and that the other index aa = O. Renee 8 = O. 
Further, for all a E A, points (M(l - I:bEQaUQà eh); 0; ea ) are in pc n H. Note 
that imposing tb = 0 for all b E Cà allows that the given Monotonicity inequality 
holds at equality when a is so that b E~. This implies that ra = 0 for all a E A. 
Finally, for all a E A such that a, b tJ. Ca' one considers points 
(Ml + (Ma - M) L eh; Maea; ea) 
bEQa 
of pc n H. Otherwise, i.e., when b E ~, points 
(Ml + (Mb - M) L eh; Mbea; ea) 
bEQaUQà 
belong to pc nH. Again, the small change in those point coordinates (Ma becomes 
Mb) allows that the Monotonicity inequality involving a, b E A holds at equality. 
This yields (3a = 0 for all a E A, and the result follows. o 
Renee most constraints of the model (RP3*) define faeets of the convex hull 
of (RP3*) feasible solutions. Now let us focus on the valid inequalities presented 
in Chapter 4. For a single commodity, the Strengthened Profit Upper Bound 
inequalities (4.7) to (4.11) are obviously redundant, thus are not considered here. 
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In contrast, the Strengthened Shortest Path inequalities (4.1) and (4.2) become 
L (Pb + CbXb) + cod(1- LXb) :::; ta + Ca + L (Pb + (Cb - Ca)Xb) (5.1) 
bEA bEA bEA\(SU{a}) 
L (Pb + CbXb) + cod(1 - L Xb) :::; Cod + L (Pb + (Cb - Cod)Xb) (5.2) 
bEA bEA bEA \S 
for aIl a E A and for aIl S <::;; A. However, (5.2) can be equivalently rewritten as: 
LPb :::; L(Cod - Cb)Xb VS<::;;A 
bES bES 
which are redundant by constraints (3.23). 
Let us state the conditions in which the Strengthened Shortest Path inequalities 
( 4.7) define facets of pC. 
Proposition 13 The single commodity Strengthened Short est Pa th inequalities 
(5.1) L (Pb + CbXb) + cod(1 - L Xb) :::; tà + Cà + L (Pb + (Cb - Cà)Xb) 
bEA bEA bEA\(SU{à}) 
are facet defining for pC for all sets S such that Cà 2 Cb for all b in A \ (S U {à} ). 
Proof 
Considering a Strengthened Shortest Path inequality in its generic form, let H be 
defined as 
H = {(t;p;x) : tà - L Pa + L (Cod - Ca)xa + 
aESU{à} aESU{à} aEA\(SU{à}) 
à E A, S <::;; As. t. Cà 2 Ca Va E A \ (S U {à} ) } . 
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First, points 
(Ml + (Mâ - M) L eb;O;O) 
bEQii 
(Ml + (Mâ - M) L eb + L eb;O;O) 
bEA\{â}:b:=;a 
belong to pC n H for all a E A. This implies 
M L Cl'b + Nh L Cl'b = 8 and M L Cl'b+Mâ L Cl'b+ L Cl'b = 8, 
bEA\Qâ bEQa bEQa bEA\{â}:b:=;a 
thus Cl'b = 0 for any b :cf. il, and 8 = MaCl'â' 
The point (Ml + (Mâ - M) eb; Màea; eâ) ofpcnH yields to Mà Cl' à + Maf3a+ 
Îa = MaCl'a, and Îâ = -Maf3à' The point (M(l- I:bEQà eb);O;eà ) also belongs 
to pC n H, leading to Îa -Cl'à. 
Further, for all a E A \ (8 U {il}), points (M(l 
belong to pC n H, which implies "fa MaCl'a. From points 
(M(l L eb) + (Ca Ca - M) L eb); (Ca - ca)ea; ea) 
bEQa\Qii 
of pC n H, it follows that (Cà ca)f3a + Îa = Mà.Cl'â, and f3a = O. 
For aIl a E 8 \ {il}, the points 
(Ml + (Ma M) L eb + (Ma - M) L eb; Maea;ea) 
bEQa \Qâ 
are in pC n H, yielding Îa -Maf3a. If Ca 2': Câ, the point 
(M(l L eb) + (ca Ca - Nf) L eb; 0; ea) 
bEQâ 
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belongs to penH. Renee, (ca Cà)aà+~fi)' = Maaa and la = M(l.aà' Otherwise, i.e., 
if Ca < Ca, points (A1(1 - eb) + (ca Ca - M) LbEQ" \Qà eb; (Ca - ca)ea; ea) 
are in pc n H and (ca - ca)f3a + la IVfaaà' As la -Maf3a, we obtain f3a = -aà 
for ail a ES \ {à} and the result follows. 0 
In the next subseetion, we restriet our attention to the GCT-NPP. In this case, 
the Strengthened Shortest Path inequalities allow to present a complete description 
of the eonvex hull of feasible solutions for the corresponding single commodity 
problem. 
5.1.2 Single commodity GCT-NPP 
Now con si der the single commodity General Complete Toll KPP, and let us 
define p as the convex hull of feasible solutions for this problem, i.e., 
P=conv{(t;p;x) EIR~ xIR~ x {O,l}n: (3.21) (3.27)}. 
As pc ç P, we have the following results. 
Corollary 1 Dim(P) = 3n. 
Corollary 2 Ineq'llalit'ies 
Pa 2 ° Va E A 
L (Pb + CbXb) + cod(1- L Xb) ::;: ta + Ca + L (Pb + (Cb - Ca)Xb) 
bEA bEA bEA\(SU{a}) 
Va E A, VS ç A S.t. Ca 2 Cb Vb E A \ (S U {a}) 
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with Ma = max{O, Cod - Ca}, are facet defining for P. 
Further, this allows us to present a minimal complete description of P. 
Proposition 14 Let 15 = {(t; p; x) E lR~ x lR~ x lR~ : 
Pa 2:: 0 
(5.3) 
Va E A (5.4) 
Va E A (5.5) 
L (Pb + CbXb) + cod(I - L Xb) :S ta + Ca + L (Pb + (Cb - Ca)Xb) 
bEA bEA bEA\(SU{a}) 
Va E A, VS ÇA: Ca 2:: Cb Vb E A \ (S U {a}) (5.6) 
with Ma = max{O,Cod - Ca} }. Then 15 = P. 
Proof 
Let A = {l, ... , n} be the toll arcs of the network. We define a fractional point of 
15 as a point of 15 with a fractional component x, i.e., there exists i in {l, ... , n} 
such that 0 < Xi < 1. Similarly, an integer point of 15 is defined as a point of 15 
with an integer component x, i.e., Xi E {O, I} for aIl i in {l, ... , n}. 
We have proved that (5.3)-(5.6) define facets of P. Now one can show that any 
fractional point of P is not extremal. lndeed, let (t; p; x) be a fractional point of 
15, where 0 :S Xi :S 1 for aIl i E {l, ... , n} and there exists at least one Xi such that 
o < Xi < 1. This point can be presented as a convex combination of integer points 
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of 15: 
(t; p; x) . 1 n L Xi(t\ xPiei;ei) + (1- LXi) (tn +1;o;o) 
iE{I, ... ,n}:xi#O 2 i=1 
( . L._ Xi
ti + (1 -t Xi)t n +1; p; X) , 
2E{I, ... ,n}.xi#O 2-1 
with 0 :s; Xi :s; 1 Vi E {1, ... , n}, :J i : 0 < Xi < 1, t i = (t~)j=I, ... ,n+l and 
i {Pi } t = max 0 - + C - C· J ' - 2 J Xi Vi,j E {1, ... ,n} : Xi i= 0 (5.7) 
t n+1 + j = Cod - Cj Sj Vj E {1, ... ,n}, (5.8) 
with Sj E lR+. 
These integer points belong to 15. lndeed, (5.3)-(5.5) are clearly satisfied. Next, 
for the integer points corresponding to i E {1, ... , n}, (5.6) yields either tj ~ 0 or 
t~ ~ ~+Ci-Cj followingthati E A\(Su{j}) ornot, whichisensured by (5.7). For 
the last integer point n + 1, the null components x and p force taxes t'rI: j E A 
to be larger that Cod - Cj in (5.6), which is also ensured by the definition (5.7) of 
these taxes. 
Next, for each j E A, we introduce the set B(j) = {i E A : Xi i= 0, ~ + Ci - Cj > 0 } 
and let Sj be such that 
Since the fractional point (t, p, x) satisfies (5.6) with Su {j} = B(j), it follows 
that Sj ~ o. 
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Hence we have: 
n L xitj + (1 - L XiW;+l (5.9) 
iE{l, ... ,n}:xdO i=l 
. L _ Xi max {o, ;/5i + Ci - Cj} + (1 - tXi) (Cod - Cj + Sj) (5.10) 
tE{l, ... ,n}:xi#O t=l 
= (Cod - cj)(l - t Xi) + . L _ Xi max {o, ;/i + Ci - Cj} (5.11) 
i=l tE{l, ... ,n}:xdO 
n 
+ fj - L (Pi + CiXi - CjXi) - (1 - LXi)(Cod - Cj), (5.12) 
iEB(j) i=l 
which is equal to fj by definition of B(j). 0 
In the next section, we focus on two-commodity instances. We prove that most 
valid inequalities and (HP3) constraints are facet defining for the two-commodity 
GCT-NPP, Le., for the polyhedron described by the convex hull of (HP3) feasible 
solutions. 
5.2 Two-commodity problems 
We now focus on two-commodity problems. Further, as Triangle and Mono-
tonicity constraints are not involved in the valid inequalities presented in Chapter 
4, we restrict the theoretical analysis of two-commodity problems to the GCT-NPP. 
This section aims to point out several facets of the convex hull of (HP3) feasible 
solutions, i.e., for the GCT-NPP. 
72 
Let P be the convex hull of feasible solutions for the two-commodity GCT-~PP, 
I.e., 
x .lR~n x {D, 1}2n : (3.21) - (3.27)}, 
where n is the number of toll arcs. 
Let us denote by en a unit vector in direction a, and by E a very small 
non negative scalar. Further, let M: max{O, C~d c~} as defined in (HP3), and 
Na = maxkEiC ]'.1[: + E. This last choice, which is not exactly the same as in Chapter 
3, is motivated by the fact that we some fiexibility to be able to vary the 
ta : a E A variables when the corresponding toll arcs are not used by any commod-
ity. However, note that this choice does not change the set of optimal solutions for 
the problem. 
Throughout the analysis, we also make the foUowing assumptions. 
Assumption 1: For all k E K and for all a E A, ivf: > D. 
By contrast, if there exists k E K and a E A with M: 0, aU points of P lie on 
an hyperplane p~ O. Hence P is not full dimensional and the proofs presented 
further need to be transformed accordingly. 
Assumption 2: For aU a E A, either M:! i= A1:2 , or there exists b E A \ {a} 
such that Ck2 - ck1 ...t. ck2 ck ! a a ~ b b 
Note that this assumption is not very restrictive. Indeed, it excludes the particular 
case in which C~2 C~l + K (K E IR) for aU a EAu {od}. In this case, all points 
of P lie on the following hyperplane: 
L(p~l + C!!X!l) + c~à(l L X!l ) + K = L (p!2 + C~2 X!2) + c~â( 1 
aEA aEA aEA 
Renee the cost structure is the same for commodities kl and k2 , and it becomes a 
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single commodity problem. 
Let 'H = {( t; p; x) : J.Lt + IJkl pk1 + IJk2 pkz + ek1xk1 + e2x k2 = <p} and assume 
that aU points of P n 'H lie on a generic hyperplane ç = {(t; p; x) : at + ;3klpkl + 
;3k2 pk2 + ~/l Xk! + Îkzxk2 = (j}. The following lemmas show that properties on the 
coefficients of'H impose conditions on the coefficients of ç. Note that the second 
and third statements of the following lemmas are variants of the corresponding first 
statements, and will be usedfor the proofs of facets of constraints (3.21) and (3.24). 
Lemma.4 Consider that aU points of P n 'H lie on the generic hyperplane ç. 
1. If the coefficients of'H are such that NaJ.La <p and J.Lb = 0 for b E A, 
then ab = 0 and EaEA Naaa = 15. Further, if <p 0 and J.La 0 for all a E A, 
then aa = 0 for all a E A and 15 O. 
2. If the coefficients of'H are such that J.La 0, ~!1 0 and e!2 = <p for ail 
a E A, then aa = 0 and Î!l + Î!2 = 15 for all a E A. 
Proof 
1. The points 
(I: Naea; 0; 0; 0; 0) (5.13) 
aEA (I: Naea Œb; 0; 0; 0; 0) (5.14) 
aEA 
are in P n 'H. As they also belong to the generic hyperplane g, it follows that 
I: Naaa Eab = (j, 
aEA 
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thus O'b = 0 and NaO'a <5. Further, if rp = 0 and !-ta = 0 for aIl a E A, 
then the points (5.13), (5.14) are in P n H for aU b E A. Hence O'a 0 for 
aU a E A and <5 = O. 
2. The points 
( L Naea; 0; 0; eb; eb) 
aEA\{b} 
( L Naea tef; 0; 0; eb; eb) 
aEA\{b} 
are in P n H for aIl b E A and for all f E A \ {b}. As they also belong to the 
generic hyperplane Q, it foUows that 
LNaO'a + 1;1 + 1;2 = <5 
aEA 
'" NT kl k2 , L..t aO'a - EO'f + lb + lb = u. 
aEA 
Hence O'a = 0 and I~l + 1~2 <5 for aU a E A. 
Lemma 5 Consider that all points of P n H lie on the generic hyperplane Q. 
1. If the coefficients of H are such that LaEA Na!-ta = rp, !-tb = 0 and ç;l = 
for b E A then ~ykl = _ryk'l Further zf 1}1 = _vk2 then {3kl = _{3k'l 1 b lb • 'b b , b b . 
o 
2. If the coefficients of H are su ch that !-ta 0, ç~1 = 0, ç~2 = rp for all a E A 
3. If the coefficients of H are su ch that !-ta 0 for all a E A \ {b}, !-tb = - V;2 , 
V;1 = 0 = ç;l and ç;2 = rp = Nb!-tb, then O'b + {3;1 + ,3;2 = 0 and 1;1 + ~f;2 = 
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Proof 
1. As /-Lb = 0 and '2:aEA Na/-La = 4>, one knows that O'.b = 0 and '2:aEA NaO'.a = r5 
by Lemma 4.1. Then, the point ( Naea; 0; 0; eb; eb) is in P n 'H, 
and one obtains 'Y;1 + 'Y;2 = O. Further, if 1.1;1 _1.1;2, th en the point 
('2:aEA\{b} Naea + Œb; Œb; Œb; eb; eb) also belongs to P n 'H, which yields 
(Jk1 __ ~k2 
,b - tJb' 
2. The point ('2:aEA\{b} Naea + Œbi Œb; Œb; eb; eb) belongs to Pn'H. As /-La = 0, 
ç!l = 0 and ç!2 = 4> for all a E A imply O'.a 0 and 'Y!1 + 'Y!2 = r5 for aIl 
a E A by Lemma 4.2, one obtains f3;1 = 
3. As /-La = 0 for all a E A \ {b} and 4> - Nb/-Lb, one knows that O'.a = 0 
for aIl a E A \ {b} and NbO'.b = r5 by Lemma 4.1. Further, the points 
('2:aEA\{b} Naea; 0; 0; eb; eb) and ('2:aEA\{b} Naea + Œb; Œb; Œb; eb; eb) are in 
P n 'H, thus one obtains 
k 1 + k2 N 
'Yb 'Yb = bO'.b 
E(O'.b + f3;1 + f3;2) + 'Y;1 + 'Y~2 = NbO'.b. 
and the result follows. o 
Lemma 6 Consider that all points of P n 'H lie on the generic hyperplane 9 and 
let b E A su ch that M~l < JvJ~2 . 
1. If the coefficients of 'H are such that '2:aEA N a/-La = 4> J /-Lb = 0 a nd 1.I~2 0 
ç~2 J then f3;2 = 0 = 'Y;2 . 
2. If the coefficients of'H are su ch that /-La = 0, ç!l = 0, ç!2 4> for aU a E A 
and 1.1;'2 = 0, th en f3;2 = 0 and 'Y;2 = J. 
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$, If the coefficients of ft are 8uch that f-L(, = 0 fOT aU a E A \ {b}, Pb = - vtz 
and ~;2 = <p == Nbf.lry, then Œb = -/3;2 and ft'"' = NbŒb' 
Proof 
The points 
are in P n ft. 
( L Nae,,+A1ileb;0;Mtleb;0;eb) 
aEA\{b} 
( L Nue" + (Mil + t)eb; 0; (J'vIiI + t)eb; 0; eu) 
aEA\{b} 
1. As Pb = 0, LaEA Naf-La = <P imply ab = 0 and 2:aEA Naaa (j by Lernrna 4.1, 
one obtains 
2, As Pa = 0, e!l = 0 and t;:2 = <P for all a E A imply 0:'(, = 0 for all a E A by 
Lemma 4.2, one obtains 
3, As 11.0. = 0 for aH il E A \ {b} and <P = NbPbl one knows that Œa 0 for all 
77 
a E A \ {b} and Nbab = 8 by Lemma 4.1. 1 t follows that 
AIti ab + JVItl ;3t2 + ~ft2 = 8 
(Mt l + f)ab + (M;l + f),8;2 + ',;2 = 8, 
thus ab = o 
Lemma 7 Consider that aU points of P n 'H lie on the generic hyperplane 9 and 
let b, d E A such that C~2 
1. If the coefficients of'H are su ch that LaEA Na/ka = 4>: /kb = 0 = /kd, çtl = _ç~2 
and vk ! 0 b Vk2 then ;3kl - _;3k'l and (Mkl _ Mkl );3kl + ~ykl + ~yk2 - 0 d: b- d b db b d-
(resp. (Mt2 M~2);3tl + ,~l + ,;2 = 0). 
2. If the coefficients of 'H are such that /ka = 0 for ail a E A \ {d}, 11d = 
,ç;'l 4> NdlJ'd and V~l = 0 = ç~l, then ad + ;3~1 + ,3~2 = 0 and 
(J'vft l JVI~1 ),3tl + ,~l + ,;2 8 (resp. (J'vItz 1vI~2),3tl + ,tl + ,~2 = 8). 
Proof 
If lVI~l ::; M;2, the points 
( L Na€a + Mtl€b + !vI;l€d; 1VIt1€b; !v[;l€d; €b; €d) 
aEA\{b,d} 
( L Na€a + (Mtl - E)€b + (M;l 
aEA\{b,d} 
are in P n 'H. If Mkl > M k2 the points d - d' 
( L Na€a + lvft2€b + lvf;2€d; Mt2€b; M;2€d; €b; €d) 
aEA\{b,d} 
( L Na€a + UvI:2 E)€b + (M~2 - E)€d; (Mtz E)€b; (N[~2 - f)€d; €b; €d) 
aEA\{b,d} 
78 
1. As /-Lb = 0 = /-Ld and LaEA Na/-La = cP imply ab = 0 = ad and LaEA Naaa = 8 
by Lemma 4.1, one obtains 
M;1 (3;1 + M;1 (3;2 + ,;1 + ,;2 = 0 
(M;1 - E)(3;1 + (M;1 - E)(3;2 + ,;1 + ,~2 = 0, 
2. As /-La = 0 for aU a E A \ {d} and cP = Nd/-Ld, one knows that aa = 0 for aU 
a E A \ {d} by Lemma 4.1. It foUows that 
M;1 ad + M;1 (3;1 + M;1 (3;2 + ,;1 + ,;2 = 8 
(M;1 - E)ad + (M;1 - E)(3;1 + (M;1 - E)(3;2 + ,;1 + ,;2 = 8, 
o 
Lemma 8 Consider that all points of P n 'H. lie on the generic hyperplane 9 and 
let b d E A such that Ck2 - Ck1 < Ck2 - ck1 
, d d b b . 
1. If the coefficients of'H. are such that LaEA Na/-La = cP, /-Lb = 0 = /-Ld, ç;1 = _ç;2 
and 1/;1 = 0 = 1/;2, then (3;1 = 0 and min {M;1 , M;2} (3;2 + ,;1 + ,;2 = o. 
2. If the coefficients of'H. are su ch that /-La = 0, ç~1 = 0, ç~2 = cP for all a E A 
and 1/;1 = 0 = 1/;2, then (3;1 = 0 and min { M;1 , M;2} (3;2 + ,;1 + ,;2 = 8. 
3. If the coefficients of'H. are such that /-La = 0 for all a E A \ {d}, /-Ld = _1/;2, 
ç;2 = cP = Nd/-Ld and 1/;1 = 0 = ç;l, then (3;1 = 0 and min {M;1 , M;2} (ad + 
(3;2) + ,;1 + ,;2 = 8. 
Proof 
If M;1 :s; M;2, the points 
( L Naea + M;l eb + M:l ed ; M;l eb ; M:l ed ; eb; ed) 
aEA\{b,d} 
( L Naea + (M;1 - E)eb + M;l ed ; (M;1 - E)eb; M;l ed ; eb; ed) 
aEA\{b,d} 
are in P n H. Otherwise, i.e., if M:l > M:2, the points 
( L Naea + M;2 eb + M;2 ed ; M;2 eb ; M;2 ed ; eb; ed) 
aEA\{b,d} 
( L Naea + (M;2 + E)eb + M;2 ed ; (Jvf;2 + E)eb; M;2 ed ; eb; ed) 
aEA\{b,d} 
are in P n H. 
1. As {Lb = 0 = {Ld and L:aEA Na{La = cP , one knows that ab 
L:aEA Naaa = 5 by Lemma 4.1. If M;1 :s; M;2, one obtains 
M;I13:1 + M;I13;2 + Î:1 + Î~2 = 0 
(M;1 - E)13:1 + M;1 13~2 + Î:1 + Î~2 = 0, 
o 
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thus 13:1 = 0 and M;1 13~2 + Î:1 + Î~2 = O. Otherwise, i.e., if M;1 > M;2, one 
obtains 
M:213:1 + M;2 13~2 + Î:1 + Î~2 = 0 
(M:2 + E)13:1 + M;2 13~2 + Î:1 + Î~2 = 0, 
2. As {La = 0, ç~1 = 0 and ç~2 = cP for aIl a E A, one knows that aa = 0 for aIl 
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a E A by Lemma 
M:1 /3~1 + lvI;1 /3~2 + ,~1 + ,~2 = 8 
(M:l E) /3;1 + lv!;1 /3~2 + ,:1 + ,~2 6. 
thus /3;1 0 and Mjl /3~2 + ,~1 + ,~2 = 8. Otherwise, Le.) if Mjl > Mj2, one 
obtains 
Mt2 /3;1 + lvI;z /3~2 + ,;1 + ,~2 = 8 
(Mt2 + E)/3;1 + lvfj2/3~2 + ,;1 + ,~2 8. 
3. As /-La 0 for an a E A \ {b} and <P = Nb/-Lb, one knows that aa 0 for an 
a E A \ {b} by Lemma 4.1. If 1\1;1 :S M;2 , one obtains 
M;l ad + Mtl /3;1 + IvI;1 /3~2 + ~(;l + ~(~2 8 
M:l ad + (M:l - E)/3~1 + 11,1;1/3;2 + ,tl + ,;2 8. 
thus /3:1 0 and 1\1;1 (ad+ /3~2) +,;1 +,;2 = 6. Otherwise, 
one obtains 
lvl:2 ad + lvItz /3;1 + li1;2/3;2 + ,;1 + ,;2 = 6 
M;2 ad + (1'1It2 + E)/3;l + lvf;2 /3~2 + ,;1 + ,j2 8. 
o 
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Lemma 9 Consider that aU points of P n 1{ lie on the generic hyperplane 9 and 
let b E A such that Al;l :s; M;2. 
1. If the coefficients of 1{ are su ch that LaEA N al1a 
_Mk2 vk2 then Î k2 = _Mk2(3k2 bb' b bb' 
2. If the coefficients of 1{ are 8uch that l1a = 0, ~~1 0, 
and v:2 = 0, then A1;2 (3;2 + Î;2 6. 
Proof 
The points (LaEA\{b} Naea + Nf;2 eb ; 0; i\II;2 eb ; 0; eb) are in P n 1{. 
4> for aU a E A 
1. As /J'b = 0, LaEA Na/-la = 4> imply 0:b = 0 and LaEA N a0:a 6 by Lemma 4.1, 
one obtains Î;2 = -1'vf;2 (3;2. 
2. As /-la = 0, ~~1 = 0 and ~~2 = 4> for aIl a E A imply 0:a 0 for aIl a E A by 
Lemma 4.2, one obtains Nf;2(3;2 + Î;2 = 6. 0 
Lemma 10 Consider that aU points of P n 1{ lie on the generic hyperplane 9 and 
let b E A such that A1;1 > i'vf;2. If the coefficients of1{ are such that Na/-la 
4> , /-lb = 0, ~;1 = - M;2 V;l and ç;2 = - 1\1[;2 v:2, then Î;l = -Nf;2 (3;1 and Î;2 
_Mk2(3k2 
b b' 
Proof 
As /-lb 0, LaEA Na/-la = 4>, one knows that ab = 0 and LaEA N a0:a 6 by 
Lemma 4.1. Further, permuting the commodity indices k1 and k2 in Lemma 6 
yields (3;1 = 0 = Î:1. Hence, as the points 
( I:: Naea + }Vf;2 eb ; Nf;2 eb ; 0; eb; 0) 
aEA\{b} 
( I:: Naea + M;2 eb ; 1'vf;2eb ; M;2 eb; eb; eb), 
aEA\{b} 
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belong to P n H, one obtains 
M;2 ;3~1 + "(~1 = 0 
lvI;2 ;3;1 + 1'..1;2 ;3;2 + "(;1 + "(;2 = o. 
The result follows. o 
Using these lemmas, we can prove that P is full dimensional. 
Proposition 15 The polyhedron P has full dimension, i.e., Dim(P) = 5n. 
Proof 
Let H = {(t; p; x) : Ox = O}. Suppose by contradiction that the points of P n H 
lie on a generic hyperplane Ç}. By Lemma 4.1, one knows that ab = 0 for all b E A 
and {y = o. Further, by Lemma 5.1, one obtains ;3~1 = _;3~2 and "(~1 = _"(~2 for all 
bE A. 
Next, for all b E A such that M;1 < M~2, one has ;3~2 = 0 = "(~2 by Lemma 6.1. 
For all b E A such that M;1 > M~2, permuting the commodity indices k1 and k2 
in Lemma 6.1 yields ;3~1 = 0 = "(~1. Rence ;3~1 = 0 = ;3~2 and "(~1 = 0 = "(~2 for all 
b E A such that M;1 =1 M;2. 
Now, for all b E A such that M;1 = M;2, Assumption 2 ensures that there exists 
dE A \ {b} such that C~2 -C~1 =1 C~2·_C~I. Without loss of generality, we can assume 
that C~2 - C~1 < C~2 - C~I, and Lemma 8.1 yields ;3~1 = O. Further, permuting the 
commodity indices k1 and k2 in Lemma 9.1 yields "(~1 = O. Rence ;3~1 = 0 = ;3~2 
and "(~1 = 0 = "(~2 for all b E A such that M;1 = M;2, and the result follows. 0 
One can also prove that several (RP3) constraints, as well as most valid in-
equalities presented in Chapter 4, are facet defining for P. Let (t; pkl; pk2; Xkl; Xk2) 
be points of P. In order to prove that a given inequality is facet defining for P, 
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we consider h as the hyperplane induced by this given inequality, and ç a generic 
hyperplane. Then, we prove that ç h. 
Proposition 16 Constraints (3.21) X~2 ::; 1 are facet defining for P if and 
only if, for each b E A such that M;l > M;2, the're exists d E A \ {b} such that 
M;l ::; M;2 and C~2 C~1 =1= C~2 C~1 
Proof 
Leth= {(t;p;x): X~2 1 }. By Lemma 4.2, one knows that ab = 0 for aH 
obtains ,t3~1 ,t3~2 by Lemma 5.2. 
Further, for aH b E A such that 1\11;1 < 1',1[;2, Lemma 6.2 yields ;3~2 = 0 and ,~2 = 5, 
thus also ;3:1 = 0 = ,;1. 
For aH b E A such that M;l = .M;2, we know by Assumption 2 that there exists 
d E A \ {b} su ch that C~2 - C~1 =1= C~2 - C~l. If C~2 C~l < C~2 C~l = c~~ c~à, 
Lemma 8.2 yields ;3;1 = 0 = ;3~2. Further, one obtains ,;2 S, thus also ,;1 = 0, 
by Lemma 9.2. If c~~ - c~à = C~2 - C~l < C~2 C~l, permuting k l and k2 in Lemma 
8.2 yields ;3;2 = 0 = ;3;1. One also obtains ,,(~2 0 and ,il 0 by Lemma 9.2. 
Otherwise, i.e., for aIl b E A snch that J'vI;1 > M;2, the proposition hypothesis 
ensures that there exists d E A \ {b} such that Mj1 ::; Mj2 and C~2 C~1 =1= C~2 C~1 , 
which implies C~2 - C~1 ::; c~~ c~à < C~2 - C~l. It follows that ;3~1 0 = ;3:2 and 
I\llj1 ;3~2 +,;1 +,~2 = 0 by Lemma 8.2. As ;3~2 = 0 and ,~2 0, one obtains ",;1 = 0 
and ,~2 = o. 
Finally, assume there exists b E A, M'il > M~;2, such that there does not any 
d E A \ {b} with Mj1 ::; lvlj2 and C~2 C~1 =1= C~2 - C~1. If there does not exist any 
d E A \ {b} with Ck2 - Ck1 -t. Ck2 - Ck1 then Ck2 - ckl < c k2 c k1 c k2 c k1 for aIl d d Î b b , od od b b d d 
b, d E A, thns J\;fj! > J\;fj2 for aU d E A. Further, if there exists d E A \ {b} with 
C~2 - c~! =1= C~2 - C~1 but Mjl > Mj2) one also obtains Mjl > Mj2 for an d E A. 
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Bence, as points of H must satisfy LbEA X~2 = 1 and M;l > M;2 for aIl b E A, it 
foIlows that points of P n H lie on the hyperplane LbEA X~l = 1 by Lemma 3. The 
result foIlows. D 
Note that the condition imposed in the previous proposition is not very restric-
tive. Indeed, it only excludes the case in which c~â - c~à < C~2 - C~l = C~2 - C~l for 
aIl b, dE A, i.e., C~2 = C~l + K (K E IR) for aIl b E A. 
In the next proposition, we state the conditions in which the Profit Upper 
Bound constraints define facets of P. Let a E A. As the corresponding constraints 
contain constants Mg : k = k1 , k2 which depend on the commodity k, we intuitively 
deduce that these constants will be involved in the conditions. 
Proposition 17 Constraints (3.23) p~2 :S M:2X~2 are facet defining for P if and 
only if M:2 < M:l or there exists b E A \ {a} such that (a, k1 ) rv (b, k2 ). 
Proof 
Let H = {(t;p;x) : p~2 = M;2X~2}. Lemma 4.1 yields ab = 0 for aIl b E A and 
8 = O. Further, for aIl b E A \ {a}, one obtains ;3~1 = _;3~2 and ')'~l = _')'~2 by 
Lemma 5.2. 
Next, for aIl b E A \ {a} such that Mbk1 < M;2, Lemma 6.1 yields ;3~2 = 0 = ')'~2. If 
M;2 < M;l, permuting the commodity indices k1 and k2 in Lemma 6.1 also yields 
;3~1 = 0 = ')'~l. It foIlows that ;3~1 = 0 = ;3~2 and ')'~l = 0 = ')'~2 for aIl b E A \ {a} 
such that M;l i= M;2. 
Otherwise, i.e., if M;l = M;2, we know by Assumption 2 that there exists d E 
A \ {b} (possibly a) such that C~2 - C~l i= C~2 - C~l. 
If ck2 - ck1 < ck2 - Ck1 with d ...j.. a Lemma 8 1 yields ;3kl = 0 thus also ;3k2 = 0 d db b r, . b' b' 
Further, one obtains ')'~2 = 0 by Lemma 9.1. Note that we can assume d i= a. 
Indeed, consider C~2 - C~l < C~2 - C~l and there does not exist any d E A \ {a, b} 
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thus M;l < M;2 and there does not exist any b E A \ {a} such that (a, kl ) rv (b, k2 ) 
by Lemma 2, which is in contradiction with the proposition hypothesis. 
If C~2 - C~l < C~2 - C~l, permuting the commodity indiees kl , k2 in Lemma 8.1 yields 
;3~2 = O. One also obtains 1~2 = 0 by Lemma 9.1. Renee ;3~1 = 0 = ;3~2 and 
I~l = 0 = 1~2 for aU b E A \ {a} such that M;l = M;2. 
Next, if M;2 < M;l, setting b = a and permuting the commodity indices kl , k2 
in Lemma 6.1 yields ;3~1 = 0 = I~l. Further, setting b = a in Lemma 10.1 yields 
'Y~2 = _ M~2 ~~2 la a /Ja . 
Otherwize, i.e., if M;2 2: M;l, the proposition hypothesis ensures that there exists 
b E A \ {a} such that (a, kl ) rv (b, k2 ). As one can check that M;l ::; M;2, setting 
b = a and d = b in Lemma 7.1 yields ;3~1 = - ;3~2 and (M;l - M;l ) ;3~1 +,~l +,~2 = O. 
As ;3~2 = 0 = 1~2, one obtains ;3~1 = 0 = I~l. Further, setting b = a in Lemma 9.1 
yields 1~2 = - M;2 ;3~2 = O. 
FinaUy, assume M;2 ~ M;l and there does not exist any b E A \ {èi} such that 
(a, kl ) rv (b, k2 ). Renee X~l = 1 implies that either X~2 = 1, or X~2 = 0 for aU b E A. 
Then: 
'f M k2 Mkl kl l' l' h t 'th k2 1 d kl k2 M k2 
• 1 a = a' xa = lmp les t a el er X a = an Pa = Pa = a' or 
xk2 = 0 for aU b E A and M~2 < t- = p~l < M~l thus p~l = M~2 This b a-a a- a' a a' 
means that aU points of P n H lie one the hyperplane p~l = M;2 X~l, which 
is a contradiction. 
• If M~2 > M~l X~l = 1 implies that there exists a toU arc b E A such that 
a a' a 
X~2 = 1 by Lemma 3. Renee X~2 = 1. Rowever, as points of H satisfy 
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P~2 = M~2X~2 this yields p~1 = p~2 = M~2 > M~1 which is a contradiction. a a a' a a a a' 
Rence all points of P n H lie on the hyperplane X~1 = o. 
The result follows. D 
As expected, the conditions imposed in the previous proposition depend on 
the constants Mi : k = k], k2 . Similar conditions must be imposed such that 
constraints (3.24) define facets of P. 
Proposition 18 Constraints (3.24) ta - p~2 ~ N a(1- X~2) are facet defining for 
P if and only if M;l < M;2 or there exists b E A \ {a} such that (b, k1 ) rv (a, k2 ). 
Proof 
Let H = {(t; p; x) : ta - p~2 = N a(1 - X~2)}. Lemma 4.1 yields ab = 0 for all 
b E A \ {a} and !j = Naaa. Further, for all b E A \ {a}, one obtains ;3:1 = _;3:2 
and ,:1 = _,:2 by Lemma 5.3. 
Next, for aU b E A \ {a} such that M:1 < M:2, Lemma 6.3 yields ;3:2 = 0 = ,:2. If 
M;2 < M;l, permuting the commodity indices k] and k2 in Lemma 6.3 also yields 
;3:1 = 0 = ,:1. As ;3:1 = _;3:2 and ,:1 = _,:2 for all b E A \ {a}, one obtains 
;3:1 = 0 = ;3:2 and ,:1 = 0 = ,:2 for aU b E A \ {a} such that M;1 =1= M;2. 
For all b E A \ {a} su ch that M;1 = M;2, Assumption 2 ensures that there exists 
dE A \ {b} (possibly a) such that C~2 - C~1 =1= C~2 - C~I. If C~2 - C~1 < C~2 - C~1 with 
d =1= a, one obtains ;3:1 = 0 = ;3:2 by Lemma 8.1. If d = a, Lemma 8.3 yields the 
same conclusion. One also obtains ,:2 = 0 = ,:1 by Lemma 9.1. 
If C~2 - C~1 < C~2 - C~1 with d =1= a, permuting the commodity indices k1 , k2 in 
Lemma 8.1 yields ;3:2 = 0 = ;3:1. One also obtains ,:2 = a = ,:1 by Lemma 9.1. 
Note that we can assume d =1= a. By contradiction, consider C~2 - C~1 < C~2 - C~1 
and there does not exist any d E A \ {a, b} with C~2 - C~1 =1= C~2 - C~I. It follows 
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that 
any b E A \ {a} such that (b, kl) rv (a, k2 ) 
by Lemma 2, which is in contradiction with the proposition hypothesis. 
Further, setting b a in Lemma 5.3 yields Î~l +Î~2 = Niiaii and aii + f3~1 + f3~2 = O. 
Next, if M;1 < M;2, setting b a in Lemma 6.3 yields aa = -f3~2 and Î~2 = Naaa. 
Otherwize, Le., if 1\1;1 ~ M;2, the proposition hypothesis ensures that there exists 
b E A \ {a} such that (b, k1 ) t'V (a, k2 ). As one can check that 1\1:2 ::; M:1, setting 
b = a, d = band permuting the commodity indices kI, k2 in Lemma 7.2 yields 
aa + f3~l + f3~2 = 0 and (M:2 NI:2)f3~1 + Î:l + Î!2 = 6. As 13:1 = 0 = ~{~1, one 
obtains aii = -f3~2 and Î~2 6 Niiaii. 
Finally, assume NI;1 ~ M;2 and there does not exist any b E A \ {a} such that 
(b, kt) rv (a, k2 ). First note that any point of P n H such that X~l = 1 also satisfies 
kz 1 1 d d .kl Xii = . n ee , assume x a 1 d .k2 - 0 Th - N M k1 h' h . an Xii . en tii - ii > ii' W lC lS a 
contradiction. Renee: 
• if M:2 = M:l, Assumption 2 ensures that there exists b E A \ {a} such that 
C~2 -C~l =1= C~2 - C~l, which implies either (b, k l ) rv (a, ~) or (a, kd rv (b, k2 ) by 
Lemma 2. As there does not exist any b E A \ {a} such that (b, kd rv (a, k2 ) 
by hypothesis, we conclude that (a, kd rv (b, k2 ). Rowever, any point of PnH 
such that X~l 1 also satisfy X~2 = 1. Rence (a, kl) rv (b, k2 ) cannot happen 
either, which is in contradiction with Assumption 2 . 
• Otherwise, Le.) if M;l > M;2, X~2 = 1 implies that there exists a toU arc 
b E A such that X~l = 1 by Lemma 3. As there does not exist any b E A \ {a} 
such that (b, kd t'V (a, k2 ), one obtains X~l = 1. Further, as any point of 
P n H such that X~l 1 also satisfies X~2 = 1) it means that aU points of 
P n H lie on the hyperplane X~l = X~2 . 0 
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Next, we prove that constraints (3.25) do not define facets of P. As the defini-
tion of p variables is closely related to the t and x variables, i.e., one has pk txk 
for aIl k E K, this result is not surprising. 
Proposition 19 Constraints (3.25) are not facet defining for P. 
Proof 
Let 'H { (t; p; x) : p~2 ta}. Assuming X~2 = 0 for aU b E A yields p~2 0 by 
constraints (3.23), and t~2 ~ c~~ - C~2 > 0 by constraints (3.22) and Assumption 1. 
Hence aIl points of P n 'H lie on the hyperplane LbEA X~2 = 1, thus 'H is not facet 
defining for P. o 
Finally, we state the conditions in which constraints (3.26) define facets of 
P. 1<'Or given a E A, note that these conditions also depend on the constant 
AI:: k = k1,k2• 
Proposition 20 Constraints (3.26) p~2 ~ 0 are facet defining for P if and only if 
one of the following conditions holds: 
• M;2 .A1;l and either there exists b E A \ {â} such that (â, kd rv (b, k2 ), or 
there exists b E A \ {â}, v E IR such that (b, k1) l'V (â, k2 ), 0 :::; v :::; Ivf;1 and 
- ck2 < V < C~l _ Ckl . b - - a b 
Proof 
Let'H {(t;p;x): p~2 = O}. Lemma 4.1 yields ab 0 for aU b E A and 6 = O. 
Further, one obtains ,;1 = _,;2 for aIl b E A and t3~1 -t3~2 for aIl b E A \ {â} 
by Lemma 5.1. 
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Next, for all b E A \ {à} such that M:I < M:2 , Lemma 6.1 yields /3;2 = 0 = ,,/;2. If 
M;2 < lW:1 ) permuting the commodity indices k1 and k2 in Lemma 6.1 also yields 
/3;1 = 0 = ,,/~l. It follows that /3;1 0 = /3;2 and ,,/;1 = 0 = ,,/;2 for ail b E A \ {à} 
such that M;1 =1= M;2. 
Now, for aIl b E A \ {à} such that M;1 = M;2, Assumption 2 ensures that there 
exists dE A \ {b} (possibly à) such that C~2 - C~I =1= C~2 - C~I. 
If Ck2 _ ckl < ck2 d d b C~I with d =1= à, Lemma 8.1 yields /3;1 = 0, thus also /3;2 o. 
Further, one obtains ,,/;2 0 by Lemma 9.1. Note that we can assume d =1= à. 
lndeed, consider C~2 C~1 < C~2 - C~1 and there does not exist any d E A \ {à, b} 
thus M:l < Nf:2 and there does not exist any b E A \ {à} such that (à, kd rv (b, k2 ) 
by Lemma 2, which is in contradiction with the proposition hypothesis. 
If C;2 - C;I < C~2 C~l , permuting the commodity indices k1 , k2 in Lemma 8.1 yields 
/3~2 O. One also obtains ,,/;2 = 0 by Lemma 9.1. Renee /3~1 0 /3;2 and 
,,/;1 = 0 = ,,/;2 for aIl b E A \ {à} such that M;I = Nf;2. 
Next, if M:2 < M~l , setting b = à and permuting the commodity indices in Lemma 
6.1 yields /3~1 0 ,,/~l. As ,,/~2 = _,,/~l, one also obtains ,,/~2 O. 
Otherwize, i.e., if lW:2 ;::: Nf~\ assume that there exists b E A \ {à} such that 
(à, k 1 ) rv (b, k2 ). As one can check that Nf;l ::S M;\ setting b à and d b in 
Lemma 7.1 yields/3~l = -/3;2 and (M:l_l'v1;l)/3~1 
one 0 btains /3~1 0 = ,,/~1, thus also ,,/~2 = o. 
Now consider the case M~2 = M:l, and assume that there does not exist any 
b E A \ {à} such that (à, kd rv (b, k2 ). This implies C~2 C~l < C~2 C~l, i.e., 
(b, k1) rv (à, k2 ) for all b E A \ {à} by Lemma 2. Provided there exists b E A \ {à}, 
( L Naea + Veb; Veb; 0; eb; eà) 
aEA\{à,b) 
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belong to P n H. The existence of v is required since points of H must satisfy 
p~2 = O. As (3~1 = 0 = I~l, it foUows that 1~2 =0, thus also I~l = O. Further, 
setting b = a and permuting the commodity indices kI , k2 in Lemma 9.1 yields 
kl Mkl(3kl d bt' (3kl 0 là = - à à' an one 0 alns à = . 
Note that, if there does not exist such a v, then C~2 < C~2 for aU b E A \ {a}. As 
points of H satisfy p~2 = 0, aU points of P n H lie on the hyperplane X~2 = 1. 
FinaUy, assume M~2 > M~l and there do es not exist any b E A \ {a} such that 
(a, kI ) '" (b, k2 ). This means that X~l = 1 implies that either X~2 = 1 or X~2 = 0 
for aU b E A. However, as M~2 > M~l, X~l = 1 implies that there exists a toU arc 
b E A such that X~2 = 1 by Lemma 3. Hence X~2 = 1. As points of H must satisfy 
p~2 = 0, one obtains p~l = p~2 = O. It foUows that aU points of P n H lie on the 
hyperplane p~l = 0, which is a contradiction. o 
Hence most constraints of (HP3) define facets of P. Note that, for a given 
a E A, additional conditions must be imposed in the previous propositions, which 
depend on the constants M! : k = kI , k2 . However, these are not so restrictive, as 
they only exclude very particular cases. 
We can also prove that most valid inequalities presented in Chapter 4 define 
facets of P. The only exception concerns the Strengthened Shortest Path inequal-
ities (4.1), which require several very restrictive conditions to be facet defining for 
P. Note that these restrictive conditions come from the fact that there does not 
exist any point of P n H such that X~2 = 1 with b E A \ (S U {a}). lndeed, 
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• either X~l = 0 for aH d E A, and points in P n 'H are such that p~2 
kl k l t h' h . 1'·' t cod - c b - ii, w lC unp les a o since tb ~ c!à - C~l by (3.22); 
• or X~1 = 1 for d E A, and points in pn'H are sllch that p~1 +C~1 = ta +p~2 +C~l. 
When d =1= a, it implies ta = 0 since p~l + C~l :::; tb + c:1 by (3.22). 
As setting ta = 0 would yield to contradictions in terms of path costs, we deduce 
that lin king variables ta, p~1 : b E A and p~2 : b E A \ (S U {a}) will be difficult. 
Proposition 21 Inequalities 
(4.1) L (p~1 + c:1 x: l ) +c~à(l-L X~1 
~A ~A 
are facet defining for P if the following conditions hold: 
• (a, kd cv (b, k2 ) and C~l C~l ~ 0 for aU b E A \ (S U {a}); 
• there exists b E S \ {a} such that (a,k1 ) t'V (b ,k2 ); 
• for aU b E A such that M~l < !vI~2, there exists dES such that (b, k1 ) cv 
(d, k2 ). 
Note that the first and second conditions implies that li çJ. S. The third and 
fourth conditions yield C~2 C~1 = C~2 C~l for aU b E A \ (S U {Ii}). Hence one 
must also have M~2 :::; M~1 for aIl b E A \ S. 
Proof 
Let H = {(t; p; x) : I:bEA (p~l + C~lX~l) + c~à(1- I:bEA X~l) - tà - C~l 
- I:bEA\(SU{à}) (p~2 + (C~l - C~l )X~2) = O}. 
( L Naea + M~leà; 0; 0; 0; 0) 
aEA\{à} 
( L Naea + M~leà - Œb; 0; 0; 0; 0) 
aEA\{à} 
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are in P n H for all b E A \ {à}, which yields ab 
J: _ Mkl 
o for all b E A \ {à} and 
U - à aà· 
Further, for all b E A such that M;l 2: M;2, points 
( L Naea + M~leà + M;leb; M;leb; 0; eb; 0) 
aEA\{à,d} 
are in P n H, which yields r~l = - M;l j3~1. Otherwise, i.e., for aIl b E A such that 
M;l < M;2, and provided that there exists dES such that (b, k1) f'V (d, k2 ), points 
( " N + Mkl + Mkl + Mkl . Mkl . Mkl . . ) ~ aea à eà b eb d ed, b eb, d ed, eb, ed 
aEA \ {à,b,d} 
( L Naea + M~leà + M;led; 0; M;led; 0; ed) 
aEA\{à,d} 
Next, provided that M;1 < M;2 for aU b E 5, the points 
( L Naea + M~lea + M;l eb ; 0; M;l eb ; 0; eb) 
aEA\{a,b} 
( L Naea + M~lea + (M;1 + E)eb; 0; (M;1 + E)eb; 0; eb) 
aEA\{a,b} 
belong to P n H. It foUows that /3;2 = 0 = ,;2 for aU b E 5. 
Provided that (b, kd "" (a, k2 ) for aU b E A \ {a}, points2 
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( L Naea + M~2ea + (M~2 + C~1 - C;1 )eb; (M~2 + C~1 - C~1 )eb; M~2ea; eb; ea) 
aEA\{a,b} 
( L Naea + (M~2 - E)ea + (M~2 + C~1 - C~1 - E)eb; (M~2 + C~1 - C~1 - E)eb; 
aEA\{a,b} 
are in P n H sinee M~2 ::; M~I, and one obtains /3;1 + /3~2 + aa = O. 
Points 
( L Naea; 0; 0; ea; ea) 
aEA\{a} 
( L Naea + tea; tea; tea; ea; ea) 
aEA\{a} 
also belong to P n H. Renee ,~1 + ,~2 = M~laa and /3~1 + /3~2 + aa = O. Further, 
point 
( L Naea + M~lea;M~lea;O;ea;O) 
aEA\{a} 
is in P n H, thus ,~1 = _M~1 /3~1 and ,~2 = O. 
2Note that this very restrictive condition seems necessary to link variables p~l : b E A and t(i. 
Provided there exists b ES \ {a} such that (a, k1 ) rv (b, k2 ), points 
( L Naea + M:2 eii + jW;2 eb; J\!1:2 eii; M;2 eb ; eii; eb) 
aEA\{b,ii} 
are in P n 'H. As 'V~l = - M~l /Q~l one obtains Œa-la a fJa , , th us ,6;2 = o. 
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Next, provided (a, kr) rv (b, kz) and - C~l ;::: 0 for aIl b E A \ (S U {à}), points3 
aEA\{b,ii} 
In the previous proposition, we proved that the Strengthened Shortest Path 
inequalities (4.1) can define facets of P if several very restrictive conditions are 
imposed on the set S and on the constants M~ : a E A, k = k1 , k2 . Renee these 
inequalities are often not tight. 
Next, we state the conditions in which the Strengthened Shortest Path inequal-
ities (4.2) define facets of P. 
Proposition 22 Inequalities 
(4.2) L (p~l M;lX~l) L (p~2 - J\![;lX~2) ~ 0 
~A ~A~ 
are facet defining for P if M;l < M;2 for aU b ES. 
3Again, this very restrictive condition seems necessary to link variables p~2 : b E A \ (SU {il}) 
and ta. 
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Proof 
Let 'H = {(t; p; x) : L:bEA (p~1 '" (k2 M kl k2) - o} F' L...,bEA\S Pb - b Xb - . lrst, 
one knows that ab = 0 for aIl b E A and 8 o by Lemma 4.1. Further, for any 
b E Sand provided that M;I < A1;2, one obtains /3:2 = 0 = 1:2 by Lemma 6.1. 
aIl b E A \ S, Lemma 5.1 yields /3;! -/3;2 and 1:1 = _1~2. 
Next, for aIl b E A such that M;1 ;:: M;2, permuting the commodity indices k1 
and k2 in Lemma 9.1 yields 1;1 = -N1;1/3;I. Otherwise, i.e., for aIl b E A such 
that N1;1 < M;z, permuting the commodity indices k1 and k2 in Lemma 10 yields 
1~1 -Iv1;! /3~1 . 
Further, if there exist d E A \ 5, b E A such that (b, kt) rv (d, k2 ) and C~1 < C~I, 
points 
( L Naea + (C~1 C~1 )eb; (C~l - C~1 )eb; 0; eb; ed) 
aEA\{b,d} 
( L Naea + (C~1 C~1 + €)eb + ted; (c~! - C~1 + €)eb; ted; eb; ed) 
aEA\{b,d} 
also belong to P n 'H. This yields /3:1 = - /3~2. Otherwise, i.e., if C~l ;:: C~I, points 
( L Naea + (C~1 C~l )ed; 0; (C~1 - C~1 )ed; eb; ed) 
aEA\{b,d} 
( L Naea + teb + (C~l C~1 + €)ed; teb; (C~I - C~l + €)ed; eb; eb) 
aEA\{b,d} 
are in P n 'H. Renee one obtains f3;1 = -f3~2 for aIl b E A and d E A \ 5. The 
result foIlows. o 
The Strengthened Shortest Path inequalities (4.2) are obviously stronger than 
the Strengthened Shortest Path inequalities (4.1). This will be highlighted numer-
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ically in the next chapter. 
Now we state the conditions in which the Strengthened Profit Upper Bound 
inequalities define facets of P. Let a E A. Intuitively, the conditions will depend 
on the constants Mg : k = kl , k2 and on the sets A~, A~. 
Proposition 23 Inequalities 
(4.7) p!2 - M:2 X~2 (11;1:2 1\11:!) ( L (X~2 - X~l ) - X!!) ~ 0 
bEA~\{a} 
are facet defining fOT P if, fOT aU b E A~ su ch that M;l = 1\11;2, theTe exists d E A~ 
such that C~2 
Proof 
C
k ! 
d • 
Let 11. = {(t; p; x) : p~2 IV1~2x~2 (111;2 - M;l) (2:bEA~\{â} (X~2 - X~l) - X~l) = 
o}. Lemma 4.1 yields Œb 0 for aH b E A and 8 = O. Further, for all b E A \ {èi,}, 
one obtains p~l and ,;1 = -,i2 by Lemma 5.1. 
For any b E A~ \ {à}, setting b = à and d = b in Lemma 7.1 yields p~2 = 
thus also pil 
Further, for aIl b E A~ such that M;l < 1\11;2, Lemma 6.1 yields p;2 = 0 = ,~2. 
If 11;1;2 < 11;1;!, permuting the commodity indices kl and k2 in Lemma 6.1 yields 
pi! = 0 ,i!· Hence P;! = 0 = P:2 and ,il = 0 = ,iz for all b E A~ such that 
Nf;! =1= M;2. 
Otherwise, Le., for aIl b E A~ such that M;l = M;z, Assumption 2 ensures that 
there d E A \ {b} (possibly à) such that C~2 - C~l =1= C~2 - c~!. Then, 
provided there exists such a toll arc d in A~, Lemma 8.1 holds and one conclude 
that pi! 0 pi2 • One also obtains ,iZ = 0 = ,;1 by Lemma 9.1. 
N ext, for aIl b E A~ \ {a}, recall that there does not exist any b E \ {a} such that 
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C~2 - c~! = C~2 - c~! by hypothesis. Henee, setting b = êi and d = b in Lemma 8.1 
yields f3~! = 0 and M;! f3~2 + r~! + r~2 = O. As f3~2 = - f3~! = - f3~!, it follows that 
f3~2 = 0 = f3~! for all b E A~ \ {êi}. One also obtains r~2 = -r~!. 
Finally, setting b = êi in Lemma 9.1 yields r~2 = - M~2 f3~2. As the point 
( ~ lVaea + JVI~!eà;M~!eà;JVI~!eà;eà;eà) 
aEA\{à} 
also belongs to pn1t, it follows that r~! = (M;2 - M;!) f3~2. The result follows. 0 
Note that the conditions imposed in the previous proposition imply that JVI;! of:-
JVI;2 for all b E A~ or there are at least two toll arcs b, d E A~ such that C~2 - c~! of:-
C~2 - c~!. N ow, in order to prove that inequalities (4.8) define faeets of P, we need 
to impose stronger conditions. lndeed, we assume that if there exists b E A~ such 
that M;! :::; M;2 (resp. M;! > M;2), then there exists at least another toll arc 
d E A~ \ {b} such that Mj! :::; Mj2 (resp. Mj! > JVIj2) and C~2 - c~! of:- C~2 - c~!. 
Proposition 24 Inequalities 
(4.8) p~2 - M:2X~2 - (M:2 - M:!) ( L (X~2 - x~!) - X~!) 
bEAt\{a} 
are facet defining for P if, for all b E A~ such that M;! :::; M;2 (resp. M;! > 
M;2), there exists d E A~ \ {b} su ch that Mj! :::; JVIj2 (resp. JVIj! > Mj2) and 
ck2 _ ck! -.L ck2 _ ck! 
b b r d d . 
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Proof 
Let Ji 
Lemma 4.1 yields ab = 0 for aIl b E A and fi O. Further, for aIl b E A \ {il}, one 
obtains /3;1 = -/3;2 and 1;1 = _1;2 by Lemma 5.1. 
For any b E A~ \ {à}, setting b = à and d b in Lemma 7.1 yields /3;2 = -/311, 
thus .B;1 = - /3:1 . 
For all d E A~ such that M;! ~ Nf;2 (resp. M;! > M;2), the proposition hy-
pothesis ensures that there exists b E A~ \ {d} such that Nf;! ~ 11,11;2 (resp. 
M;! > M;2) and C~2 - C~1 1:- C~2 - C~I. Without 10ss of generality, let us as-
sume that C~2 - C~1 < C~2 - C~I. As Lemma 7.1 yields /3;1 = -/3~2, it follows that 
/3;1 0 /3;2 for all b, d E A~ by Lemma 8.1. 
Further, for all b E A~ such that M;l > M;2, permuting the commodity indices 
k1 and k2 in Lemma 9.1 yields 1;1 = M;l ,B;I. As /3;1 = 0, one 0 btains 1;1 = 0, 
thus also 1;2 = O. 
N ext, for aIl b E A~ \ {à}, recall that there do es not exist any b E \ {à} such that 
Ck2 _ Ck1 
b b C~2 - C~I by hypothesis. Hence, setting b = à and d = b in Lemma 8.1 
Yields B~1 = 0 and M k1 Bk2 + "ï~1 + rvkz 0 A.s akz = - B~1 = - Bk l it foIlows that , ab, b a lb •• f-Ib ' a ' b , 
Bk 2 
, b 0=/3;1 for all b E A~ \ {il}. One also obtains 1;2 = -I~!' 
Next, setting b = il in Lemma 9.1 yields 1~2 
also belongs to P n Ji, it follows that 1~1 = (M~2 - Al;l) ,B~2 . 
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Finally, for aIl b E A~ such that Mt! ~ Nft2, points 
( L Naea + (Nf;! + c;; c~2)eâ + (Mt,! + c~; - c;2)eb; 
aEA\{â,b} 
(M"bk•1 + Cbk: ck2 )e' (Mk ! + Ck2 ck2 )e' e . e ) . b b, b' b' - il â, b, il 
are in P n 'H since xl 1 
for points of 'H, which yields 
Note that we have not proved that, if the conditions imposed in the previous 
proposition are not satisfied, then inequalities (4.7)-(4.8) do not define facets of P. 
As this would require the study of several particular cases, we have tought it would 
not bring any additional relevant information, at least for the purpose of the thesis. 
Next, we state the conditions in which inequalities (4.9) and (4.10) define facets 
ofP. 
Proposition 25 Inequalities 
(4.9) p~2_ p~1 - M:2 L (X~2 - x;!) ~ 0 
bEA~ 
ar'e facet defining for P if the following conditions hold: 
• for ail b E A~ such that AIt! = Mt2 , there exists d E A~ \ {b} such that 
• for all b E A1 \ {â}, there exists d E A1 \ {â} such that C;2 
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• there exists b E A~ \ {à}, v E IR such that C~1 - C~1 ::; V < C~2 - C~2 and 
o ::; v ::; M;2. 
Proof 
Let H = {(t; p; x) : p~2 - p~1 - M;2 2:bEA~(X~2 - X~1) = O}. Lemma 4.1 yields 
ab = 0 for aH b E A and <5 = O. Further, for aH b E A, one obtains ;3;1 = _;3;2 and 
,:1 = _,:2 by Lemma 5.1. 
Next, for any b E A~ \ {à}, there exists d E A~ \ {à} such that C~2 - C~1 =1= 
C~2 - C~1 by the proposition hypothesis. Without loss of generality, let us assume 
that ck2 - Ck1 < ck2 - ck1 As M k1 < Mdk2 for aH d E Aa~ \ {à}, Lemmas 7.1 d d b b' d-
and 8.1 yield /3:1 = - ;3~2 and ;3:1 = 0 respectively. Rence /3:1 = 0 = /3:2 for aH 
b E A~ \ {à}. 
Further, for aH b E A~ such that M;1 < M;2, Lemma 6.1 yields /3:2 = 0 = ,:2. 
If M;2 < M;1, permuting the commodity indices k1 and k2 in Lemma 6.1 yields 
;3:1 = 0 = ,:1. It foHows that /3:1 = 0 = ;3:2 and ,:1 = 0 = ,:2 for aH b E A~ such 
that M;1 =1= M;2. 
Otherwise, i.e., for aH b E A~ such that M;1 = M;2, Assumption 2 ensures that 
there exists d E A \ {b} (possibly à) such that C~2 - C~1 =1= C~2 - C~1. Then, 
provided there exists such a toH arc d in A~, Lemma 8.1 holds and one conclude 
that /3:1 = 0 = /3:2. One also obtains ,:2 = 0 = ,:1 by Lemma 9.1. 
Next, provided there exists b E A~ \ {à}, v E IR such that C~1 - C~1 ::; V ::; C~2 - C~2 
and 0 ::; v ::; M;2, point 
( L Naea + veb; 0; veb; eii; eb) 
aEA\{b,ii} 
is in P n H. The existence of v E IR is required since X~1 = 1 = X~2 ( b E A~ \ {à}) 
implies p~1 = 0 for points of H. This yields ,:2 = _,~1 for aH b E A~ \ {à}. 
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FinaIly, setting b = Ci in Lemma 9.1 yields ')'~2 = - M~2 (3~2. As ')'~l = _')'~2 for aIl 
b E A, one obtains ')'~2 = M~2 (3~2 = _')'~l for aIl b E A. The result foIlows. D 
Proposition 26 Inequalities 
(4.10) p~2 - p~l - M~2 L (X~2 - X~l) - (M;.2 - IVI;n L 
bEAK bEA~:M:2?M:l 
are facet defining for P if the following conditions hold: 
• for all b E A~ such that M;l :S IVI;2 (resp. M;l > M;2 J, there exists 
d E A>\{b} such that M k1 < M k2 (resp M k1 > Mk2J and Ck2 _Ck1 -i- Ck2 _Ck1 . à d - d . d d b br d d' 
• for all b E A~ \ {Ci}) there exists d E A~ \ {Ci} such that C~2 - C~l i= C~2 - C~l ; 
• there exists b E A~ \ {Ci}) v E IR such that C~l - C~l :S v :S C~2 - C~2 and 
0< v < M k2 . 
- - b 
Lemma 4.1 yields ab = 0 for aIl b E A and 8 = O. Further, for aIl b E A, one 
obtains (3~1 = _(3~2 and ')'~l = _')'~2 by Lemma 5.1. 
Next, for any b E A~ \ {Ci}, there exists d E A~ \ {Ci} such that C~2 - C~l i= C~2 - C~l 
by the proposition hypothesis. Without loss of generality, let us assume that 
C~2 - C~l < C~2 - C~l. As M;l :S M;2 for aIl d E A~ \ {Ci}, Lemmas 7.1 and 
8.1 yield (3~1 = _(3;2 and (3~1 = 0 respectively. Renee (3~1 = 0 = (3~2 for aIl 
b E A~ \ {Ci}. 
For aH d E A~ such that M;l :S M;2 (resp. M;l > M;2), the proposition hy-
pothesis ensures that there exists b E A~ \ {d} such that M:1 :S M:2 (resp. 
\ 
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Mkl > Mk2) and Ck2 - Ck1 -1- Ck2 - Ck1 Without loss of generality let us as-d d d d r b b' , 
sume that C~2 - C~l < C~2 - C~l. As Lemma 7.1 yields {3~1 = _{3~2, it foUows that 
{3~1 = ° = {3~2 for aU b, dE Ai by Lemma 8.1. 
Further, for all b E A~ such that M;l > M;2, permuting the commodity indices 
k 1 and k2 in Lemma 9.1 yields I~l = - M;l {3~1. As {3;1 = 0, one obtains I~l = 0, 
thus also 1~2 = O. 
Next, provided there exists b E A~ \ {Ci}, v E lR such that C~l - C~l ::; V ::; C~2 - C~2 
and 0 ::; v ::; M;2, point 
( L Naea + veb; 0; veb; ea; eb) 
aEA\{b,a} 
is in P n Ji. Note that the existence of v E lR is required since X~l = 1 = X~2 
(b E A~ \ {Ci}) implies that p~l = 0 for points of Ji. This yields 1~2 = _I~l for 
aU b E A~ \ {Ci}. Further, setting b = Ci in Lemma 9.1 yields 1~2 = -M~2{3~2. As 
I~l = _1~2 for aU b E A, one obtains 1~2 = M~2 {3~2 = _I~l for aU b E A. 
FinaUy, for aU b E Ai such that M;l ::; M;2, points 
aEA\{a,b} 
are in P nJi since x~ = 1 = X~2 (b E Ai : M;l ::; M;2) implies p~2 = M;'l + c~; - C~2 
for points of Ji, which yields 
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Note that the conditions imposed such that inequalities (4.9) and (4.10) define 
facets of Pare similar to these imposed for inequalities (4.7) and (4.8). Again, we 
did not consider the particular cases in which these conditions are not satisfied. 
FinaIly, we state the conditions in which inequalities (4.11) define facets of P. 
Proposition 27 Inequalities 
(4.11) p~l - p~2 - M:l L (X~2 
bEA1\{ii} 
are facet defining for P if the following conditions hold: 
• for all b E A~ such that AI;l = M;2, there exists d E A~ \ {b} such that 
ck2 _ ck1 .../.. ck2 _ ck1 . 
b bTd d' 
• there exists b E A~, v E IR such that C~2 
Proof 
L t 'l...J {(t··)· kl k2 ~Akl '\""" (k2 kl) - o} L 4 1 . Id e /1. , p, X . Pâ - Pâ - iV1â L..bEAâ\{â} xb - x b - . emma . yle s 
ab = 0 for aU b E A and b = O. Further, for aIl b E A, one obtains ,6;1 = -/3;2 and 
,;1 = _,;2 by Lemma 5.1. 
Next, for any b E A~ \ {à}, the points 
( L Naea + j\1:1 es. + M;l eb ; }vl;leà; j\lf;l eb ; eS.; eb) 
aEA\{b,â} 
( L Naea + .M;leâ + (M;l + é)eb; M~leâ; (AI;l + é)eb; eS.; eb) 
aEA\{b,â} 
belong to pnH. Indeed, one can check that 1\1;1 < l'vI;2 by definition of A~ and the 
hypothesis that there does not exist any b E A~ \ {à} such that C~2 C~l i= C~2 C~l a' 
Rence /3;1 = 0 = /3;2 for aIl b E \ {à}. 
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If j\;ft2 < Mt l , perrnuting the cornrnodity indices k l and k2 in Lernrna 6.1 yields 
/3;1 0 1:1. Hence /3;1 = 0 = /3:2 and IiI = 0 1;2 for aIl b E A~ such that 
Mt l =1= Mt2 • 
Otherwise, for all b E A~ such that .Mtl = Jv1t2, Assurnption 2 ensures that 
there cl E A \ {b} (possibly Ci) such that C~2 C~l =1= C~2 C~l. Then, 
provided there exists such a toll arc cl in A~, Lernrna 8.1 holds and one conclude 
that /3;1 0 /3;2. One also obtains 1;2 = 0 = ~f:1 by Lernrna 9.1. 
Next, provided there exists b E A~, v E IR such that C~2 
O::;v 
( L Naea + veb; veb; 0; eb; eà) 
aEA\{b,ii} 
v 
is in P n H. Note the existence of v E IR is required since X~l 1 = X~2 (b E A~) 
irnplies that p~2 = 0 for points of H. This yields 1~2 0 
Finally, for aH b E A~ \ {à}, points 
( L Naea + Jvl:1eii + 1'vltleb; M~leà; jvltleb; eii; eb) 
aEA\ {ii,b} 
are in P n H. Hence ~f:2 = -A.f:l,B~l for an b E A~ \ {à}. The result follows. 0 
Hence, rnost inequalities presented in Chapter 4 are facet defining for the two 
cornrnodity GCT-NPP, i.e., for the polyhedron described by the convex hull of 
(HP3) feasible solutions. As a consequence, we expect that those valid inequalities 
are also strong in the rnulti-cornmodity case, i.e., they can help to solve faster or 
better (in terms of gap or nurnber of nodes) the multi-cornrnodity GCT-NPP. 
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5.3 Conclusion 
In this chapter, we focused on problems involving one or two commodities. For 
the single commodity problem, we proved that several constraints of model (HP3*), 
as weIl as vaUd inequalities presented in Chapter 4, define facets of the convex hull 
of (HP3*) feasible solutions, i.e., for the CCT-NPP. Further, we highlighted a com-
plete description of the convex hull of feasible solutions for the single commodity 
GCT-NPP. Next, we proved that most of the valid inequalities and (HP3) con-
straints are also facet defining for the corresponding two-commodity problem, Le.) 
for the GCT-NPP. 
CHAPTER 6 
NUMERICAL RESULTS 
This chapter assesses the efficiency of the valid inequalities presented in Chapter 
4 by numerical results. For that purpose, they are tested on randomly generated 
instances for both General and Constrained Complete ToU NPP. Sections 1 and 2 
give technical details concerning the generation of instances and the implementation 
of models. Then, the numerical results for GCT-NPP and CCT-NPP are presented 
in Sections 3 and 4 respectively. 
6.1 Data instances 
The networks considered include 5, 8 or 10 cities with a commodity between 
each ordered pair of cities, i.e., m(m - 1) commodities for m cities. Demands for 
commodities are selected randomly between 10 and 100. The highways consist of 
10 or 15 highway nodes (i.e., the entry and exit nodes of the highway), and lead to 
bi-directional complete toU subgraphs with n( n - 1) toU arcs for n nodes1 . Consid-
ering that the size of an instance is determined by both the number of cities and 
the number of entry and exit nodes in the network, we generate 6 instances of each 
size. 
In order to set fixed costs on paths, fixed costs on aU arcs of the network are gen-
erated randomly as explained further. Note that the random generation intervals 
were chosen after performing an analysis of distances in a real Canadian highway 
network, the highway 10 (autoroute des Cantons de l'Est, Québec). 
Fixed costs on toU arcs a E A such that h(a) = t(a) + 1 are first randomly 
1 Note that we only test bi-directional networks, as we think that this structure is more realistic 
than a single directional structure. 
l' 
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generated between 20 and 70. Then fixed costs on toll arcs b E A such that 
h(b) = t(b) + l, l > 1 are set to the sum of fixed costs of aU toU arcs a E Cb such 
that h(a) = t(a) + 1. We set Cb = Ca for all a, b E A : h(b) = t(a), t(b) = h(a). 
Next, fixed costs on toll free arcs linking cities and highway nodes are generated 
as follows. First, the closest highway node i E N from a given city v is selected 
randomly, and the fixed cost on the corresponding arc a E A is randomly generated 
between 2 and 70. The fixed costs on the toll free arcs b E A :t(b) = t(a), h(a) 2::; 
h(b) ::; h(a) + 2 (Le., the toll free arcs linking the given city v and the four closest 
nodes from i) are randomly generated between 15 and 120. Finally, the fixed costs 
on the toll free arcs b E A : t(b) = t(a), h(b) < h(a) - 2 or h(b) > h(a) + 2 are 
randomly generated between 30 and 1000. 
The fixed costs between cities are randomly generated between 150 and 1000. 
Note that these are computed so that the cost from a city VI to a city V2 is equal 
to the cost from V2 to VI. 
Further, we assume that the use of a road besides the highway, compared to 
a road on the highway, often takes more time and requires more attention for a 
network user. Hence the fixed costs on toll free arcs are multiplied by a 1.5 factor. 
Finally, the fixed costs on paths are computed. For each commodity k E K and 
each toll arc a E A, the fixed cost c~ is the SUffi of fixed costs on the arcs that 
belong to the corresponding path. 
For a network with n nodes, each commodity contains initially n(n - 1) paths. 
Then, the preprocessing described in Section 3.3 is performed, which reduces the 
number of feasible paths for each commodity. In order to allow comparisons be-
tween the results obtained for the GCT-NPP and CCT-NPP respectively, the pre-
processing for the CCT-NPP is applied on all instances. 
Hence, in the data instances, each commodity is linked with the corresponding 
set of feasible paths, which allows us to deal with sm aller networks. Table 6.1 
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provides the minimum (MIN), maximum (MAX), mean (M) and variance (0-2 ) of 
the number of feasible paths for each commodity in the generated instances. 
Inst. MIN MAX fi (j~ 
5v 10n 1 20 17,3 24,2 
5 v - 15 n 1 35 12,9 53,1 
8v lOn 1 20 7,4 25,6 
8v 15 n 1 35 13,2 66,1 
lOv lOn 1 24 7,5 24,6 
10 v - 15 n 1 35 13,1 60,8 
Table 6.1: Number of feasible paths per commodity 
6.2 Implementation of models 
The numerical experiments are carried out on a Pentium 4.3GHz equipped with 
2Gb of RAM and running Linux Kernel version 2.6.4. models are implemented 
using Mosel of Xpress-MP, Optimizer version 18. We switch on aIl Xpress proce-
dures concerning presolve. However, the Xpress automatic heuristic strategies have 
to be switched off, because they cannot be handled properly when appending our 
own cut procedure to the model. Finally, Xpress automatically selects the variables 
and nodes during the braneh and eut algorithm. 
We test models (HP3*) and (HP3) with the upper bounds M:, Na : k E K, a E 
A and preprocessing deseribed in Chapter 3, and with each class of vaUd inequali-
ties deseribed in Chapter 4. The latter, as weIl as the Triangle and Monotonicity 
eonstraints for model (HP3*), are generated at the root and nodes of the braneh 
and eut algorithm and appended to model (HP3*) or (HP3) when violated (viola-
tion tests are performed at eaeh iteration of the braneh and cut algorithm). 
We also impose an upper bound on the number of Triangle, Monotonicity and 
Strengthened Shortest Path inequalities appended at a single iteration of the branch 
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and eut algorithm, depending either on the maximal number of feasible paths for 
a commodity MaxP (Le.) at most n(n - 1) for n nodes without preprocessing of 
the network, thus obviously less when preprocessing of the network according to 
Section 3.3) or on the number of commodities IKI. These are set to O.5MaxP, 
2NlaxP and 0.51KI respectively, and were chosen during preliminary tests on in-
stances, according to the best results obtained. FinaIly, we set a computation al 
time upper bound of 5 hours (18000 seconds), after whieh the solution pro cess is 
aborted. 
In order to assess the efficiency of the vaUd inequalities, the related number of 
nodes, cpu times and gaps are reported for aIl instances. We call gap of a problem 
the gap between the linear relaxation optimal solution Zlp and the integer problem 
optimal solution Zopt, Le., gap = . If Zopt cannot be determined (i.e., the 
computational time upper bound is reached), Zopt is set to the value of the best 
integer solution. Aiso note that Zlp is computed after addition of violated valid 
inequalities at the root of the branch and cut algorithm. 
The results are presented in tables in the following way. The first column pro-
vides the size of instances, Le., the number of cities m and number of nodes n. 
Next, minimum (MIN), maximum (MAX), me an (I.t) and standard deviation (a) 
values are given for the gaps, cpu times and number of nodes in the branch and 
eut algorithm. The symbol *x* indicates that x instances cannot be solved to opti-
mality because the eomputational time upper bound has been reached. Finally, for 
eaeh class of inequalities, an additionnaI table provides the number of inequalities 
(Nb INEG) appended to the initial model (HP3*) or (HP3), at the root or during 
the braneh and eut algorithm. 
The next section provides numerical results for the General Complete ToU NPP. 
110 
6.3 Numerical results for GCT-NPP 
In this section, we point out the efficiency of the valid inequalities proposed in 
Chapter 4 for the Constrained Complete ToU NPP, which is described by model 
(HP3). Table 6.2 provides the gaps, cpu times and number of nodes corresp·onding 
to the resolution of (HP3) without any valid inequalities. 
Inst. Gap(%) Time(sec) Nodes 
MIN MAX /-L (J MIN MAX /-L (J MIN MAX /-L (J 
5 v - 10 n 0.28 12.16 6.49 4.4 0 2 1 1 1 121 36 45 
5 v - 15 n 3.48 18.21 9.69 5 1 7 3 2 7 397 117 132 
8 v - 10 n 3.47 27.18 15.40 7.9 1 1020 234 368 39 69837 15309 25049 
*
10 8 v - 15 n 9.77 27.83 15.26 6.4 24 18001 3379 6562 551 739553 133233 271484 
10 v - 10 n 12.68 22.27 16.61 3.4 24 5132 895 1895 1625 362460 62785 134021 
*4*10v-15n 11.17 20.82 16.17 3.4 433 18004 12421 7909 10817 437890 256207 169469 
Table 6.2: Model (HP3) 
In the next subsections, each class of valid inequalities is appended to model 
(HP3) and tested on the randomly generated instances described in Section 6.1. For 
the sake of clarity, the results are presented in two subsections, which correspond to 
the Strengthened Shortest Path and Profit Upper Bound inequalities respectively. 
Then, a last subsection provides results for model (HP3) with the best (i.e., most 
efficient) valid inequalities. 
6.3.1 Strengthened Shortest Path inequalities 
In this section, we test model (HP3) with the Strengthened Shortest Path in-
equalities (4.1) and (4.2). In order to differentiate the efficiency of both classes 
of inequalities, tests of these on es are performed separately. Numerical results are 
presented in Tables 6.3 and 6.5. 
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Jnst. Gap(%) Time(sec) Nodes 
MIN MAX f.l, (J' MIN MAX f.l, (J' MIN MAX f.l, (J' 
5v lOn 0.00 10.96 4.30 3.9 0 5 2 2 1 139 37 54 
5v 15 n 1.28 14.90 5.65 4.5. 0 12 5 4 1 167 56 54 
8v 10 n 3.20 20.24 12.14 5.8 2 3974 1295 1564 36 27464 8794 10714 
*3*8 v - 15 n 7.20 22.43 10.32 6.9 85 18014 7179 8015 347 51007 18605 19664 
*hl0 v 10 n 11.34 21.17 15.31 3.4 160 18001 4134 6233 395 60575 14556 20743 
*6*10 V - 15 n 9.14 18.90 14.10 3.6 18000 18025 18015 6 11172 20638 15889 3594 
Table 6.3: Model (HP3) with inequalities (4.1) 
Jnst. Nb Ineq. (total) Nb Ineq. (root) 
MIN MAX f.l, (J' MIN MAX f.l, (J' 
5 v - 10 n 10 337 101 116 10 49 32 14 
5v 15 n 48 895 325 293 33 83 57 18 
8v 10 n 57 64541 25340 28273 13 270 120 91 
8 v - 15 n 1915 323845 110462 135304 82 378 152 115 
10 v - 10 n 1963 123275 30156 42192 53 117 90 20 
10 v - 15 n 69940 138536 111748 23664 123 444 270 107 
Table 6.4: Number of inequalities (4.1) appended to (HP3) 
Inst. Gap(%) Time(sec) Nodes 
MIN MAX f.l, (J' MIN MAX f.l, (J' MIN MAX Il (J' 
5 v IOn 0.00 3.26 1.44 1.3 0 4 1 2 1 29 Il 12 
5 v - 15 n 0.00 4.87 1.58 1.7 0 4 2 2 1 61 21 24 
8v-lOn 1.21 6.94 3.85 2.4 2 693 228 291 17 2874 869 1127 
8v 15 il 2.93 7.57 3.96 1.6 28 8572 1545 3145 63 22343 3961 8222 
lOv-lOn 1.58 5.49 3.63 1.2 10 388 88 135 24 2580 499 932 
*3*10 v - 15 n 1.42 7.13 4.44 1.9 304 18017 9654 8379 316 24594 11435 9548 
Table 6.5: Model (HP3) with inequalities (4.2) 
Inst. Nb Ineq. (total) Nb lneq. (root) 
MIN MAX f.l, (J' MIN MAX f.l, (J' 
5v-lOn 12 191 77 70 12 93 50 33 
5v 15 n 28 244 116 84 28 155 71 40 
8v IOn 103 15151 5329 6527 87 646 335 208 
8 v - 15 n 748 ]04624 19457 38126 226 815 469 184 
IOv IOn 790 9892 2588 3275 420 818 536 132 
IOv 15 n 5947 275338 137897 117995 715 1311 987 186 
Table 6.6: Number of inequalities (4.2) appended to (HP3) 
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Observing Tables 6.2 and 6.3, we conclude that the Strengthened Shortest Path 
inequalities (4.1) yield a decrease from 8 ta 42% in the gaps. The number of nodes 
also decreases by 77% for the instances of the largest size solved ta optimality, Le., 
lOv-10n. Note that, from now, we only report the decrease by the number of nodes 
and of the cpu times for the instances of the largest size solved ta optimality, Le., 
lOv-lOn. However, the inequalities also yield a significant increase of the cpu times, 
probably due ta the time required by the separation procedure. 
The Strengthened Shortest Path inequalities (4.2) are mueh more efficient, as 
the results show a decrease from 74 ta 84% in the gaps. For the largest instances 
solved ta optimality (Le., 10v lOnL we observe a deerease by 90% in the number 
of nodes, and of 99% in the epu times. 
Further, Tables 6.4 and 6.6 provide the number of Strengthened Shortest Path 
inequalities appended ta (HP3) at the root and during the branch and eut algo-
rithm. We note that the evolution of the number of violated inequalities is not the 
same for both classes of inequalities. lndeed, more inequalities of class (4.2) are 
appended to (HP3) at the root of the branch and cut algorithm, while there are 
more inequalities of class (4.1) during the braneh and eut algorithm. 
Next, Table 6.7 provides results for model (HP3) with both classes of inequalities 
(4.1) and (4.2). Comparisons with Table 6.2 lead ta the conclusion that bath 
classes are useful. Aiso note that the cpu times are now similar to the ones of 
the initial model (HP3) for the small instances, and better than these for the 
largest instances. However, as we know that adding the first class of inequalities 
(4.1) yields a significant increase of the cpu times, it could be better ta add these 
inequalities only at the root of the branch and cut algorithm. The results obtained 
are presented Table 6.9. 
Comparing Tables 6.7 and 6.9, we observe that adding inequalities (4.1) and 
(4.2) (resp. only at the root of the bran ch and cut algorithm) leads ta a decrease 
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Inst. Gap(%) Time(sec) Nodes 
MIN MAX f.L a- MIN MAX f.L a- MIN MAX f.L a-
5 v - 10 n 0.00 2.14 0.90 0.8 0 5 2 2 1 33 9 12 
5 v - 15 n 0.00 3.76 1.15 1.3 0 11 5 4 1 109 30 40 
8v-lOn 1.19 5.77 3.31 1.9 3 976 294 391 9 1832 479 683 
*h8 v - 15 n 2.42 6.88 3.43 1.6 63 18021 3182 6639 63 16877 2979 6216 
10 v - 10 n 1.34 4.82 2.97 1.3 42 552 155 180 19 1200 337 418 
*3*10 v - 15 n 0.90 6.75 3.23 2.4 616 18052 7194 7792 97 5878 2496 2135 
Table 6.7: Model (HP3) with inequalities (4.1) and (4.2) 
Inst. Nb Ineq. (total) Nb Ineq. (root) 
MIN MAX f.L a- MIN MAX f.L a-
5 v - 10 n 13 286 109 115 13 153 64 53 
5 v - 15 n 34 865 298 296 34 219 122 58 
8v-lOn 146 16163 5575 6988 115 986 484 339 
8 v - 15 n 1296 224526 40231 82454 396 1184 722 245 
10 v - 10 n 1185 9098 3063 2732 531 1090 721 177 
10 v - 15 n 5705 140361 57424 58863 1054 1637 1144 544 
Table 6.8: Number of inequalities (4.1 )-( 4.2) appended to (HP3) 
Inst. Gap(%) Time(sec) Nodes 
MIN MAX f.L a- MIN MAX f.L a- MIN MAX f.L a-
5v-lOn 0.00 2.14 0.90 0.8 0 4 1 2 1 37 12 16 
5 v - 15 n 0.00 3.76 1.15 1.3 0 5 3 2 1 91 28 35 
8 v - 10 n 1.19 5.77 3.31 1.9 2 803 219 307 25 7393 1794 2737 
8 v - 15 n 2.42 6.88 3.43 1.6 28 5352 970 1962 119 25344 4518 9316 
10 v - 10 n 1.34 4.82 2.97 1.3 16 142 45 44 27 3971 766 1438 
*3* 10 v - 15 n 0.90 5.65 3.67 1.6 377 18037 10410 7932 385 43696 22537 16057 
Table 6.9: Model (HP3) with inequalities (4.1) and (4.2) appended only at root 
by 83% (resp. 95%) in the cpu times for the instances of the largest size solved 
to optimality. The number of nodes decreases by 99% (resp. 99%) for instances 
lOv-lOn, while the gaps decrease from 79 to 88%. Rence the inequalities should be 
appended at the root of the branch and cut algorithm only. 
In the next section, we test the Strengthened Profit Upper Bound inequalities 
for model (HP3). 
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6.3.2 Strengthened Profit Upper Bounds inequalities 
We also test the efficiency of the Strengthened Profit Upper Bound inequalities 
for the General Complete Toll NPP. As the development of a separation procedure 
for the inequalities would be a long and possibly arduous task, their efficiency is 
tested as follows. First, the three classes of inequalities (4.7)-(4.8), (4.9)-(4.10) 
and (4.11) are generated at the root of the branch and cut algorithm. Next the 
strongest of each class is appended to the model when violated. The results are 
presented in Tables (6.10), (6.14) and (6.12). 
Inst. Gap(%) Time(sec) Nodes 
MIN MAX f.l a MIN MAX f.l a MIN MAX f.l a 
5 v - 10 n 0.17 11.11 4.91 3.6 0 4 2 2 1 91 29 32 
5 v - 15 n 2.74 16.56 8.03 4.7 1 6 4 2 9 263 102 102 
8v-lOn 2.20 20.18 11.93 6.2 1 1305 310 464 31 48239 11383 17176 
8 v - 15 n 7.54 15.69 11.54 2.9 20 5385 1404 1915 269 74292 24297 27776 
10 v - 10 n 5.81 15.87 10.39 3 17 2175 494 759 153 64672 13678 22897 
*4*lOv-15n 10.08 18.46 14.06 3.1 4353 18016 13485 6401 56587 261491 149044 79142 
Table 6.10: Model (HP3) with inequalities (4.7)-(4.8) 
Inst. Nb Ineq. (root) 
MIN MAX f.l a 
5v-lOn 6 110 37 37 
5 v - 15 n 25 50 32 9 
8 v - 10 n 27 681 268 240 
8 v - 15 n 53 275 136 70 
10 v - 10 n 215 431 309 68 
10 v - 15 n 218 747 396 166 
Table 6.11: Number of inequalities (4.7)-(4.8) appended to (HP3) 
Compared to Table (6.2), the results show a small decrease by the gaps: from 17 
to 37% for inequalities (4.7)-(4.8) and from 12 to 25% for inequalities (4.9)-(4.10). 
The cpu times and number of nodes also decrease for large instances. For the three 
classes of inequalities, we observe a decrease by 45%, 47% and 26% in the cpu 
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Inst. Gap(%) Time(sec) Nades 
MIN MAX J-L a MIN MAX J-L a MIN MAX J-L a 
5 v - 10 n 0.17 11.27 5.32 3.9 0 3 2 2 1 125 33 43 
5 v - 15 n 2.84 16.92 8.52 4.8 1 6 4 2 9 204 82 68 
8v-lOn 2.30 20.78 12.77 6.7 2 657 157 234 53 24522 5635 8802 
8 v - 15 n 8.53 16.30 12.12 2.9 29 4153 1507 1620 519 80169 29307 29444 
10 v - 10 n 7.27 18.99 12.43 3.5 18 2306 478 822 221 75721 14818 27288 
*4* 10 v - 15 n 10.35 19.05 14.76 3.2 1556 18015 12644 7592 27350 443859 215299 160459 
Table 6.12: Model (HP3) with inequalities (4.9)-(4.10) 
Inst. Nb Ineq. (root) 
MIN MAX J-L a 
5v-lOn 5 65 27 23 
5 v - 15 n 21 43 28 7 
8 v - 10 n 26 605 212 201 
8 v - 15 n 43 237 103 64 
10 v - 10 n 173 391 265 73 
10 v - 15 n 194 568 311 121 
Table 6.13: Number of inequalities (4.9)-(4.10) appended to (HP3) 
Inst. Gap(%) Time(sec) Nades 
MIN MAX J-L a MIN MAX J-L a MIN MAX J-L a 
5 v - 10 n 0.17 12.16 6.44 4.4 0 2 1 1 1 113 35 42 
5 v - 15 n 3.38 18.21 9.57 5.1 1 7 3 2 7 397 105 133 
8v-lOn 3.47 26.75 15.24 7.8 1 545 123 192 39 27697 6267 9807 
8 v - 15 n 9.49 17.32 12.89 3 22 1529 544 556 354 44623 16716 16990 
10 v - 10 n 12.46 22.22 16.38 3.3 24 3565 662 1299 435 162860 29278 59755 
*4*lOv-15n 10.94 20.50 16.12 3.5 606 18008 12694 7561 11628 534114 252863 169438 
Table 6.14: Model (HP3) with inequalities (4.11) 
Inst. Nb Ineq. (root) 
MIN MAX J-L a 
5 v - 10 n 0 17 5 6 
5 v - 15 n 0 12 6 4 
8 v - 10 n 0 68 19 24 
8 v - 15 n 0 70 22 23 
10 v - 10 n 8 53 30 16 
10 v - 15 n 14 115 52 36 
Table 6.15: Number of inequalities (4.11) appended to (HP3) 
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times, and of 78%, 76% and 53% in the number of nodes for instances 10v-10n. 
Further, Tables (6.11), (6.15) and (6.13) provide the number of Strengthened 
Profit Upper Bound inequalities appended to model (HP3). We observe that in-
equalities (4.11) are the least violated, thus they could be less efficient that the 
other classes of inequalities. 
We also test combinations of inequalities. In these tests, each class of inequal-
ities is generated at the root of the branch and cut algorithm. Then the most 
violated class - if any - is appended to formulation (HP3*). The results are pre-
sented in Tables (6.16), (6.17) and (6.18). 
Inst. Gap(%) Time(sec) Nodes 
MIN MAX f-t a MIN MAX f-t a MIN MAX f-t a 
5 v - 10 il 0.17 11.60 5.55 3.8 0 2 1 1 1 81 28 28 
5 v - 15 il 3.22 17.50 8.66 5 1 7 3 2 11 687 163 238 
8 v - 10 n 2.69 20.45 12.89 6.2 1 765 161 274 35 36593 7830 13069 
8 v - 15 n 8.76 16.53 12.09 2.9 13 2178 585 759 349 47533 17171 18271 
10 v - 10 il 6.24 16.50 11.79 3 17 905 238 320 295 43817 10131 15394 
*4*10v-15n 10.34 19.44 14.69 3.2 998 18014 12590 7679 32088 484325 249469 150359 
Table 6.16: Model (HP3) with inequalities (4.7)-(4.8) and (4.9)-(4.10) 
Inst. Gap(%) Time(sec) Nodes 
MIN MAX f-t a MIN MAX f-t a MIN MAX f-t a 
5 v - 10 n 0.17 11.11 4.91 3.6 0 2 1 1 1 91 30 32 
5 v - 15 n 2.74 16.56 8.02 4.7 1 3 3 1 9 223 88 79 
8 v - 10 n 2.20 20.18 11.91 6.2 2 1230' 264 439 47 46625 9733 16710 
8 v - 15 n 7.54 15.69 11.53 2.9 15 2630 788 896 273 48106 19648 17154 
10 v - 10 n 5.79 15.86 10.36 3 10 3027 554 1107 239 172138 30359 63415 
*4*10v-15n 10.08 18.58 13.94 3 926 18010 12339 8017 23013 443483 230147 161084 
Table 6.17: Model (HP3) with inequalities (4.7)-(4.8) and (4.11) 
Combining inequalities (4.7)-(4.8) and (4.9)-(4.10) yields a decrease from 11 to 
29% in the gaps, compared to Table 6.2. Further, for the instances of the largest 
size solved to optimality (i.e., 10v-10n), the cpu times and number of nodes de-
crease by 73% and 84% respectively. Observing Tables 6.2 and 6.17, we conclude 
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Inst. Gap(%) Tirne(sec) Nodes 
MIN MAX tt () MIN MAX tt () MIN MAX tt () 
5v-1On 0.17 11.27 5.31 3.9 0 5 2 2 1 125 35 44 
5 v - 15 n 2.84 16.92 8.52 4.8 1 7 5 2 9 367 122 126 
8v-1On 2.3 20.77 12.76 6.7 2 3199 584 1171 53 115845 20702 42589 
8 v - 15 il 8.52 26.62 14.34 6.2 36 18004 4413 6485 585 403053 88481 143778 
1Ov-1On 7.27 18.97 12.37 3.6 22 2571 533 916 190 71593 14049 25792 
_6_ 10 v - 15 n 10.35 19.24 14.62 3.1 2136 18017 13162 6903 25610 267260 148720 80939 
Table 6.18: Model (HP3) with inequalities (4.9)-(4.10) and (4.11) 
that pairing inequalities (4.7)-(4.8) and (4.11) leads to a from 17 to 38% 
in the gaps. The cpu times and number of nodes by 38% and 52% respec-
tively for instances lOv-lOn. Finally, combining inequalities (4.9)-(4.10) and (4.11) 
yields a decrease from 6 to 25% in the gaps. The cpu times and number of nodes 
decrease by 40% and 78% respectively for instances lOv-l0n. 
Henee, for the Strengthened Profit Upper Bound inequalities, we conclude that 
the best results are obtained when combining inequalities (4.7)-(4.8) with (4.9)-
(4.10). 
6.3.3 Final tests for (HP3) 
According to Subsections 6.3.1 and 6.3.2, the best results are obtained with the 
Strengthened Shortest Path inequalities (4.1)-(4.2), or the Strengthened Profit Up-
per Bound inequalities (4.7)-(4.8) and (4.9)-(4.10). In this section, we test model 
(HP3) with these valid inequalities, which are appended at the root of the branch 
and cut algorithm when violated. The results are presented in Table 6.19. 
If we compare Tables 6.2 and 6.19, we observe that the gaps decrease from 78 
to 89% with respect to the initial model (HP3). Further, for the largest instances 
solved to optimality, Le., lOv-lOn, the inequalities yield a decrease by 90% in the 
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Inst. Gap(%) Time(sec) Nodes 
MIN MAX J-L (J MIN MAX J-L (J MIN MAX J-L (J 
5v-lOn 0.00 1.89 0.86 0.7 0 4 2 2 1 37 11 15 
5 v - 15 n 0.00 3.49 1.09 1.2 0 5 3 2 1 95 30 36 
8v-lOn 1.01 5.51 3.02 1.6 2 569 130 203 15 4732 889 1725 
8 v - 15 n 2.42 6.73 3.36 1.5 38 6928 1236 2546 87 28103 4875 10388 
lOv-lOn 1.13 4.63 2.84 1.2 22 347 90 116 5 4613 874 1682 
*3*lOv-15n 0.89 5.78 3.62 1.7 ·202 18076 9621 8462 181 34462 12170 11592 
Table 6.19: Model (HP3) with inequalities (4.1)-(4.2), (4.7)-(4.8) and (4.9)-(4.10) 
(only at root) 
cpu times and of 99% in the number of nodes. 
To illustrate the results, Figures 6.1, 6.2 and 6.3 depict the evolution of the 
lower and upper bounds of the objective function with respect to the cpu time for 
three instances. The lower and upper bounds for the initial model (HP3) are de-
noted 'LB (HP3)' and 'DB (HP3)', while the lower and upper bounds for the final 
model (HP3) with inequalities (4.1)-(4.2), (4.7)-(4.8) and (4.9)-(4.10) are denoted 
'LB (HP3) Final' and 'DB (HP3) Final' respectively. 
1750000,-------------, 
1700000 
f 1600000 
~ 
1 i 1550000 
1500000 
1450000 
1400000 +--~--~--~----1 
10 100 1000 10000 
('pullme(.~) 
-LB (HP3) 
00_00 UB (HP3) 
-LB (HP3) Final 
- UB (HP3) Finul 
Figure 6.1: Evolution of the objective function with respect to the cpu time for an 
instance of class 8v-l0n 
~ 
.§ 
~ 
1880000 
1830000 ....... . 
'6 1780000 
i' 
1730000 
1680000 +-----_----~----_,----____l 
10 100 
cpll finie ($) 
1000 10000 
119 
-LB (HP3) 
-UB(HP3) 
- LB (HP3) Final 
-UB(HP3) Final 
Figure 6.2: Evolution of the objective function with respect to the cpu time for an 
instance of class 1 Ov-l On 
2470000 ----------------.--------.• ----.---, 
2420000 ..................... . 
2370000 
~ 
li 
~ 2320000 .................... _---..;: j 
i 
2270000 
2220000 
2170000 +-----~---_---_---~-------' 
10 100 1000 10000 100000 
<pu lime (s) 
-LB (HP3) 
- LB (HIè3) Final 
-UB (1IP3) Finm 
····UB(HP3) 
Figure 6.3: Evolution of the objective function with respect to the cpu time for an 
instance of class lOv-15n 
120 
6.4 Numerical results for CCT-NPP 
In this section, we test the valid inequalities proposed in Chapter 4 in the con-
text of the Constrained Complete ToU NPP, i.e., for model (HP3*). First of aU, the 
results obtained for model (HP3*) without any new valid inequalities are presented 
in Tablé 6.20. Note that appending the Triangle and Monotonicity constraints to 
the problem yields a significant increase of the cpu times, which does not aUow us 
to solve instances as large as for the GCT-NPP. 
Inst. Gap(%) Time(sec) Nodes 
MIN MAX IL a MIN MAX IL a MIN MAX IL a 
5v-lOn 8.34 30.25 19.46 7.3 0 4 2 1 41 393 173 140 
5 v - 15 n 12.74 27.86 19.50 4.4 0 9 5 3 29 1067 370 346 
8v-lOn 16.88 39.94 30.54 7.8 3 1105 271 388 175 121461 28430 42968 
*5*8 v - 15 n 30.26 54.24 40.60 8.5 3570 18001 15596 5378 202361 1138242 812369 307804 
Table 6.20: Model (HP3*) 
In the next subsections, we test each class of valid inequalities. Subsection 
6.4.1 provides numerical results for model (HP3*) with the Strengthened Shortest 
Path inequalities, while Subsection 6.4.2 provides results for model (HP3*) with 
the Strengthened Profit Upper Bound inequalities. Finally, model (HP3*) is tested 
with the best valid inequalities in Subsection 6.4.3. 
6.4.1 Strengthened Shortest Path inequalities 
This section aims to test model (HP3*) with the Strengthened Shortest Path 
inequalities (4.1) and (4.2). The results are presented in Tables 6.21 and 6.23. 
If we compare Tables 6.20 and 6.21, we observe that the Strengthened Shortest 
Path inequalities (4.1) yield a decrease by 30% in the number of nodes for the 
instances of the largest size solved to optimality, i.e., Sv-IOn. Note that, from 
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Inst. Gap(%) Time(sec) Nodes 
MIN MAX Ji (J" MIN MAX Ji (J" MIN MAX Ji (J" 
5 v - 10 n 8.34 29.79 19.24 7.1 1 7 4 2 39 349 182 106 
5 v - 15 n 12.70 27.83 19.42 4.4 1 26 13 9 31 1413 554 465 
8 v - 10 n 16.63 39.65 30.36 7.7 13 9801 3550 3556 129 44373 19902 17581 
*5*8 V - 15 il 30.10 58.01 41.01 9.5 3440 18004 15577 5427 100000 649572 473912 172174 
Table 6.21: Model (HP3*) with inequalities (4.1) 
Inst. Nb INEG (total) Nb INEG (root) 
MIN MAX Ji (J" MIN MAX Ji (J" 
5 v - 10 n 16 62 28 16 5 32 13 9 
5 v - 15 n 4 220 104 85 1 36 15 12 
8v-lOn 41 162856 45732 57287 3 44 22 14 
8 v - 15 n 285 550 381 106 12 42 28 10 
Table 6.22: Number of inequalities (4.1) appended to (HP3*) 
Inst. Gap(%) Time(sec) Nodes 
MIN MAX Ji (J" MIN MAX Ji (J" MIN MAX Ji (J" 
5v-lOn 2.84 15.49 7.90 4 0 7 4 3 25 125 68 37 
5 v - 15 n 0.00 8.74 4.78 3.3 0 19 9 6 1 291 132 108 
8v-lOn 8.20 21.59 13.65 4.6 6 13295 2710 4785 37 59424 12376 21224 
*5*8 v - 15 n 16.56 23.18 19.07 2.6 4329 18016 15731 5099 68529 253956 119928 64542 
Table 6.23: Model (HP3*) with inequalities (4.2) 
Inst. Nb INEG (total) Nb INEG (root) 
MIN MAX Ji (J" MIN MAX Ji (J" 
5v-lOn 23 239 140 70 13 143 78 44 
5 v - 15 n 37 244 166 67 37 149 115 37 
8v-lOn 188 295532 61556 106030 114 589 344 175 
8 v - 15 n 483 1589 1009 376 293 923 577 193 
Table 6.24: Number of inequalities (4.2) appended to (HP3*) 
now, we always report the decrease in the number of nodes for the instances of the 
largest size solved to optimality, i.e., Sv-IOn. However, the cpu times increase and 
the decrease by the gaps is insignificant. 
In what concerns the Strengthened Short est Path inequalities (4.2), the results 
show a decrease from 55 to 75% in the gaps, and of 56% in the number of nodes for 
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the instances of the largest size solved to optimality. i.e., 8v-lOn. Hence, although 
an increase of the cpu times due to the time required by the separation procedure, 
this class of valid inequalities is very efficient. 
Further, Tables 6.22 and 6.24 provide the number of Strengthened Shortest 
Path inequalities appended to (HP3*) at the root and during the branch and cut 
algorithm. One can observe that there is mu ch more violated inequalities of class 
(4.2) than of class (4.1). This explains why adding inequalities (4.2) to (HP3*) 
yields a larger decrease in the gaps and number of nodes. 
Next, as the first class of Strengthened Shortest Path inequalities is much less 
efficient than the second one, we also test model (HP3*) with both classes of in-
equalities, in order to decide if the first class (4.1) should be used or not. In this 
case, the most violated among both classes of inequalities is appended to model 
(HP3*), if any. The results are presented in Table 6.25. 
Inst. Gap(%) Time(sec) Nodes 
MIN MAX f.1 !7 MIN MAX f.1 !7 MIN MAX f.1 !7 
5v-lOn 2.22 15.15 6.85 4.1 0 7 4 2 9 103 41 30 
5 v - 15 n 0.00 8.44 4.30 3 0 16 10 6 1 335 108 109 
8v-lOn 7.18 20.75 12.80 4.6 8 10010 2125 3568 31 21941 4913 7697 
*5*8 v - 15 n 16.28 24.47 18.87 3.1 1357 18017 15236 6207 27870 261180 145685 76628 
Table 6.25: Model (HP3*) with inequalities (4.1) and (4.2) 
Inst. Nb INEG (total) Nb INEG (root) 
MIN MAX f.1 !7 MIN MAX f.1 !7 
5v-lOn 31 299 176 89 24 220 109 63 
5 v - 15 n 42 314 241 100 42 218 156 56 
8v-lOn 198 162548 36234 57595 111 820 443 273 
8 v - 15 n 773 1953 1441 386 343 1240 730 276 
Table 6.26: Number of inequalities (4.1)-(4.2) appended to (HP3*) 
If we compare Tables 6.20, 6.23 and 6.25, we conclude that both classes of in-
equalities are useful. One can observe a decrease from 58 to 78% in the average 
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gaps, and of 83% in the number of nodes. However, Table 6.26 points out the 
huge number of violated inequalities appended to (HP3*) during the branch and 
cut algorithm, which explains the significant increase of the cpu times. As a con-
sequence, it cou Id be better to append the Strengthened Shortest inequalities only 
at the root of the branch and cut algorithm, which would yield a more reasonable 
number of additional inequalities in the model. The results obtained are presented 
in Table 6.27. 
Inst. Gap(%) Time(sec) Nodes 
MIN MAX J.L (]" MIN MAX J.L (]" MIN MAX J.L (]" 
5 v - 10 n 2.22 15.15 6.85 4.1 0 6 4 2 11 115 63 39 
5 v - 15 n 0.00 8.44 4.30 3 0 16 8 5 1 239 109 80 
8 v - 10 n 7.18 20.75 12.80 4.6 5 2617 595 937 37 39434 8452 13999 
*5*8 v - 15 n 16.28 26.16 19.52 3.9 5796 18027 15980 4554 72548 166820 110460 33264 
Table 6.27: Model (HP3*) with (4.1) and (4.2) inequalities appended only at root 
To conclude, the Strengthened Shortest Path inequalities (4.1) and (4.2), and 
especially the second ones, are very useful to decrease the gap and number of nodes 
in the branch and cut algorithm. Unfortunately, they are quite costly in terms of 
cpu time. This effect can be reduced by adding the valid inequalities at the root 
of the branch and cut algorithm only. However, it also yields a loss of efficiency 
relative to the number of nodes, as the decreasing factor is now 70% (instead of 
83%, see Table 6.25). Hence, the results can be balanced depending on the relative 
importance of cpu times and number of nodes. 
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6.4.2 Strengthened Profit Upper Bound Inequalities 
Here we test model (HP3*) with the Strengthened Profit Upper Bound Inequal-
ities (4.7)-(4.8), (4.9)-(4.10) and (4.11). The results are presented in Tables (6.28), 
(6.30) and (6.32). 
Inst. Gap(%) Time(sec) Nades 
MIN MAX f-t a MIN MAX f-t a MIN MAX f-t a 
5 v - 10 n 7.06 27.93 16.80 7.8 0 6 4 2 42 475 183 163 
5 v - 15 n 8.56 26.95 17.50 5.4 1 33 13 11 23 1225 512 419 
8 v - 10 n 12.56 36.83 25.32 7.8 5 1749 404 617 109 73944 16330 26061 
*5*8 v - 15 n 28.15 53.70 38.72 8.8 4859 18006 15814 4899 100000 627600 427785 141419 
Table 6.28: Model (HP3*) with inequalities (4.7)-(4.8) 
Inst. Nb INEG (root) 
MIN MAX f-t a 
5v-lOn 8 144 45 46 
5 v - 15 n 23 55 41 11 
8v-lOn 58 674 263 241 
8 v - 15 n 101 312 166 68 
Table 6.29: Number of inequalities (4.7)-(4.8) appended to (HP3*) 
Inst. Gap(%) Time(sec) Nades 
MIN MAX f-t a MIN MAX f-t a MIN MAX f-t a 
5v-lOn 7.47 27.93 17.69 7.1 1 5 3 1 29 217 111 63 
5 v - 15 n 9.46 27.17 18.22 5.1 2 29 12 10 19 1447 475 487 
8 v - 10 n 13.71 37.36 26.74 7.7 4 2579 574 910 47 107406 24315 37934 
*5*8 v - 15 n 28.90 55.61 40.05 9.3 1076 18005 15183 6309 35782 581625 429370 185519 
Table 6.30: Model (HP3*) with inequalities (4.9)-(4.10) 
Comparisons with Table (6.20) lead to the following conclusions. Inequalities 
(4.7)-( 4.8) yield a decrease from 10 to 17% in the gaps, and of 43% in the number 
of nodes. Inequalities (4.9)-(4.10) yield a decrease from 9 to 12% in the gaps and 
of 14% in the number of nodes. However, to generate aU inequalities increase the 
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Inst. Nb INEC (root) 
MIN MAX Jl (J" 
5 v - 10 n 5 89 31 29 
5 v - 15 n 4 48 27 16 
8 v - 10 n 55 604 211 207 
8 v - 15 n 79 229 116 52 
Table 6.31: Number of inequalities (4.9)-(4.10) appended to (HP3*) 
Inst. Cap(%) Time(sec) Nodes 
MIN MAX Jl (J" MIN MAX Jl (J" MIN MAX Jl (J" 
5v-lOn 8.15 30.19 19.38 7.3 0 5 3 2 41 393 173 141 
5 v - 15 n 12.74 27.86 19.41 4.4 1 15 8 6 23 745 386 277 
8 v - 10 n 16.88 39.93 30.33 7.6 3 2800 632 990 57 183141 40731 64970 
*5*8 v - 15 n 30.34 55.43 40.85 8.7 2055 18003 15345 5943 86706 772089 538845 219395 
Table 6.32: Model (HP3*) with inequalities (4.11) 
Inst. Nb INEC (root) 
MIN MAX Jl (J" 
5 v - 10 n 0 18 4 6 
5 v - 15 n 0 6 2 2 
8 v - 10 n 0 76 20 28 
8 v - 15 n 0 17 9 6 
Table 6.33: Number of inequalities (4.11) appended to (HP3*) 
cpu times. Finally, inequalities (4.11) are useless for model (HP3*). lndeed, the 
decrease by the gaps is insignificant, while the cpu times and number of nodes 
increase. 
Further, comparing Tables (6.29), (6.31) and (6.33) with the corresponding ta-
bles for the GCT-NPP, which provide the number of violated inequalities appended 
to model (HP3*) and (HP3) respectively, we conclude that the Strengthened Profit 
Upper Bound inequalities are more useful in the context of the GCT-NPP, i.e., 
without Triangle and Monotonicity inequalities. Further, we observe the very small 
number of inequalities (4.11). It explains why the gaps do not decrease when adding 
this class of inequalities to model (HP3*). 
126 
In order to know if inequalities (4.7)-(4.8) and (4.9)-(4.10) should be used 
singly or together, we also perform tests of model (HP3*) with both classes of 
Strengthened Profit Upper Bound inequalities, adding the most violated one to 
model (HP3*), if any. The results are presented in Table (6.34). 
Inst. Gap(%) Time(sec) Nades 
MIN MAX f-t 17 MIN MAX f-t 17 MIN MAX f-t 17 
5 v - 10 n 7.68 30.17 17.84 8.5 0 8 3 3 41 499 179 166 
5 v - 15 n 9.55 27.17 18.26 5.1 0 16 9 6 29 739 395 247 
8 v - 10 n 14.81 38.03 26.9 7.3 5 1305 365 462 35 45544 13068 15823 
*5*8v-15n 28.98 51.59 38.53 8 17506 18009 17924 187 100000 666912 559308 85244 
Table 6.34: Model (HP3*) with inequalities (4.7)-(4.8) and (4.9)-(4.10) 
Combining inequalities (4.7)-(4.8) and (4.9)-(4.10) yield a decrease from 6 to 
12% in the gaps and of 54% in the number of nodes, compared to Table 6.20. 
However, the cpu times increase. Further, as these results are similar to the ones 
obtained when adding inequalities (4.7)-(4.8) to model (HP3*) (see Table 6.28), we 
cannot determine if inequalities (4.9)-(4.10) should be used or not. 
6.4.3 Final tests for (HP3*) 
Now we test model (HP3*) with the most efficient valid inequalities, according 
to Subsections 6.4.1 and 6.4.2. The inequalities are appended to model (HP3*) at 
the root of the branch and cut algorithm. Results are presented in Tables 6.35 and 
6.36. 
Comparing these two tables, we observe that the gaps obtained are similar, 
and lead to a decrease from 59 to 78% with respect to the initial model (HP3*). 
However, model (HP3*) with inequalities (4.1)-(4.2) and (4.7)-(4.8) yields better 
results in terms of both cpu times and number of nodes, especially for large in-
stances. These valid inequalities lead to a decrease by 64% in the number of nodes 
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Inst. Gap(%) Time(sec) Nodes 
MIN MAX /-L ()' MIN MAX /-L ()' MIN MAX /-L ()' 
5 v - 10 n 1.93 15.15 6.80 4.2 0 10 5 4 9 211 78 68 
5 v - 15 n 0.00 8.40 4.23 2.9 0 20 11 7 1 213 106 69 
8v-lOn 7.13 20.73 12.74 4.7 7 5119 1263 1782 29 63895 15152 22045 
*5*8v-15n 16.26 23.35 19.05 3.0 2918 18033 15511 5632 71731 163993 115733 28462 
Table 6.35: Model (HP3*) with inequalities (4.1)-(4.2), (4.7)-(4.8) and (4.9)-(4.10) 
(only at root) 
Inst. Gap(%) Time(s) Nodes 
MIN MAX /-L ()' MIN MAX /-L ()' MIN MAX /-L ()' 
5 v - 10 n 1.94 15.15 6.80 4.2 0 10 5 3 9 151 66 50 
5 v - 15 n 0.00 8.37 4.22 2.9 0 20 11 7 1 171 97 64 
8v-lOn 7.16 20.71 12.57 4.7 7 2732 654 964 71 45363 10222 15885 
8 v - 15 n 16.18 22.81 18.92 2.4 6689 18052 16143 4228 41230 124506 78708 29887 
Table 6.36: Model (HP3*) with inequalities (4.1)-(4.2) and (4.7)-(4.8) (only at 
root) 
for the instances of the largest size solved to optimality (i.e., 8v-IOn). 
However, the results obtained for model (HP3*) with only the Strengthened 
Shortest Path inequalities (4.1 )-( 4.2) appended at the root of the branch and cut 
algorithm (see Table 6.27) are slightly better than these ones, both in terms of 
cpu times and number of nodes. Further, the decrease by the gaps obtained when 
adding the Strengthened Profit Upper Bound inequalities (4.7)-(4.8) is insignificant. 
We conclude that the best valid inequalities for the CCT-NPP are the Strength-
ened Shortest Path inequalities (4.1)-(4.2), and should be appended to model 
(HP3*) at the root of the branch and cut algorithm only. However, this increases 
the cpu times. lndeed, the Triangle and Monotonicity constraints make the prob-
lem much more difficult. While the valid inequalities proposed yield a significant 
decrease by both gap and number of nodes in the branch and cut algorithm, they 
also interfere negatively with the Triangle and Monotonicity constraints, which ob-
structs the program to reach quickly optimality. 
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To illustrate the results, Figures 6.4 and 6.5 depict the evolution of the lower 
and upper bounds on the objective function with respect to the cpu time for two 
instances. The lower and upper bounds for the initial model (HP3*) are denoted 
'LB (HP3*)' and 'DB (HP3*)', while the lower and upper bounds for model (HP3*) 
with inequalities (4.1)-(4.2) (appended only at root) are denoted 'LB (HP3*) Final' 
and 'DB (HP3*) Final' respectively. 
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Figure 6.5: Evolution of the objective function with respect to the cpu time for an 
instance of class 8v-15n 
6.5 Conclusion 
In this chapter, we é:U:j~,e::,tjeu the vaUd inequalities from Chapter 4 for the GCT-
NPP and CCT-NPP. Obviously, the Strengthened Shortest Path inequalities (4.2) 
lead to the best improvements in terms of gaps, cpu times and number of nodes 
in the branch and cut algorithm. Several other valid inequalities, especially the 
Strengthened Profit Upper Bound inequalities (4.7)-(4.8) and (4.9)-(4.10), but also 
the Strengthened Short est Path inequalities (4.1), are useful. For the the GCT-
NPP, we observe a decrease by 78 to 89% in the gaps, 90% in the cpu times and of 
99% in the number of nodes for the largest instances solved to optimality. In what 
concerns the CCT-NPP, the best results show a decrease by 58 to 78% in the gaps 
and of 70% in the number of nodes for the largest instances solved to optimality. 
CHAPTER 7 
LINKING PRICING PROBLEMS IN TRANSPORTATION 
NETWORKS AND ECONOMICS 
In this last chapter, we highlight the links between the Network Pricing Problem 
studied in the thesis and a more standard design and pricing family of problems 
in economics. While the first family of problems seeks to set tolls on a multi-
commodity transportation network within the framework of bilevel programming, 
the second family intends to design and price a set of products taking into account 
the utility-maximizing customers. Both topics have been extensively studied in the 
literature. However, we focus on problems that can be modelled as mixed integer 
programs. 
In Section 1, we consider a standard design and pricing family of problems. 
General definitions are first provided, foUowed by a summary of the main results 
from the literature. Next, in Section 2, we point out the relationships between this 
family of problems and the Network Pricing Problem. FinaUy, the aim of Section 
3 is to compare a specific pricing problem in economics with the General Complete 
ToU NPP. 
7.1 Designing and pricing a set of products 
Consider the family of problems which intends to design and price a set of 
products in a given economic market. In the mathematical literature dedicated 
to this field, three different paradigms are studied: the Buyer Welfare, the Seller 
Welfare and the Share-of-Choices problems. We first provide a general definition 
131 
of the three problems. Then we summarize the main mathematical contributions 
to this field. 
7.1.1 Problem definition 
Let K be a set of purchasers, and I a set of products. The purchaser prefer-
ences for the various products are described by a utility matrix u7 : k E K, i E I. 
Each purchaser chooses the product with the largest utility, so far as this utility is 
positive. Otherwise he refrains from buying. 
The Buyer Welfare Problem consists of determining which subset of prod-
ucts S ç I should be introduced in the market so as to maximize the sum of the 
purchaser utilities at optimality, i.e., for the products they have chosen. Consider-
ing binary flow variables Yi, x7 : k E K, i E I that indicate if a product is introduced 
in the market and if a product is chosen by a purchaser respectively, this problem 
can be described by the following mixed integer program: 
(BWP) maxLLu7x7 
kEK iE'I 
subject to: 
~UkXk > uky. ~JJ- tt 
JET 
where Y is a non negative constant. 
Vk E K, Vi E I 
Vk E K 
Vk E K, Vi E I 
Vk E K, Vi E I, 
(7.1 ) 
(7.2) 
(7.3) 
(7.4) 
(7.5) 
Constraints (7.1) ensure that each purchaser chooses his/her best product in 
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terms of utility, constraints (7.2) force each purchaser to choose at most one prod-
uct, constraints (7.3) impose that the products chosen by purchasers are among 
those offered, and constraint (7.4) imposes an upper bound Y on the number of 
products that are introduced in the market. 
Now consider additional parameters vf : i E I, k E K corresponding to the 
incomes perceived by a seller if purchaser k E K buys product i E I. The Seller 
Welfare Problem consists of determining which subset of products S ç l should 
be introduced in the market so as to maximize the seller's income, knowing that 
each purchaser selects the pro du ct with largest utility for him, so far as this utility 
is positive. Rence the problem can be described as the mixed integer program: 
(SWP) max L L v;x; 
kEK iEI 
subject to constraints (7.1) to (7.5). 
The Share-of-Choices Problem is quite different from the two other pricing 
problems. One considers a set A of attributes associated with the various products, 
and a set Ja : a E A of levels for each attribute. A product profile is defined as 
the assignment of a level to each attribute of each product. It is represented by the 
vector p = (jl,j2, ... ,jIAI) of its A attribute levels. Further, each purchaser asso-
ciates a perceived value W~j : a E A, j E Ja, k E ;C to each level of each attribute. 
One also considers that the perceived values are normalized to lie between -1 and 
1. Therefore, purchaser k prefers product profile p = (jl,j2, ... ,jIAI) to status quo 
only if wk(p) = w~Jt + w~h + ... + WIAljlAI is positive. The Share-of-Choices Prob-
lem consists of determining a product profile p so as to maximize the number of 
satisfied purchasers k E ;C, knowing that a purchaser k is satisfied if the sum of its 
perceived values w k (p) is positive for this product profile p. 
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We close this section by mentioning that, in the thesis, we do not consider 
models that involve an underlying probabilistic structure, i.e., the purchaser choices 
are determined by a probabilistic function. The interested reader cou Id refer to 
Krieger and Green (2002, [42]), Shioda et aL (2007, [62]) or Maddah and Bish 
(2008, [48]) for further details. 
7.1.2 Literature review 
Green and (1985, [31]) study the Buyer and the Seller Welfare prob-
lems. For the Buyer Welfare Problem, they consider a subset of products S ç l to 
introduce in the market, with ISI exogenous to the problem, Le., constraint (7.4) 
becomes ISI. Since the two problems cannot be solved efficiently by a 
complete enumeration of the feasible solutions, at least in real applications, the 
authors propose inexact resolution methods, such as Lagrangian relaxation and 
various greedy heuristics. 
Refering to a theoretical study from Cornuéjols et al. [19] for an equivalent 
problem, the ratio of the greedy over the optimal income (latter called 'perfor-
mance ratio') in the worst case, ZGjZo = 1 - ((ISI - 1)ISI-1 )18 1. Rence, as 
ISI ---> 00, the performance ratio is approximately 63%, and will be higher for 
sm aller values of ISI. Green and Krieger also run simulations on small problems, 
randomly generated with IKI = 100, III = 10 and ISI = 4 or 5. In aIl cases, the 
greedy heuristic is within 8% of optimality and gives the optimal solution in over 
50% of the simulations. 
Whereas these methods are effective for the Buyer Welfare Problem, they do 
not perform weIl for the Seller Welfare Problem. According to the authors, neither 
a Lagrangian relaxation nor an exact method can be implemented for problems of 
realistic sizes. Further, the greedy heuristic approach can yield very poor results. 
Indeed, in the worst possible case, the performance ratio is ISI-1 , and becomes 
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arbitrarily bad when ISI -t 00. However, better results can be obtained if the 
parameters vf are almost equal for aIl k E K, i E I. Tests on randomly generated 
instances involving 100 purchasers, 10 products and ISI = 4, shows that the seller's 
greedy heuristic is within 5% of optimality and gives the optimal solution in 78% 
of the simulations. 
Kohli and Krishnamurti (1987, [39]) propose a dynamic programming heuristic 
to solve the Share-of-Choices problem with a single product. In order to highlight 
the efficiency of this new approach, the authors run tests on randomly generated 
problems involving 100 to 400 purchasers, 4 to 8 attributes, and 2 to 5 levels per 
attribute. The results are obtained very quickly. They are always within 9%, and 
on average within 2%, of optimality. The optimal solution is identified in 46% 
cases. 
The authors also compare their approach to an alternative Lagrangian relax-
ation heuristic. They conclude that the dynamic programming heuristic dominates 
the Lagrangian relaxation heuristic in terms of both computation al time and ap-
proximation of the optimal solution, the results obtained by the Lagrangian relax-
ation heuristic being only within 42% of optimality. The dynamic programming 
heuristic is also significantly faster than an enumeration procedure. 
In another article, Kohli and Krishnamurti (1989, [40]) prove the NP-hardness 
of the Share-of-Choices Problem with a single product. They also propose a 
graph representation of the problem, leading to two heuristics, based on dynamic-
programming and on a shortest path problem respectively. 
Both heuristics have arbitrarily bad worst-case bounds. However, when tested 
on random instances (the same as in [39]), the dynamic programming solution is 
on within 2% of optimality (at worst within 12%), while the shortest path 
solution is on average within 6% of optimality (at worst within 13%). Optimal 
135 
solutions are found in 42% and 14% cases respectively. 
Kohli and Sukumar (1990, [41]) present dynamic-programming heuristics for the 
Buyer Welfare, Seller Welfare and Share-of-Choices problems, considering this time 
a multi-product set for the last problem. However, the Buyer and Seller Welfare 
problems involve a multi-attribute structure like in the Share-of-Choices Problem, 
i.e., levels have to be determined for each attribute of each product. 
The heuristics are tested on randomly generated instances involving 50 to 150 
purchasers, 2 to 4 products, 4 to 6 attributes and 2 to 4 levels per attribute. The 
empirical results are near-optimal, as the performance ratios are on average within 
2%, 5% and 2% of optimality for the three problems, while the worst ratios are 
within 4%, 15% and 8% respectively. Optimal solutions are found in 10%, 12% and 
30% cases respectively. Computationally, solutions are found very quickly. 
Nair et al. (1995, [54]) propose beam search based heuristics for the Buyer 
Welfare, Seller Welfare and Share-of-Choices problems, where the Buyer and Seller 
Welfare problems involve a multi-attribute structure. Such heuristics consist in 
breadth first searches with no backtracking and breadth limited to a given number 
of the most promising nodes. 
In order to compare the efficiency of this new approach with the Kohli and Suku-
mar dynamic programming heuristics, the authors randomly generate instances as 
in [41]. The results show performance ratios within 1% of optimality for the three 
problems, and optimal solutions are found in 38%, 58% and 66% cases respectively. 
Further, the beam se arch based heuristics is approximately two times faster than 
the Kohli and Sukumar heuristics. 
Alexouda and Paparrizos (2001, [2]) present a genetic algorithm based heuristic 
for solving the Seller Welfare Problem with a multi-attribute structure. It is tested 
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on randomly generated problems involving 100 or 150 purchasers, 2 or 3 products, 
3 to 7 attributes and 3 to 6 levels per attribute. When compared to the beam 
search based heuristics proposed by Nair et al. . [54], the methods perform better 
both in terms of cpu time and solution quality. The genetic heuristic are on average 
three times faster than the beam search based method, while the solution found is 
better by 8% on average. Optimal solutions are found in 74% cases. 
The only authors which consider an exact resolution for the Seller Welfare Prob-
lem are McBryde and Zufryden (1988, [52]). Observing that constraints (7.1) are 
only active when there exists j E l such that xJ = 1 and uJ < u~ (then one must 
have Yi = 0), they replace constraints (7.1) by the equivalent: 
Wk Y' W" l . --1-' k k v Ef\v,vz,]E :zr],Ui >uj ' 
Using a generic mathematical solver on the new formulation, the authors solve 
randomly generated instances with 50 to 100 purchasers and 16 products (Y = 10) 
to optimality very quickly. 
They also obtain good results for a particular case in which the seller incomes 
vf : k E ;C, i E l do not depend on the products chosen by the purchasers. lndeed, 
they solve randomly generated instances with 100 to 300 purchasers and 64 to 512 
products (Y = 10) to optimality in at most three seconds. Note that this last case 
is equivalent to a set covering problem, which is often solved using greedy methods. 
7.1.3 Profit and Bundle Pricing Problems 
Dobson and Kalish (1988, [25]) consider an extension of the Seller Welfare 
Problem, in which price variables Ki : i E l are defined explicitly. The authors 
also assume that the introduction of a product i into the market induces a fixed 
cost fi for the seller. The seller's income Vi for product i is the product price Ki, 
137 
Further, rather than a set of purehasers, the authors eonsider a set of purehaser 
segments with demand Tlk : k E K, a segment being a set of purehasers whieh have 
the same reservation priee. Hence a reservation priee matrix r~ : k E K, i E l is 
ruso defined, providing a measure of the value of each produet for each 
The utility uf for a k E K if it buys the produet i E l is defined as the 
differenee between the reservation priee rf and the produet priee ÎTi. 
The Profit Problem eonsists of determining both a subset of products S ç l 
to introduee in the market and the eorresponding product priees leading to a max-
imum profit for the seller. Let us note that, contrary to Green and Krieger [31], 
the authors eonsider an endogenous subset of produets S. 
In order to manage effieiently the case in whieh a segment would not buy any 
product (i.e., if aU the pereeived utilities for the segment are negative), an artificial 
product a is ereated for each segment, with both reservation and produet priees 
set to zero. With these notations, the authors propose the following mixed integer 
program: 
(PP) max L TlkÎTi X7 - L !iYi 
kEK,iEI iEI 
subjeet to: 
L(rj ÎTj )xJ 2:: (r~ - ÎTi)Yi 
JEI 
LX~=l 
iEI 
ÎTQ = 0 
x7, Yi E {a, 1} 
'ï/k E K, 'ï/i E l 
'ï/k E K 
'ï/k E K, 'ï/i E l 
'ï/k E K, 'ï/i E I. 
(7.6) 
(7.7) 
(7.8) 
(7.9) 
(7.10) 
(7.11) 
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To solve this problem, the authors propose a method called 'reverse greedy 
heuristic', which exploit the underlying structure of the problem. If variables 
x~, Yi : k E K, i E l are fixed (i.e., the subset of offered products and the flows are 
known), then the optimal solution of problem (PP) can be found in polynomial time 
by solving the inverse optimization problem, which consists here of a set of shortest 
path problems. It st arts with a solution x~, Yi : k E K, i E l of maximum utility for 
each purchaser segment, and the corresponding optimal priees 'Tri : i E l obtained 
through inverse optimization. At each iteration, a segment is reassigned to another 
product or removed from the market, and corresponding priees are updated. The 
proeedure stops when no further improvement is possible. The selection criterion 
for choosing the segment to reassign at each iteration is the seller profit, i.e., among 
all the segments which prevent the seller from increasing its priees, one selects the 
one which would lead to the largest improvement of the objective function. The 
authors evaluate the heuristic performanees on small randomly generated instances 
involving 5 purchaser segments and 4 products, and obtain profit ratios, i.e., ratios 
of (heuristic profit - worst profit) to (best profit - worst profit), within 10% of op-
timality. 
In another article, Dobson and Kalish (1993, [26]) consider the Buyer Welfare 
and Profit Problems, and extend their previous work. First, they show that the 
Buyer Welfare and the Plant Location Problems are equivalent. The authors also 
evaluate several heuristics for this problem, including greedy (starts with an empty 
subset S of products and adds products one at a time in S), greedy interchange 
(greedy, followed by pairwise product interchanges until no improvement is possi-
ble), reverse greedy (see ab ove , [25]) and reverse greedy interchange. 
These are tested on randomly generated problems involving from 20 to 800 
purchaser segments and from 10 to 80 products. AU heuristics perform weU, with 
average ratio of heuristic to Lagrangian upper bound within 10% of optimality, 
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and within 1% in most cases. Further, the greedy and the greedy interchange 
approaches perform better than the reverse greedy (interchange) method, as op-
timal solutions are found in almost aU problems evaluated and worst case ratios 
are always within 1% of optimality. Computationally, solutions are obtained very 
quickly. 
Next, the authors prove that the Profit Problem is NP-hard by a reduction of 
the vertex cover problem. They also evaluate two heuristics for this problem, one 
of them being the reverse greedy heuristic presented in [25J. The second greedy 
heuristic seeks to include in S, at each iteration, the product that leads to the 
largest improvement of the objective function objective. The order in which the 
products are considered is a decreasing order with respect to the purchaser utili-
ties. Further, each time an addition al product is introduced in S, corresponding 
priees are computed for aIl products so as to maximize the objective function. The 
procedure stops when no further improvement is possible. 
The authors evaluate the heuristics on the same instances as for the Buyer Wel-
fare Problem and conclude that the second greedy heuristic performs better, with 
ratio of heuristic to Lagrangian upper bound within 8% to 22% of optimality. The 
greedy heuristic is the fastest on the largest instances. 
Shioda et aL (2007, [61]) consider the Profit Problem in which aIl products are 
offered, that means Y 00, S I and Yi = 1 for aIl i in l, and without fixed 
costs (in the objective fUI}ction) for the introduction of a product into the market. 
The authors present a heuristic algorithm to solve this problem, similar to the one 
from Dobson et Kalish [25, 26J. They also derive a linear mixed integer model for 
the problem, as well as sorne valid inequalities. Further details are provided in 
Section 7.3. methods seem quite effective, even if the authors do not provide 
any quantitative conclusion concerning their preliminary results. 
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Hanson and Martin (1990, [35]) study the Profit Problem for a particular cat-
egory of products. lndeed, they consider a "global element" (for example a data-
proeessing software) composed of several components. The products are the various 
subsets of components of the global element, i.e., 2n - 1 products for a set of n 
components. As this problem involves a very specifie structure due to the set of 
components, it is called the Bundle Pricing Problem. 
The notations used are similar to those of Dobson and Kalish (1988, [25]). 
However, the authors do not consider fixed costs (in the objective function) cor-
responding to the introduction of a product in the market. Further, they assume 
that the product priees are subject to 'sub-additivity constraints'. It means that, 
if product i E l is the union of several other products, then the priee of i should 
be lower than the sum of the priees of these other products: 
7r < '""' 7r ~-L.-t J 
jES 
Vi E I, VS ç l : i (7.12) 
Note that constraints are very similar to Triangle inequalities. The authors 
present a particular mixed integer formulation for the problem as well as numerical 
results. The problems tested, involving 5 to 10 purchaser segments and 4 compo-
nents (thus 15 products), have integrality gaps ranging from 2 to 4%, and are solved 
to optimality very quickly. However) due to the exponential number of component 
subsets, and thus of products, they note the restricted 
can be solved by an exact method. 
of the instances that 
For a larger number of components, the authors propose a formulation based 
on a limited number of subsets. lndeed, they consider that, when the number 
of components of the global element is large, there often exists a most important 
component, called "key component", which appears in aIl subsets offered in the mar-
ket, and to which less important components could be incorporated. The authors 
present a more complex mixed integer formulation for this particular structure. 
Using an exact resolution method, instances involving up to 4 purchaser segments 
and 20 components in addition to the key component can be solved to optimality 
very quiekly and in one iteration of the proposed bundle algorithm, whieh is prob-
ably due to the large number of possible bundles compared to the small number of 
purchaser segments. 
Guruswani et al. (2005, [33]) study a Bundle Pricing Problem in whieh aH 
products are offered in the market, but without sub-additivity constraints. The 
authors prove that this problem is APX-hard by a reduction from the vertex cover 
problem. They also propose a logarithmic approximation algorithm for this prob-
lem. Further, the authors study several specific cases of the problem, providing 
logarithmic approximation or polynomial-time algorithms together with sorne fur-
ther algorithmic considerations. Unfortunately, they do not provide any numerical 
results. 
Nichols and Venkataramanan (2005, [55]) propose a Conjoint Buyer Welfare 
and Profit Problem, with a formulation to the one suggested by Dobson 
and Kalish [25, 26]. The difference in the fact that the authors consider a 
weighted objective function including both seller profit and purehaser utility. 
Three heuristic methods are proposed, the first one being a pure genetic algo-
rithm included for comparison. other proposed heuristics are genetic relax-
ations. One of them uses a genetic procedure to generate product priees; then, a 
braneh and bound algorithm is applied to the remaining problem, whieh eonsists 
of setting flows so as to the sum of the purehasers utilities. The last 
heuristic starts with a random generation of the products which should be intro-
dueed in the market; then, one determines the flows x~ : k E K, i E l in order to 
maximize purehasers utilities. Finally, the remaining inverse optimization problem, 
that consists in setting produet priees in order to maximize the seller's income, is 
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solved by a shortest path algorithm. 
The three heuristics are compared on problems involving 20 to 1000 purchaser 
segments and 10 to 100 products. The results show that the relaxation methods 
perform better, on large instances, than a pure genetic algorithm. Consequently, 
they encourage the development of genetic resolution approaches in which large 
subsets of the original exact problem would be preserved. The authors do not give 
any further details concerning the performance ratios or the cpu times of their al-
gorithms. 
We conclude this section with three graphs summarizing the main contributions 
to the Buyer Welfare, Seller Welfare and Share-of-Choices Problems in literature. 
These are presented in Figures 7.1 to 7.3. 
Buv, :r" Wf'lfSlrf' 
p ohlem 
1 
Formulation with ISI Formulation with ISI 
exogenous endogenous 
1 
Solution Solution Other 
approaches approaches 
1 ~ 1 Inexact Exact Exact Inexact 
Equivalent to Plant 
Location Problem 
(Dobson 93), thus 
Dynamic programming Dynarnic programrning NP-hard 
heuristic (Kohli 90) heuristic (Kohli 90) 
Greedy (interchange) Lagrangian relaxation Greedy heuristic Bearn search based 
heuristic (Green 85) (Green 85) (Dobson 93) heuristic (Nair 95) 
Figure 7.1: Main contributions to the Buyer Welfare Problem 
Seller's Welfare 
Problem n Similar to: 
Bundle Pricin2 
(Hanson 90, 
1 
Formulation with fixed Formulation without Guruswani 05) 
cost for a product fixed cost for a product Conjoint Buyer's 
introduction in the market introduction in the market and Profit Problem 
1 
(Nichols 05) 
Profit Problem: models Solution 
including price variables approaches 
(Dobson 88, Dobson 93) 1 
1 
1 Exact Inexact 
Other Solution 
. approaches 
1 1 1 
,- Using X-system Bearn search based Genetic heuristic 
NP-hard Inexact Exact (McBryde 88) heuristic (Nair 95) (Alexouda 01) (Dobson 93) 
,---------J 
Greedy heuristic Dynamic programming (Reverse) greedy Valid Inequalities 
heuristic (Dobson 88, (Shioda 07) (Green 85) heuristic (Kohli 90) 
Dobson 93, Shioda 07) 
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In the next section, we point out the relationships between the family of design 
and pricing problems and the Network Pricing Problem. 
7.2 Relationships between both families of problems 
This section aims to point out the links between the standard design and pricing 
problems presented in Section 1 and the Network Pricing Problem. 
7.2.1 Seller Welfare, Profit Problems and GCT-NPP 
Wh en looking at their definitions, the Buyer Welfare, Seller Welfare and Share-
of-Choices problems seek to design a set of products to introduce in a given eco-
nomic market, without any specifie reference to pricing. However, we point out 
several similarities between the Seller Welfare Problem and the General Complete 
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Toll NPP. First, one can observe that both problems seek to maximize a seller 
(resp. leader) profit. Second, while a purchaser buys the product which has the 
largest utility for him in the Seller Welfare Problem, a network user travels on the 
cheapest path from his origin to his destination in the General Complete Toll NPP. 
The Profit Problem, which also includes priee variables that have to be deter-
mined in order to maximize the seller profit, is akin to the General Complete Toll 
NPP. Consider a modified problem in which all products are offered in the mar-
ket, that mean Y = 00, S = I and Yi = 1 for an i in I, and called Modified 
Profit Problem. The Modified Profit Problem and the General Complete Toll 
NPP are equivalent. Indeed, let us match purchaser segments with commodities 
and products with toll arcs. The product priees 'Tri : i E I correspond to the tolls 
ta : a E A, while the reservation priee rf of purchaser k for obtaining product i 
becomes (C~d - c~), i.e., the spaee let for tolls on a commodity k travelling on the 
toll arc a (instead of the toll free arc). These correspondanee are summarized in 
Table 7.1. 
Modified Profit Problem General Complete ToU NPP 
Purchaser segments k E K Commodities k E K 
Products i E I Toll arcs a E A 
Reservation priees rf : k E K, i E I Gains C~d - c~ : k E K, a E A 
Priees 'Tri : i E I Tolls ta : a E A 
Flows xf : k E K, i E I Flows x~ : k E K, a E A 
Table 7.1: Links between notations for the Modified Profit Problem and the General 
Complete Toll NPP 
Hence, while a purchaser segment buys the product that maximizes its utility 
rf -'Tri, a commodity travels on the toll arc that maximizes the difference C~d-c~-ta, 
i.e., that minimize its travel cost c~ + ta. However, there is a small differenee be-
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tween the parameter structures rf : k E K, i E l and C~d - c~ : k E K, a E A. 
lndeed, in the General Complete ToU NPP, the cost C~d on the toll free arc for a 
commodity k E K is given and one looks at the difference between this cost and the 
fixed costs ~ : a E A of toll arcs. In the Modified Profit Problem, the reservation 
prices rf : i E l of a given segment k E K for obtaining various products i E l are 
not linked together, so that the main part of the network structure is absent. 
Similar to the Constrained Highway Pricing Problem, the incorporation of 
angle and Monotonicity constraints to the Modified Profit Problem would make 
sense. lndeed, products might be available in various formats, with different 
priees associated with different formats. If quantity X satisfies the relationship 
X y + Z, the triangle inequality 7r x :S 7ry + 7r Z prevents obvious market incon-
sistencies. Furthermore, if X :S Y, one expects that 7r x :S Ky, i.e., the Monotonicity 
inequality holds. 
The above reasoning can be generalized in the following way. Assume that the 
purchase of a product X is equivalent to the purchase of the sum of products Y and 
Z. In this setting, one would expect the inequality 7rx :S 7ry + 7rz to hold. In the 
same way, suppose that the purchase of a product Y is equivalent to the purchase 
of a product X plus something else. Then the inequality: 7rx < 7ry should be valid 
for the same reasons. 
7.2.2 Bundle Pricing and Network Pricing Problem 
The Bundle Prieing Problem intends to design and to price a set of products, 
each product representing a subset of components of a "global element". In the 
Network Pricing Problem, each path is composed of several components which are 
the toll arcs of the network. Renee there exists a link between the two problems, 
but such relationship is less obvious than with the General Complete Toll NPP. 
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7.3 Comparison between a Modified Profit Problem and the GCT-NPP 
To conclude this chapter, we compare the results obtained for the General Com-
plete Toll NPP to these obtained by Shioda et aL (2007, [61]) for the Modified 
Profit Problem. 
We first present the linear mixed integer model of Shioda et aL, together with 
their best valid inequalities. Next, the model and valid inequalities are tested on the 
randomly generated instances described in Section 6.1. The results are compared 
to those obtained for the GCT-NPP. Finally, both models and valid inequalities 
(for the Modified Profit Problem and the GCT-NPP respectively) are tested on 
randomly generated instances proposed by Shioda et al. in [61]. 
Shioda et al. (2007, [61]) consider a linear mixed integer model for the Modified 
Profit Problem, Le., 
(LMPP) max I: 7lkp~ 
kelC,ieI 
subject to: 
I:x~:::; 1 \:fk E ;C (7.13) 
ieI 
I: (rjx; - p;) ~ r~ L x; - Ki \:fk E ;C, \:fi E l (7.14) 
jEI:j#i jeIjfi 
\:fk E ;C, \:fi E l (7.15) 
\:fk E ;C, \:fi E l (7.16) 
\:fk E ;C, \:fi E l (7.17) 
\:fi E l (7.18) 
x~ E {0,1} \:fk E ;C, i E l (7.19) 
where Ni maxk{ rf}, and p~ represents the actual priee of product i for purchaser 
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segment k. 
Excluding constraints (7.14), this model (LMPP) is identical to model (HP3*) 
for the General Complete Toll NPP. Now let us compare constraints (7.14) of 
(LMPP) to the Shortest Path constraints (3.22) of (HP3*). Adding a term 1'fxf -pf 
to both sides of inequalities (7.14) yields: 
Vk E K,Vi E (7.20) 
Then, constraints (7.13) and (7.18) imply that: 
1'k " xk _ pk < 1'~ 
t ~ J t - P 
JEI 
which means that the Shortest Path constraints (3.22) of (HP3*) are stronger than 
constraints (7.14) of (LMPP). Indeed, note that if a purchaser segment k E K does 
not buy any product, constraints (7.14) are redundant for this segment k, which 
constraints (3.22) impose C~d ~ c~ + ta for aIl to11 arcs a E A. 
Shioda et al. [61] also propose the following valid inequalities for model (LMPP): 
Vk1 E K, Vi ET (7.21) 
Vk11 k2 E K, Vi E l : 
7'~2 ~ 7'~1 Vi E T, 7'~1 - 7'~~2 > 1'Jl 1';2 Vj ET \ {i}. (7.23) 
Inequalities (7.21) and (7.22) provide lower and upper bounds for the actual 
product priee variables pr : k E K, i E T, which depend on the reservation priees 
7'7 : k E K, i E Inequalities (7.23) link the flow variables xf : k E K, i E l for 
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different purchaser segments. We refer the reader to Shioda et al. (2007, [61]) for 
further details. 
One can easily check that these inequalities are still valid for the General Com-
plete Toll NPP. In order to compare the efficiency of model (HP3*) with the valid 
inequalities proposed in Chapter 4 to model (LMPP) and inequalities (7.21), (7.22) 
and (7.23), we test the latter on the randomly generated instances described in Sec-
tion 6.1. Inequalities (7.21) and (7.22) are appended to the initial model (LMPP). 
Inequalities (7.23) are generated at the root of the branch and cut algorithm and 
added to the model when violated. The results obtained are presented in Table 7.2. 
Inst. Gap(%) Time (sec) Nodes 
MIN MAX {L a MIN MAX {L a MIN MAX {L a 
5 v - 10 n 8.65 17.70 14.66 3.2 0 24 7 9 19 5473 1273 1989 
5 v - 15 n 7.55 28.29 16.32 6.6 1 261 58 92 93 32563 6853 11580 
*4*8v-10n 6.97 32.70 22.81 8.7 6 18001 12006 8479 491 1910347 959689 718395 
*5*8 v - 15 n 16.79 37.84 24.94 8 8793 18003 16467 3432 100000 486314 362496 90458 
*6*10 v - 10 n 19.38 31.64 26.15 4 18000 18004 18003 1 100000 634355 427870 134430 
*6*10v-15n 19.78 33.35 27.26 4.7 18000 18010 18007 3 62720 221028 144249 57155 
Table 7.2: Model (LMPP) with (7.21), (7.22) and (7.23) inequalities 
Comparing Tables 7.2 and 6.2 (which reports the results for the initial model 
(HP3*)), we observe that formulation (LMPP) provides much worse results than 
formulation (HP3*). Hence constraints (7.14) of (LMPP) are weaker, both theo-
retically and numerically, than constraints (3.22) of (HP3*). 
In order to point out the efficiency of the valid inequalities (7.21), (7.22) and 
(7.23), we test these under model (HP3*). The results are presented in Table 7.3. 
Now comparing Tables 7.3 and 6.2, we conclude that the valid inequalities pro-
posed by Shioda et al. allow a decrease of the gaps, cpu times and number of nodes 
in the branch and cut algorithm. The gaps decrease of 10 to 29%, while the cpu 
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Inst. Gap(%) Time (sec) Nades 
MIN MAX jJ CJ MIN MAX jJ CJ MIN MAX jJ CJ 
5 v - 10 n 0.28 11.68 5.83 3.9 0 5 2 2 1 89 34 38 
5 v - 15 n 2.86 15.54 8.38 4.2 0 7 4 2 5 187 66 64 
8 v - 10 n 2.46 23.25 12.97 7.4 1 860 282 328 21 33811 10351 12787 
'1>8 v - 15 n 7.34 27.22 13.49 6.8 26 18006 4157 6601 297 400197 81832 145428 
10 v - 10 n 7.59 17.06. 11.73 3.9 24 735 201 250 119 19690 4791 7033 
,4, 10 v - 15 n 7.66 19.34 12.81 4.4 868 18029 12304 8083 8589 271246 145109 103612 
Table 7.3: Model (HP3*) with (7.21), (7.22) and (7.23) inequalities 
times and number of nodes decrease by 78% and 92% respectively for the largest 
instances solved to optimality, Le., 10v -IOn. However, the results obtained in the 
final tests for the GCT-NPP (i.e., gaps decrease of 78 to 89%, while cpu times and 
number of nodes decrease of 90% and 99% respectively for instances 10v - IOn) 
clearly outperform Shioda et al. 's results. 
In their numerical experiments, Shioda et al. (2007, [61]) address randomly 
generated instances in the following way. Consider from 40 to 80 purchaser seg-
ments and from 10 to 60 products. For each purchaser segment (resp. commodity) 
k E K, a demand 'Tlk is randomly generated between 500 and 799. For each product 
(resp. toll arc) a E A, reservation prices of this product for purchaser segments 
r! : k E K (resp. C~d - c!) are randomly generated between 512 and 1023. Hence, as 
the model (LMPP) and the valid inequalities (7.21), (7.22) and (7.23) were devel-
oped in a context of product pricing, they could be more effective on corresponding 
instances. 
Let us compare the best results obtained for models (HP3*) and (LMPP) re-
spectively on 3 instances of each size. The results are presented in Tables 7.4, 7.5 
and 7.6. Note that the letters 'k' and 'a' denote the number of commodities (pur-
chaser segments) and the number of toll arcs (products). 
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Inst. Gap(%) Time (sec) Nodes 
MIN MAX IL (J MIN MAX IL (J MIN MAX IL (J 
*~*40 k - 10 a 3.54 9.1 7.03 2.5 862 18003 12290 8081 19523 616169 375901 257045 
*3*40 k - 20 a 2.34 4.65 3.24 1 18000 18009 18008 1 100000 445166 395358 35547 
*h40 k - 40 a 0.51 0.89 0.65 0.2 363 18012 6805 7954 1673 120007 44444 53586 
40 k - 60 a 0.22 0.35 0.29 0.1 180 307 230 55 385 981 612 263 
*3*60 k - 10 a 5.58 11.31 9.27 2.6 18000 18014 18013 1 100000 247984 237077 9350 
*3*60 k - 20 a 4.84 7.56 6.11 1.1 18000 18060 18059 1 100000 168415 146458 16123 
*3*60 k - 40 a 0.95 2.48 1.49 0.7 18000 18036 18033 3 54571 83794 64837 13420 
*3*60 k - 60 a 0.71 0.87 0.8 0.1 18000 18065 18059 5 40866 46390 42898 2480 
*3*80k-10a 9.24 17.04 13.28 3.2 18000 18032 18031 1 100000 132840 124757 6194 
*3*80k-20a 11.25 13.62 12.45 1 18000 18179 18171 11 73376 83427 80074 4736 
*3* 80 k - 40 a 2.99 7.08 4.42 1.9 18000 18695 18577 85 41857 44767 42979 1278 
*3* 80 k - 60 a 0.9 1.18 1.02 0.1 18000 18121 18118 3 27638 30367 28582 1263 
Table 7.4: Model (LMPP) with (7.21), (7.22) and (7.23) inequalities, tested on 
Shioda et al. instances 
Inst. Gap(%) Time (sec) Nodes 
MIN MAX IL (J MIN MAX IL (J MIN MAX IL (J 
40 k - 10 a 1.68 5.77 4.23 1.8 18 61 44 18 228 2267 1380 853 
40 k - 20 a 1.07 2.86 1.72 0.8 57 437 187 177 466 5778 2279 2474 
40 k - 40 a 0.08 0.36 0.20 0.1 67 109 86 17 40 309 155 113 
40 k - 60 a 0.04 0.07 0.06 0 239 371 296 55 12 28 22 7 
60 k - 10 a 3.33 6.77 5.44 1.5 243 1155 772 387 3266 24159 14916 8698 
*2*60 k - 20 a 1.58 3.55 2.55 0.8 1307 18115 12510 7922 5070 117948 75761 50297 
60 k - 40 a 0.36 1.08 0.62 0.3 514 8065 3350 3357 1278 32587 12982 13949 
60 k - 60 a 0.22 0.39 0.31 0.1 1579 6574 4319 2068 833 7365 4659 2782 
80 k - 10 a 3.57 6.36 5.38 1.3 5628 17422 9955 5302 51638 221040 117504 74110 
*3*80k-20a 2.13 3.75 3.15 0.7 18000 18361 18332 21 51477 56982 54901 2440 
*2*80 k - 40 a 0.45 1.59 1.14 0.5 17107 19144 18433 938 27058 44366 35782 7067 
*h80 k - 60 a 0.21 0.28 0.25 0 9295 18326 13778 3687 4893 12067 8869 2980 
Table 7.5: Model (HP3*) with (7.21), (7.22) and (7.23) inequalities, tested on 
Shioda et al. instances 
As before, comparisons between Tables 7.4 and 7.5 show that formulation 
(LMPP) is much weaker than formulation (HP3*). lndeed, the largest instances 
solved to optimality with model (LMPP) involve 40 commodities and 60 toU arcs, 
while model (HP3*) is able to solve instances up to 80 commodities and 10 toU 
arcs. Further, the gaps in Table 7.5, i.e., for model (HP3*), are from 40 to 79% 
lower than the ones for model (LMPP). 
153 
Inst. Gap(%) Time (sec) Nodes 
MIN MAX f-L (J MIN MAX f-L (J MIN MAX f-L (J 
40 k - 10 a 0.34 1.79 1.28 0.7 14 233 130 90 42 2809 1791 1242 
40 k - 20 a 0.37 1.07 0.66 0.3 88 220 136 60 387 3801 1534 1603 
40 k - 40 a 0.05 0.22 0.11 0.1 100 173 129 32 19 356 137 155 
40 k - 60 a 0.02 0.04 0.03 0 169 228 189 
, 
28 7 14 9 3 
60 k - 10 a 0.97 2.45 1. 78 0.6 222 4821 2283 1908 925 25354 13475 9984 
*h60 k - 20 a 0.46 1.35 0.88 0.4 1422 18057 9553 6796 4145 60553 31684 23048 
*h60 k - 40 a 0.11 0.53 0.28 0.2 346 18333 6568 8325 49 34762 13814 15054 
60 k - 60 a 0.09 0.17 0.14 0 820 5515 2585 2087 189 17405 6346 7836 
80 k - 10 a 1.01 1.76 1.5 0.3 1105 16213· 6520 6870 3706 75237 29498 32430 
*3*80 k - 20 a 0.72 1.51 1.18 0.3 18000 18152 18145 6 13541 22660 19029 3948 
*2*80 k - 40 a 0.17 0.64 0.41 0.2 1461 18752 12925 8106 1928 20585 12180 7728 
80 k - 60 a 0.08 0.11 0.09 0 2175 3057 2614 360 323 1153 732 339 
Table 7.6: Model (HP3*) with (4.1)-(4.2), (4.7)-(4.8) and (4.9)-(4.10) inequalities, 
tested on Shioda et al. instances 
Further, when replacing constraints (7.14) of (LMPP) by the Shortest Path 
constraints (3.22), we obtain a comparison of model (HP3*) with either (7.21), 
(7.22), (7.23) or (4.1)-(4.2), (4.7)-(4.8), (4.9)-(4.10) inequalities. The results are 
presented in Tables 7.5 and 7.6. The latter show that the valid inequalities pre-
sented in Chapter 4 outperform the valid inequalities proposed by Shioda et al. 
[61] in terms of the gaps (which decrease of 45 to 72%), and, for specifie instances, 
in terms of computing times or number of nodes (up to 80% and 60% respectively 
for the largest instances solved to optimality, i.e., 80k - 10a). 
Finally, we test formulation (HP3*) with (7.21), (7.22), (7.23) and (4.1)-(4.2), 
(4.7)-(4.8), (4.9)-(4.10) inequalities. The results are presented in Table 7.7. 
Comparing Tables 7.6 and 7.7, we conclude that adding (7.21), (7.22) and (7.23) 
inequalities to our best formulation (i.e., model (HP3*) with (4.1)-(4.2), (4.7)-(4.8), 
(4.9)-(4.10) inequalities) helps to decrease the gaps and the number ofnodes in the 
branch and eut algorithm. The gaps decrease from 18 to 45%, while the number 
of nodes decrease by 87% for instances 80k - 10a. However, cpu times increase, 
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Inst. Gap(%) Time (sec) Nodes 
MIN MAX J-L (J' MIN MAX J-L (J' MIN MAX J-L (J' 
40 k - 10 a 0.08 l.39 0.79 0.5 31 170 111 58 15 710 341 285 
40 k - 20 a 0.21 0.79 0.45 0.2 180 448 338 114 31 801 386 317 
40 k - 40 a 0.02 0.1 0.06 0 112 356 216 103 5 139 71 55 
40 k - 60 a 0.01 0.02 0.02 0 563 866 677 135 7 16 12 4 
60 k - 10 a 0.6 l.36 l.l 0.4 304 2081 1054 752 225 4207 2164 1627 
*1*60 k - 20 a 0.29 l.26 0.74 0.4 1356 18371 8547 7192 472 7455 3411 2956 
*
10 60 k - 40 a 0.07 0.43 0.21 0.2 954 18516 9858 7172 136 5518 3450 2367 
*
10 60 k - 60 a 0.06 0.15 0.11 0 4529 20730 11759 6728 179 7752 3619 3130 
80 k - 10 a 0.61 l.27 0.97 0.3 1344 8059 4346 2787 949 6643 3302 2427 
*3*80 k - 20 a 0.55 l.32 0.95 0.3 18000 18537 18507 25 3966 6305 4960 987 
*3*80 k - 40 a 0.13 0.6 0.35 0.2 11890 20328 17487 3957 2096 2925 2517 339 
*10 80 k - 60 a 0.04 0.06 0.06 0 6467 15359 11633 3770 483 726 588 102 
Table 7.7: Model (HP3*) with (4.1)-(4.2), (4.7)-(4.8), (4.9)-(4.10), (7.21), (7.22) 
and (7.23) inequalities, tested on Shioda et al. instances 
probably due to the time required by the separation procedure. The latter should 
be improved in future research. 
7.4 Conclusion 
In this chapter, we highlighted the links between standard design and pricing 
problems in economics and the Network Pricing Problem. While both families of 
problems have been extensively studied in literature, it seems that no relationships 
have been noticed so far. However, it is clear that these families of problems are very 
similar and should be interconnected in the future. Especially, the real efficiency 
of valid inequalities has been shown numerically for a pricing problem. Hence, it 
would be interesting to go further in the polyhedral study within the framework of 
a design and pricing problem. 
CHAPTER 8 
CONCLUSION 
In this thesis, we have studied a Network Pricing Problem whose features repre-
sent these of a real highway topology. As tollieveis are usually computed using the 
highway entry and exit nodes, a complete toll subgraph is considered, where each 
toll arc corresponds to atoll subpath. Two variants of this problem are studied, 
with or without Triangle and Monotonicity constraints linking together the tolls 
on the arcs. 
First described by a bilevel formulation, the problem can be modelled as a 
linear mixed integer program with a single level. It is proved to be NP-hard 
by a reduction from 3 - SAT. Next, we have proposed several families of valid 
inequalities for this problem. The latter inyolve pairs of commodities at a time, 
and strenghten important constraints of the initial model. 
Then, focusing on instances involving one or two commodities, we have proved 
that most of the valid inequalities, as well as several constraints of the initial model, 
define facets of the convex hull of feasible solutions for these restricted problems. 
In the single commodity case, a complete description of the convex hull of feasible 
solutions for one variant of the problem is also provided. 
Next, the efficiency of the proposed valid inequalities is highlighted by numerical 
results. With regards to the first variant of the problem, which includes Triangle 
and Monotonicity constraints, several of the valid inequalities are efficient, and 
yield to a significant decrease of the gap and number of nodes in the branch and cut 
algorithm. Unfortunately, the cpu times increase, probably because the Triangle 
and Monotonicity constraints interfere negatively with the valid inequalities, which 
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obstructs the program to reach quickly optimality. 
\Ve have also performed numerical tests for the second variant of the problem, 
which does not include Triangle and Monotonicity constraints. Most of the valid 
inequalities lead to a significant decrease of the gap and number of nodes. Further, 
they also allow a of the cpu time. 
Finally, we have pointed out the links between the Network Pricing Problem 
studied in the thesis and a more standard design and pricing family of problems in 
economics. A description of these problems, together with an overview of results, 
is first provided. Then we have highlighted the strong relationships between both 
families of problems. We have also compared the model and the valid inequalities 
proposed in the thesis to the on es from a very similar work in economics. It shows 
that our results clearly outperform the se obtained for an identical pricing problem. 
To conclude, the polyhedral structure of the specific problems studied in the 
thesis is probably simpler than the one for the classical Network Pricing Problem. 
In view of the efficiency of the proposed valid inequalities, it would be interesting to 
study the validity of these inequalities in the context of a classical Network Pricing 
Problem. With a path formulation, the inequalities would obviously stay valid for 
the Network Pricing Problem. However, in consequence of the exponential number 
of paths in such a formulation, one should find an efficient separation algorithm to 
implement the inequalities. A transformation of the inequalities to an arc formula-
tion, as weIl as a detailed polyhedral study of this formulation, also provide good 
ideas for future research. 
Next, in view of the strong relationships between the problems studied in the 
thesis and several pricing problems in economics, it would interesting to go fur-
ther in the polyhedral study within the framework of a design and pricing problem. 
Especially, the real efficiency of the valid inequalities has been shown numerically 
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for a pricing problem. Renee a deeper analysis should be performed, and could, for 
instance, exploit the compatibility notion described in Chapter 4. 
In a larger context, this study provides sorne major conclusions. even if 
heuristics have been extensively developed during these last years, our results show 
that exact methods still hold promises. Adding valid inequalities (even perhaps 
alrnost valid inequalities) to complex network pricing models cou Id be useful, and 
one should think about their integration in a large real system. AIso, the links with 
another classical pricing problem in economics, mostly solved by inexact methods, 
give possible for future research. 
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Appendix 1 
Proofs of complexity for the Basic NPP 
Here we consider the Basic NPP, which deals with a network where aIl toll arcs are 
connected, i.e. neither complete toU subgraph nor Triangle or Mono inequalities. 
Proposition 28 The single directianal Basic NPP is strongly NP-hard. 
Proof 
Any conjunctive normal form F = I\~l (lil V li2 V li3), where lij for j = 1,2,3 rep-
resents a variable Xi : i E {1, ... , n} or its negation, can be polynomial1y converted 
to an instance of the Basic NPP. 
For each variable Xi : i E {1, ... , n}, a su bnetwork is constructed as shown in Figure 
1.1. 
3 
Figure 1.1: Subnetwork for variable Xi' 
Each of these subnetworks contains three commodities (aij , dij ) : j E {1, 2, 3} with 
unit demand, and two toll arcs ai and ai of zero fixed cost, corresponding to the 
truth and false assignment for variable Xi respectively. Toll free arcs of cost zero 
connect ail (resp. a i3 ) to the tail node of arc ai (resp. ad, the head node of arc 
XVlll 
ai (resp. ai) to dil (resp. di3 ), Oi2 to both tail nodes of toll arcs, and both head 
nodes of toll arcs to di2 . Toll free arcs (Oil, dil ) of cost 3, (oi3, di3 ) of cost 3 and 
(Oi2, di2 ) of cost 2 are also added. Thus an upper bound on the revenue for each 
subnetwork is 7, obtained by setting one toll to 2 and the other one to 3. In all 
other cases, the revenue cannot exceed 6. Note that the toll free arcs that do not 
appear from sorne origins to tail nodes of toll arcs (resp. from head nodes of toll 
arcs to sorne destinations) are supposed to be so expensive that they can never 
be used. Then the subnetworks are linked together so that the single direction al . 
highway corresponds to the set of all subnetworks. 
Further, for each clause k, a clause-commodity (ok, dk ) with unit demand is con-
structed. If variable Xi (resp. Xi) is a literaI of clause k, toll free arcs of cost 0 are 
added from ok to the tail node of ai (resp. ai) and from the head node of ai (resp. 
ai) to dk . An additional toll free arc (ok, dk ) of cost 2 is added, which defines an 
upper bound of 2 on the revenue from each clause-commodity. This construction 
is depicted in Figure I.2. 
XIX 
Figure 1.2: Subnetwork for = ( ... V Xi V Xj) 1\ (Xj V Xz V ... ) 1\ ... (single-directionaI 
Basic NPP). 
Let show that a satisfying truth assignrnent for F exists if and onIy if the revenue 
for the Basic NPP is equal to 2m + 7n. 
Suppose there exists a satisfying truth assignrnent, which rneans that at least one 
literaI is true in each clause. Set the toll on the corresponding arc to 2, and the 
ton on the cornplernentary arc (with respect to the corresponding subnetwork) to 
3. Thus the total revenue for all clause-cornrnodities is 2m. For aIl rernaining sub-
neworks, if any (i.e. this situation only happens if a variable Xi do es not appear 
in any clause), the toll arcs are set arbitrarily to 2 and 3 for a variable and its 
negation, respectively. Thus the revenue for an subnetworks is 7n, which rneans 
that the total revenue is 2m + 7n. 
Conversely, suppose there exists tolls such that the total revenue is 2m + 7n. The 
xx 
maximal possible revenue for aIl subneworks is 7n, only achievable by setting one 
toU per subnetwork to 2 and the other one to 3. On the other hand, the max-
imal possible revenue for aIl clause-commodities is 2m. Set to true aIl literaIs 
corresponding to toIl arcs of cost 2, and false to the other. This corresponds to a 
weIl-defined assignment for F, sinee there is exactly one toIl of 2 in each subnet-
work. Moreover, each clause-commodity contributes to the total revenue with a 
toU of 2, which means that at least one literaI per clause is true, and there exists 
a truth assignment for F. o 
Proposition 29 The bi-directional Basic NPP is strongly NP-hard. 
Proof 
Here subnetworks for variables Xi : i E {l, ... , n} are constructed ln a slightly 
different way, as shown in Figure I.3. 
3 2 
3 
Figure 1.3: Subnetwork for variable Xi. 
ToIl arcs ai : i E {l, ... , n} are in one direction of the highway, while toIl arcs 
ai : i E {l, ... , n} are in the other direction. Such a network is depicted in Figure 
I.4. 
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Figure 1.4: Subnetwork for F = ( ... V Xi V Xj) A (Xj V Xz V ... ) A ... (bi-directional 
Basic NPP). 
Then the same proof as before can be applied. o 
Proposition 30 The Basic NPP where access to all entry points (resp. from all 
exit points) is feasible from all origins (resp. to all destinations) is strongly NP-
hard. 
Proof 
This addition al condition means that there is no so expensive path that it could 
never be taken, which is a little different from the situation described before. 
XXll 
Subnetworks are constructed as before, except that some additional toll free arcs 
(those that were too expensive) are added so that there is one toU free arc from 
any origin to any tail Ilode of a toll arc, and from any head node of a toU arc to 
any destination. For each commodity k and for each toU arc ai, the cost on those 
arcs (Ok, t(ai)) and (h(ai), dk ) are set in a way such that the sum of the fixed cost 
of these two arcs is equal to the cost of the toll free arc (Ok, dk ). Such a subnetwork 
is depicted in Figure 1.5. 
3 
Figure 1.5: Subnetwork for variable Xi (All feasible access Basic NPP) 
Then, as costs of additional paths (the ones that were too expensive) are equal to 
costs on toll free arcs from origins to destinations of commodities, one can only 
choose them if tolls are set to zero on corresponding arcs. But this do es not lead 
to a maximal revenue for the leader, thus those new arcs are not used and toUs on 
arcs are set as before. Then the same proof as before is applied. o 
